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THE INCONVENIENT MILITIA CLAUSE OF
THE SECOND AMENDMENT: WHY THE
SUPREME COURT DECLINES TO RESOLVE
THE DEBATE OVER THE RIGHT TO BEAR
ARMS
ROBERT HARDAWAY1
ELIZABETH GORMLEY
BRYAN TAYLOR

"The Gun Lobby's interpretation of the Second Amendment
is one of the greatest pieces of fraud, I repeat the word fraud,

on the American People by special interest groups that I
have ever seen in my lifetime."
Former Chief Justice of the United States Supreme Court
Warren Burger
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INTRODUCTION
There are sound public policy reasons why gun ownership by

law abiding citizens in a free society should be protected. Good
public policy, however, cannot be formulated as long as there
remain fundamental misconceptions about the meaning and
history of the Second Amendment of the U.S. Constitution and
the law interpreting it. In August of 1994, an exasperated
1 Robert Hardaway is Professor of Law at the University of Denver College of Law.
Elizabeth Gormley and Bryan Taylor both graduated from the University of Denver
College of Law in 2001.
2 Warren E. Burger, The Right to BearArms, PARADE (Jan. 14, 1990). But see Todd
Barnet, Gun "Control"Law Violates the Second Amendment and May Lead to Higher
Crime Rates, 63 MO. L. REV. 155, 165 (1998) (arguing right to bear arms should be
fundamental right); Brent J. McIntosh, The Revolutionary Second Amendmen4 51 ALA.
L. REV. 673, 713 (2000) (concluding denial of right to bear arms takes away American
people's absolute check on government).
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American Bar Association, finding itself unable to match the Gun
Lobby's publicity campaigns, pleaded for help from the legal
profession to educate the American public about the meaning of
the Second Amendment and the intent of the Constitutional
Framers. Specifically, the ABA sought help in clarifying the fact
that the United States Supreme Court and lower federal courts
have consistently, uniformly held that the Second Amendment to
the United States Constitution is related to a "well regulated
militia and that there are no federal constitutional decisions
which preclude the regulation of firearms in private hands ...

3

Even the American Civil Liberties Union, not an organization
known to suffer perceived constitutional violations lightly, has
tried valiantly, though largely in vain, to educate the American
public that the Second Amendment is a collective rather than an
individual right.4
The exasperation of the American Bar Association is
understandable, and this article is a humble response to its plea.
"It seems that no bad idea can ever die," observes Gary Wills in
his recent book A NECESSARY EVIL.5 He cites the irrational fear
of extreme right wing groups that the fluoridation of water
represented a sinister communist conspiracy to poison Americans
gradually seeped through "our political culture from truck stops
to the Ivy League." 6 Similarly, he notes that academic support
has even seeped through in support of the Gun Lobby's view of
the Second Amendment. They defend an individual right to bear
arms, Wills writes, and "argue for insurrection as a right
guaranteed within the United States Constitution" guaranteed
3 Brannon P. Denning, Can the Simple Cite Be Trusted?" Lower Court
Interpretationsof United States v. Miller and the Second Amendment, 26 CUMB. L. REV.
961, 963 (1995); see U.S. v. Emerson, 46 F. Supp. 2d 598, 610-11 (N.D. Tex. 1999) (noting
that individual right to keep and bear arms may be subjected to "limited, narrowly
tailored specific exceptions or restrictions for particular cases that are reasonable and not
inconsistent with the right of Americans generally to individually keep and bear their
private arms as historically understood in this country."), revd, 270 F.3d 203 (5th Cir.
2001).
4 See infra note 9; see also John D. Ingrain and Alison A. Ray, The Right (?) To Keep
and BearArms, 27 N.M. L. REV. 491, 504 (1997) (examining how to determine whether
state constitution guarantees individual or collective right); Elizabeth M. Welch, Arnold v.
City of Cleveland: An Analysis of the ConstitutionalityofAssault Weapon Bans in Ohio,
55 Oio ST. L.J. 953, 960-62 (1994) (explaining Ohio's interpretation of Second
Amendment as collective right).
5 GARY WIuLS, A NECESSARY EVIL (Simon and Schuster 2000).
6 Taylor Branch, Roll over, Madison, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 24, 2000, at 82 (reviewing G.
WILLs, A NECESSARY EvIL (Simon and Schuster 2000)).
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specifically, in the Second Amendment. He further quotes a Yale
Professor who claims that "fresh from their own revolutionary
experience, the last thing the Framers would have done is to
deny the People the means of armed insurrection" 7 against their
own government.
Two hundred years of intense judicial scrutiny and case law
holding that there is no individual right to bear arms leaves the
8 and yet again in
Gun Lobby undeterred. In US. v. iller,
the
1980 case of US. v. Lewis,9 the United States Supreme Court
stated in no uncertain terms that "the second amendment
guarantees no right to keep and bear a firearm that does not
have some reasonable relationship to the preservation or
1 0 With a single
efEciency of a well-regulated militia."
exception
containing non-bonding dicta,11 every Circuit Court in the past
two hundred years has adhered to this now well-settled legal
principle, which the Supreme Court reaffirmed yet again in the
Lewis case and rejected the "individual rights" theory posited by
the Gun Lobby.12
7 WILLS, supranote 5, at 208 (quoting AKHIL REED AMAR AND ALAN HIRSCH, FOR THE
PEOPLE: WHAT THE CONSTITUTION REALLY SAYS ABOUT YOUR RIGHTS 175 (N.Y. Free
Press 1998)). But see Harold S. Herd, Re-Examination of the FirearmsRegulation Debate
and Its Consequences, 36 WASHBURN L.J. 196, 246 (1997) (concluding there is no
constitutional right to insurrection).
8 307 U.S. 174 (1939).
9 445 U.S. 55 (1980).
10 Lewis, 445 U.S. at 65 n.8 (quoting Miller to affirm proposition that Second
Amendment guarantees no right to bear arms) (emphasis added); Miller,307 U.S. at 178.
II See United States v. Emerson, 270 F.3d 203 (5th Cir. 2001) (finding that court supported concept
of individual right to bear arms, but nevertheless, affirmed lower court rule).
12 See, e.g., United States v. Chavez, 204 F.3d 1305 (11th Cir. 2000); U.S. v. Baker,
197 F.3d 211 (6th Cir. 1999); San Diego County Gun Rights Comm. v. Reno, 98 F.3d 1121
(9th Cir. 1996); Hickman v. Block, 81 F.3d 98 (9th Cir. 1996); U.S. v. Farrell, 69 F.3d 891
(8th Cir. 1995); Love v. Peppersack, 47 F.3d 120 (4th Cir. 1995); U.S. v. Hale, 978 F.2d
1016 (8th Cir. 1992); Quilici v. Morton Grove, 695 F.2d 261 (7th Cir. 1982); U.S. v. Oakes,
564 F.2d 384 (10th Cir. 1977); U.S. v. Wilbur, 545 F.2d 764 (1st Cir. 1976); U.S. v. Warin,
530 F.2d 103 (6th Cir. 1976); U.S. v. Johnson, 497 F.2d 548 (4th Cir. 1974); Cody v. U.S.,
460 F.2d 34 (8th Cir. 1972); Cases v. U.S., 131 F.2d 916 (1st Cir. 1942); U.S. v. Tot, 131
F.2d 261 (3rd Cir. 1942), revid, 319 U.S. 463 (1943).
But see David B. Kopel, The Supreme Court's Thirty- Five OtherGun Cases: What the
Supreme CourtHas Saidabout the SecondAmendment 18 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 99.
Second Amendment scholar David Kopel cites Runnebaum v. Nationsbankof Maryland,
NA., 123 F.3d 156 (4th Cir. 1997), to the contrary. This court stated therein that
"[nleither gathering in a group nor carrying a firearm are one of the major life activities
under the ADA... though individuals have the constitutional right to peaceably
assemble ... and to keep and bear arms, U.S. Const. Amend. II." 123 F.3d 156, 171 n.8
(4th Cir. 1997) (en banc, plurality op.). This is, of course, strictly dicta that does little to
contravene the long history of circuit court rulings against an individual right to bear
arms. Moreover, the mere recitation by a court of the words "right to bear arms" should
not necessarily be construed as endorsing the individual rights school.
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As the American Civil Liberties Union has noted, "if indeed the
Second Amendment provides an absolute, constitutional
protection for the right to bear arms in order to preserve the
power of the people to resist government tyranny, then it must
allow individuals to possess bazookas, torpedoes, SCUD missiles
and even nuclear warheads, for they, like handguns, rifles and
M-16s are arms. Moreover, it is hard to imagine any serious
resistance to the military without such arms."13 Nevertheless,
heated and passionate debate continues on the meaning of the
Second Amendment, often inflamed to a fever pitch by the Gun
Lobby in its advertising, circulars, and newsletters. 14
Despite its public rhetoric, however, the Gun Lobby has taken
a much different legal approach in the Courts. As U.S. News and
World Report recently reported, "the NRA doesn't even use
second amendment arguments to challenge the gun laws
Kopel's thesis is that the Supreme Court has always regarded the Second Amendment
as a guarantee of a broad, individual right to arms. This thesis is probably convincingly
refuted by the unanimous rulings of the circuit courts that there is no broad right to arm
and the failure of the Supreme Court to grant cert to correct this pervasive
misapprehension.
For further support, see the following federal district cases, with the exception of US.
v. Emerson, which are unanimous in upholding the collective interpretation. See, e.g.,
U.S. v. Spruill, 61 F. Supp. 2d 587 (W.D. Tex. 1999); U.S. v. Henson, 55 F. Supp. 2d 528
(S.D. W. Va. 1999); Gillespie v. City of Indianapolis, 13 F. Supp. 2d 811 (S.D. Ind. 1998);
Anderson v. U.S., 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7107 (N.D. Ill. 1998); U.S. v. Caron, 941 F. Supp.
238 (Dist. Ct. Mass. 1996); Barsch v. Brann, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6822 (N.D. Ca. 1996);
Luka v. Douglas, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21538 (N.D. Miss. 1995); White v. Town of
Chapel Hill, 899 F. Supp. 1428 (M.D. N.C. 1995); Pencak v. Concealed Weapon Licensing
Bd., 872 F. Supp. 410 (E.D. Mich. 1994); Moyer v. Sec'y of the Treasury, 830 F. Supp. 516
(W.D. Mo. 1993); Levy v. Abate, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9231 (S.D.N.Y. 1993); Behre v.
Thomas, 665 F. Supp. 89 (Dist. Ct. N.H. 1987); Thompson v. Dreta, 549 F. Supp. 297
(Dist. Ct. Utah 1982); Engblom v. Carey, 522 F. Supp. 57 (S.D.N.Y. 1981), revd in part
677 F.2d 957 (2d Cir. 1982); U.S. v. Three Winchester 30-30 Caliber Lever Action
Carbines, 363 F. Supp. 322 (E.D. Wis. 1973); Eckert v. Pennsylvania, 331 F. Supp. 1361
(E.D. Pa. 1971); Klinger v. Erickson, 328 F. Supp. 674 (Dist. Ct. S.D. 1971); Wainwright v.
U.S., 289 F. Supp. 820 (E.D. Tenn. 1968).
13 Chuck Klein, The Other R'ght to Bear Arns, Use the Ninth Amendment to Save
the Second, GUNS AND AMMO, Dec. 19, 1999, at 23. Interestingly, the author of the article
did not distance himself from this argument. Instead, his response to the ACLU is to
argue "[tirue or false, good or bad, founders intention or not, does not affect in any way
our individual right to use inahenable arms to protect our life, our liberty and all of our
other unlisted rights." Id.
14 See
Mariatta
Pennsylvannia
Militia,
http://www.mariettapa.com/marietta.militia.html (visited March 2, 2001) (stating
unorganized militia is protected under Second Amendment). The Marietta, Pennsylvania
Militia is typical of these hyperventilating organizations. This particular group asserts
that:
[alithough the unorganized militia can be called up for lawful (sic) (Constitutional)
purposes, it is not under the direct control of any state or political jurisdiction. It
represents the authority and power of the People over the government and stands as
the last defense of the citizens of the country against domestic tyranny. Id.
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anymore." 15 When the NRA appealed the Brady bill, it based its
argument on Tenth Amendment grounds, and never even
mentioned the Second Amendment; yet it continues to tout its
own self-interested interpretation of the Second Amendment as a
public relations strategy to raise funds. Nor did the NRA seek a
writ of certiorarito the Supreme Court after the recent Ninth
Circuit decision in San Diego County Gun Rights Committee v.
Reno upholding the California assault-weapons ban.16
As second amendment scholar Andrew Herz has observed,
By labeling every measure that in any way affects access to
firearms as the first step down a slippery slope leading to
confiscation of all weapons, the NRA attempts to keep its
members in a state of constant panic and paranoia over the
supposedly totalitarian machinations of an allegedly hostile
federal government.' 7
Herz also quotes the journalist Dan Moldea, to whom an NRA
spokesman has said "[ylou keep any special interest group alive
by nurturing the crisis atmosphere: keep sending those cards and
18
letters in. Keep sending money."
Judge Robert Bork, the conservative proponent of "originalism"
who was denied confirmation to the U.S. Supreme Court by the
Senate because of his strict constructionist views, has branded
the Gun Lobby's interpretation of the Second Amendment as an
intentional deception, and not "law as integrity."19
Although the Circuit Courts interpreting the U.S. Supreme
Court in Miller have uniformly held that the Second Amendment
right to bare arms is not an individual right,20 the Miller case
15 U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT, May 22, 1995, at 36.
16 See San Diego County Gun Rights Comm. v. Reno, 98 F.3d 1121, 1124 (9th Cir.
1996) (affirming dismissal of plaintiff gun owners' challenge to constitutionality of Crime
Control Act).
17 Andrew Herz, Gun Crazy: ConstitutionalFalse Consciousness and Dereliction of
DialogicResponsibility,75 B.U.L. REV. 57, 89 n.126 (1999).
18 Id.
19 See id. at 106; see also Ronald Dworkin, LAW'S EMPIRE 225-26 (1986).
20 See also Kopel, supra note 12, at 114-31 (citing dicta in six Rehnquist court
decisions (Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1 (1998); Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266 (1994);
Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 510 U.S. 1309 (1994); U.S. v. Verdugo-Uriquidez, 505 U.S.
1201 (1992); Printz v. U.S., 521 U.S. 898 (1997); Muscarello v. U.S., 524 U.S. 125 (1998))
to argue that modem courts uphold individual's right to keep and bear arms). These cases
are weak support for Kopel's view: none deal with interpreting the Second Amendment
and all make only oblique references to the right to bear arms. Kopel also quotes from the
dissent in Spencer, Muscarello,and Albrzighbt Id.
Of the thirty five cases discussed by Kopel, he acknowledges that Laird v. Tatum, 479
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itself is now over sixty years old.21 The Supreme Court has
declined certiorariin at least nine circuit court cases rejecting
the theory of an individual right to bear arms. 22 As long as each
circuit court is following Miller and Lewis, it may reasonably be
argued that there has been no need for the Court to accept
certioraribecause the law is clear and the circuit courts are
following it, and that it is highly improbable that the Supreme
Court would leave uncorrected nine circuit court interpretations
of such a high profile amendment of the Bill of Rights.
U.S. 911 (1986); Lewis v. U.S., 445 U.S. 55 (1980); Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143
(1972); Hamilton v. Regents, 293 U.S. 633 (1935); U.S. v. Schwimmer, 279 U.S. 644
(1929); Stearns v. Wood, 236 U.S. 75 (1915) do not indicate that the Second Amendment
embraces a private right of arms for individual purposes, rather than as a right of state
governments. Kopel, supranote 12, at 131-43.
In Justice Thomas' concurring opinion in Printz he writes that a federal law
regulating firearms may be unconstitutional "[ilf... the Second Amendment is read to
confer a personal right to keep and bear arms... As the parties did not raise this
argument, we need not consider it here." 521 U.S. 898, 945-46 (1996). Thomas indicates
that there is a "colorable argument" in favor of the right and that the Court will someday
resolve the issue. The most that can be gleaned from the opinion is that Thomas will
entertain the broad right argument. Thus, Kopel's assertion that "Thomas appears to
support [sic] individual right" is, therefore, premature. Kopel, supra note 12, at 111.
In Muscarelo, the case turned on the meaning of the term "carries a firearm" under
federal law. 524 U.S. 125, 126 (1998). Justice Ginsburg's dissenting opinion asserted that
the meaning of the phrase is what the Second Amendment would suggest: to "wear, bear,
or carry ...upon the person or in the clothing or in a pocket, for the purpose... of being
armed and ready for offensive or defensive action in a case of conflict with another
person." Id. at 139-50. Kopel extrapolates from this opinion that "a person carrying a gun
for personal protection could be said to be bearing arms. If individuals can bear arms,
then the right to bear arms must belong to individuals." Kopel, supra note 12, at 119.
Again, it appears that Kpel is overreaching. Even if the constitutional meaning of "bear"
is to carry, it does not follow that Justice Ginsburg intended to extend constitutional
protection to anyone capable of carrying a firearm. The collective view does not depend
solely on a restrictive definition of the word bear but on the modifying first phrase of the
Amendment. Thus, individuals have a right to bear arms but only for the purpose of
serving in a well-regulated militia. Given that militias must be "armed and ready for
offensive or defensive action in case of conflict with another person," Justice Ginsburg's
definition is perfectly compatible with the collective interpretation. It is therefore not
possible to discern Justice Ginsburg's interpretation of the Second Amendment from the
Muscarello opinion.
It seems that any judicial reference to the words "right to bear arms" is taken by Kopel
to support his position. But see Rohner, supra note 48, at 53-54 for the argument that
"bear arms" has a strictly military connotation.
21 One scholar notes that:
The main reason there is such a vacuum of useful Second Amendment
understanding... is the arrested jurisprudence of the subject as such, a condition
due substantially to the Supreme Court's own inertia - the same inertia that similarly
afflicted the First Amendment virtually until the their decade of this twentieth
century when Holmes and Brandeis finally were moved personally to take the First
Amendment seriously (as previously it scarcely ever was).
William Van Alystyne, The SecondAmendment and the PersonalRght to Arms, 43 DUKE
L.J. 1236, 1240 (Apr. 1994).
22 See, e.g., Herz, supra note 17, at 77 (citing cases discussed).
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Although it is the law student chant that denials of certiorari
are technically not to be interpreted as indicating the Supreme
Court's approval of a circuit court's decision, Peter Linzer, in his
massive study in the COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW on the meaning of
certioraridenials, reveals that a denial of certiorariindicates
that most of the Supreme Court justices were not , in fact,
dissatisfied with the circuit court's decision. 23 For example, if
even one circuit court (let alone nine or more) held that the
Fourteenth Amendment did not protect the civil rights of African
Americans, it is difficult to imagine that the Supreme Court
would not grant certiorariin order to make an obvious correction
on such a critical issue.
Nevertheless, if the purpose of law - and not least
constitutional law - is to provide a fair and just framework and
guide for human behavior, it must surely follow that any law or
construction of law which is not widely understood or which is
actively misunderstood, cannot adequately perform the very
function of law. In the face of an unrelenting stream of selfinterested interpretations from interest groups, it will simply not
do to refer the average man or woman on the street to the Miller
case itself, or to the mass of appellate decisions uniformly
rejecting the theory of an individual right to bear arms. Nor will
it do to rely solely on Peter Linzer's thesis that denials of
certiorari in cases involving high profile or substantial
constitutional issues indicate that the Supreme Court was not
dissatisfied with a circuit court's decision.
Every year, the Supreme Court dedicates a substantial portion
of its judicial energies to deciding what cases will be granted
certiorari. The criteria for accepting what cases to accept for full
review are 1) conflict between circuit courts; 2) conflict between
federal circuit and state courts; 3) federal circuit departure from
usual course of judicial proceedings; 4) conflict between highest
state courts on important federal question; 5) important federal
questions that have not been decided by the Supreme Court; 6)
decisions on important federal questions that conflict with
23 Peter Linzer, The Meaning of CertiorariDenials, 79 COLuM. L. REV. 1227, 1229
(1979) (noting that while not necessarily biggest factor in deciding whether to grant

certiorari, satisfaction with judgment is factor); see also Herz, supra note 17, at 78
(suggesting more behind denial of certiorari than lack of interest); The Uncertainty of
Cert., 105 HARV. L. REV. 1795, 1795 (May 1992) (noting decisions to grant certiorari are
"strategic calculations" for desired result).
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Supreme Court decisions.2 4 In light of these criteria, the
question arises as to why the Supreme Court has not granted
certiorari in cases in which the Second Amendment would
provide the controlling issue of law.25 While the fact that there is
no substantial disagreement in the circuits might be used as a
rationale for declining to grant certiorari, it is submitted that
such a rationale fails to consider fully what must surely be the
countervailing consideration of public perception - or
misperception - of the rights set forth in the Second Amendment.
It is the purpose of this article to explore the reasons for the
High Court's refusal to resolve one of the most contentious
constitutional debates of all time. At a time when the Court is
willing to dedicate considerable judicial energies to such
questions as giving a benediction at a high school football game 26
why is the issue of the right to bear arms considered so unworthy
of High Court attention?
It has been suggested that the High Court is reluctant to grant
certiorariin a Second Amendment case for the very reason that
the issue is so contentious - the proverbial legal "hot potato."
However, it is difficult to imagine an issue more contentious and
divisive than abortion, which the Court has not hesitated to

24 See Supreme Court Rules 10 (a),(b),(c) (2000) (listing reasons for granting
certiorari). But see The Uncertainty of Cert., supra note 23, at 1795 (noting selection
process is somewhat of mystery).
25 See U.S. v. Baker, 197 F.3d 211, 214 (6th Cir. 1999) (discussing due process clause
and intent requirement necessary to be convicted of possession of firearm.); Hickman v.
Block, 81 F.3d 98 (9th Cir. 1996); U.S. v. Farrell, 69 F.3d 891, 892 (8th Cir. 1995) (holding
that government need only prove knowingly or intentionally but not specific knowledge of
statute); Love v. Pepersack, 47 F.3d 120, 124 (4th Cir. 1995) (denying due process claim
against state police for wrongly denying his application to obtain firearm); U.S. v. Hale,
978 F.2d 1016, 1018 (8th Cir. 1992) (denying defendant claim that Second Amendment
bars federal government from banning particular weapons seized because they have
military use.); Quilici v. Morton Grove, 695 F.2d 261, 271 (7th Cir. 1982) (holding that
village ordinance which bars possession of handguns within village does not violate
Illinois Constitution, Second, Ninth and Fourteenth Amendments); U.S. v. Oakes, 564
F.2d 384, 387 (10th Cir. 1977) (noting that defendant's Second Amendment rights were
not violated by federal statute which regulated machine guns); U.S. v. Warin, 530 F.2d
103,107 (6th Cir. 1976) (discussing defendants argument in support of possession of
firearm and connection to phrase "a well regulated militia"); U.S. v. Johnson, 497 F.2d
548, 549 (4th Cir. 1974) (discussing defendants Second Amendment claims); Cody v. U.S.,
460 F.2d 34, 37 (8th Cir. 1972) (holding that Second Amendment was not violated); Cases
v. U.S., 131 F.2d 916, 919 (1st Cir. 1942) (discussing Federal Firearms Act).
26 See Santa Fe Indep. School Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 305 (2000) (involving
violation of Establishment Clause with student initiated prayer); see also The
Uncertainty of Cert., supra note 23, at 1795 (noting selection process is somewhat of
mystery and only 5% of more than 5,000 petition are granted).

2002]

THEINCONVENIENT MILITIA CLA USE

address directly in many decisions. 27 The notion that the High
Court is simply too timid to resolve a contentious legal issue is
therefore distinctly unsatisfying, given that the settlement of
such issues is one of the primary reasons for the very existence of
the High Court.
A second suggestion is that the Court, already under a heavy
burden of cases, is simply not prepared at this time to open up a
whole new area of the law. According to this theory, the Court
already knows that the Second Amendment cannot be resolved in
any one decision, just as Roe v. Wade did not resolve the abortion
question. Rather, any Second Amendment case will simply open
up a Pandora's box of new Second Amendment issues requiring
frequent clarification and refinement, thus encouraging a flood of
litigation. At present, the NRA declines even to seek certiorariin
Second Amendment cases (presumably because an adverse and
recent decision rejecting an individual rights theory would be
difficult, if not impossible, to keep or hide from the American
public). Thus, if the High Court were to decide even one Second
Amendment case, the dam would break and flood the Court with
the pent-up demand for Second Amendment decisions
accumulated in sixty years of Supreme Court silence. 28 Again,
however, the fear of protracted litigation has never inhibited the
Court in such other high profile constitutional areas such as
abortion or school prayer.
A third theory is that the Court is concerned about the attack
on its own integrity that might occur if it were to reaffirm Miller
today and clarify its provisions in accordance with the Court of
Appeals decisions. The High Court has rarely been unmindful of
its chief vulnerability - namely, the lack of its own internal
27 See, e.g., Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 930 (2000) (ruling that Nebraska
statute was unconstitutional as undue burden on right to partial birth abortion); Planned
Parenthood of S.E. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 846 (1992) (reaffirming woman's right to
choose abortion before fetal viability; some provisions of Pennsylvania law upheld and
others ruled unconstitutional); Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 326 (1980) (upholding
federal restrictions on use of federal funds to reimburse cost of abortions under Medicaid
program); Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 649 (1979) (upholding that Massachusetts
statute requiring minor to obtain parental consent or judicial approval before receiving
abortion unconstitutionally burdened right to abortion). See generallyRoe v. Wade, 410
U.S. 179 (1973) (recognizing woman's constitutional right to abortion).
28 See U.S. v. Lewis, 445 U.S. 55, 65 (1980) (providing only perfunctory footnote
setting forth essential holding in Mi!ler, while not resolving ambiguities in Miller alleged
by Gun Lobby); see also Kopel, supra note 12, at 112 (noting Lewis Court's attitude
toward Second Amendment is ambiguous but probably does not support broad individual
right, further, even if it is recognized, right is "less fundamental" than some others).
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means of enforcing its own decisions. Every Supreme Court
justice in the last century doubtless recalls with a shudder
President Andrew Jackson's famous tirade: "The Supreme Court
has made their decision; now let them enforce it!"29 In the end, of
course, the Court relies upon its own moral authority for
obedience, and the efficacy of the Constitution itself depends
upon that obedience. The great Supreme Court justices have
always been alert to what they consider the greatest
constitutional dangers of all - widespread disrespect, resistance,
or even confrontational disobedience to its rulings. No scholar
doubts that when Justice Marshall deliberated the case of
Marbury v. Madison,30 in 1803, the Chief Justice took fully into
account the debilitative loss of prestige, which might have
followed a refusal by the President to obey a judicial order of
mandamus to appoint judges submitted by a previous
Justice Marshall's tour de force was in
administration.
establishing the Court's great power of judicial nullification while
at the same time achieving a factual result which the President
had supported.
Likewise, the High Court (and the nation) survived widespread
disobedience and disrespect for its decision in the Dred Scott case
only by force of arms and a violent civil war. 31 Thus, this theory
must be given some attention. Given the great power which the
Gun Lobby has accumulated in recent years, including its power
29 Barry Friedman, The Histoay of the CountermajoritarianDifficulty, PartOne. The
Road to JudicialSupremecy, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 333, 399 (May 1998) (noting Jackson's
hesitation to comply with this decision); see Anthony Lewis, An IndependentJud'ciary,43
ST. LOUIS L.J. 285, 289 (Spring 1999) (noting everyone knew of Jacksons' comment);
Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Most DangerousBranch, Executive Power to Say What the
Law Is, 83 GEO. L.J. 217, 345 n.159 (Dec. 1994) (noting Jackson never followed thru
because Governor pardoned defendant).
30 5 U.S. 137 (1803) (beginning of judicial interpretation of Constitution by Court).
31 See Kopel, supra note 12, at 179-180 (arguing that Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393
(1856), supports broad individual school). One of the reasons that Chief Justice Taney
found it necessary to deny black citizenship was that doing so would grant blacks all
constitutional rights, including the right to keep and carry arms wherever they went.
Sandford,60 U.S. at 450. Taney said that "Nor can congress deny to the people the right
to keep and bear arms..." Id. But what Taney may have been referring to was what
would then have been the frightening prospect of blacks having arms while in service to a
militia. This result is consistent with the narrow reading of the Amendment in which a
freed black would have the right as a full citizen of serving in a state militia, see also
Edward A. Harnett, A Matter of Judgment, Not a Matter of Opinion, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV.
123, 152 (1999) (noting Dred Scott was one of set of terrible decisions handed down by
Court); Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Dissent,Free Speech, and the CantiouingSearc for the
"CentralMeaning" of the First Amendment, 98 MICH. L. REv. 1613, 1651 (May 2000)
(noting President Lincoln's "scathing critique" of decision).
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not only to influence public opinion, but to elect its supporters
and punish its opponents, the Court may indeed fear a Gun
If the
Lobby backlash to any decision reaffirming ]iler.
Supreme
the
outside
demonstrations
spectacle of passionate
Court during its abortion cases sends shivers down the spines of
the high jurists today, one can only imagine how they might
envision the demonstrations funded by the Gun Lobby. Surely,
this theory goes, it is the course of least resistance not to stir the
hornet's nest.
Nevertheless, it should be noted that the Court has an
admirable record of courage in deciding issues of great concern,
and providing leadership where the legislative bodies have been
timid. In Brown v. Board of Education,32 for instance, the Court
must have known the fierce resistance and even violence that
would follow its decision outlawing desegregation. Nor did the
prospect of a wave of future litigation seeking refinement of its
principles ultimately deter the Court.
Finally, it has been suggested that the Court rejects certiorazi
of Second Amendment cases because some justices fear how their
colleagues might rule, and therefore, prefer to await the
retirement of several of the older justices in the hope that new
justices might provide a strong consensus one way or the other in
order to provide a united moral front to what would ultimately be
a controversial opinion. It is no secret that the majority in
Brown fiercely lobbied the potential dissenters on the Court to
reach a unanimous decision, which would better withstand the
foreseen popular rejection of its decision, particularly in the
South. In United States v. Nixon,33 the Court also knew that a
unanimous decision was imperative in order to present the
President with a mandate, which left no political room for
disobedience.
It is the purpose of this article to examine all these theories,
and to provide the basis for a reasoned decision clarifying the
right to bear arms under the Second Amendment.
This article is divided into four parts. Part I examines the
history of the original drafting and ratification of the Second
In particular, it reviews the record of the
Amendment.
32 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1945) (holding that "separate but equal is... inherently
unequal").
33 418 U.S. 683, 689 (1974) (denying President Nixon's claim of executive privilege).
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Constitutional Convention. At Convention, not a word was
expressed concerning an individual right to bear arms; there was,
however, considerable concern expressed, particularly by
representatives of the Southern states, about a standing army.
The Southern states not only demanded that the Constitution not
forbid slavery but also that states be permitted to keep their
militias. 34
In the Bill of Rights Debates, which followed
ratification of the Constitution by the states, representatives
demanded a "militia" amendment, which forbade the elimination
of militias via the indirect means of banning firearms for those
serving in the militias.
Although a draft of the Second
Amendment, which did not contain a militia preamble to the
right to bear arms, was proposed,3 5 it was soundly defeated by
the U.S. Senate 36 and replaced with the draft specifically setting
forth the militia preamble. Part I further explores the thesis that
the founding fathers somehow intended to include in the Second
34 See Robert Hardaway, A Right to Bear Arms? Courts Don't Buy Gun Owners'
ClaLms, DENV. ROCKY MOUNTAIN NEWS, June 4, 1995, at 86A (stating Constitution clearly
gives Supreme Court - not gun owners - power to interpret Second Amendment in
context of "well-regulated militia"); see also Paul Campos, Ardent Gun Debate Offers No
Solutions, DENy. ROCKY MOUNTAIN NEWS, May 9, 2000, at 40A (discussing debate on gun
control sponsored by Colorado Bar Association that centered on whether Second
Amendment guarantees individual or collective right to bear arms); Carla Crowder,
ConstitutionalScholarsBlast NRA, Say Gun Group Has Deceived Public,DENV. ROCKY
MOUNTAIN NEWS, March 28, 2000, at 7A (relating argument that Second Amendment
does not guarantee individualright to bear arms, but right to bear arms in relation to
well-regulated militia) (emphasis added).
35 See BERNARD SCHWARTz, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY (1971)
(finding that "The right of the people to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed; a well
armed but well regulated militia being the best security of a free country;, but no person
religiously scrupulous of bearing arms shall be compelled to render military service in
person.") (quoting proposed amendment); see also Ariel A. Rodriguez, Is the Right to Bear
Arms Individual, Collective, Insurrectionistor All of the Above.9, 10 SETON HALL CONST.
L.J. 797, 798-803 (2000) (assessing arguments for individual versus collective right to
bear arms); Andrew M. Wayment, The Second Amendment: A Guard for Our Future
Security, 37 IDAHO L. REV. 203, 222 (2000) (quoting U.S. v. Emerson, 46 F. Supp. 2d. 598,
604 (N.D. Tex. 1999), revd, 270 F.3d 203 (5th Cir. 2001) (explaining Framers of
Constitution considered individual right to keep and bear arms as "paramount right by
which [all] other rights could be protected").
36 See SCHWARTZ, supra note 35, at 280 (discussing proposed amendment); see also
Carl T. Bogus, The Hidden Hstory of the Second AmendmenA 31 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 309,
321 (1998) (stating that "The Second Amendment was not enacted to provide a check on
government tyranny; rather, it was written to assure the Southern states that Congress
would not undermine the slave system by using its newly acquired constitutional
authority over the militia to disarm the state militia and thereby destroy the South's
principal instrument of slave control. In effect, the Second Amendment supplemented the
slavery compromise made at the Constitutional Convention in Philadelphia and obliquely
codified in other constitutional provisions."); Glenn Harlan Reynolds, A CiticalGuide to
te Second Amendment; 62 TENN. L. REV. 461, 466, 503-512 (1995) (discussing critical
interpretations of Second Amendment and whether it allows individuals right to bear
arms as opposed to only militia).
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Amendment a citizen's right of armed insurrection against their
own democratically elected government.
Part II traces the judicial history of interpretation of the
Second Amendment by U.S. courts. Although this part cites all
decisions found which refer, even in dicta, to the Second
Amendment, it is revealed that the underlying Second
Amendment issue requiring clarification is quite simple. In
1981, in US v. Lewis the Court held: "The Second Amendment
guarantees no right to keep and bear a firearm that does not
have some reasonable relationship to the preservation or
efficiency of a well-regulated militia."3 7 Part II explores the only
two reasonable interpretations of this language. The first is that
the right to bear arms is granted only to those who require such
arms for service in the militia. The second interpretation is that
every citizen has the right to bear an arm of the type that might
be used by a militia.
The Courts of Appeal have uniformly adopted the first
interpretation. Typically, as in US. v. Tot,38 the Courts have
stated:
It is abundantly clear both from the discussions of this
amendment contemporaneous with its proposal and adoption
and those of learned writers since, that this amendment,
unlike those providing for protection of free speech and
freedom of religion, was not adopted with individualzrights in
mind, but as protection for the states in the maintenance of
their militia organizations against possible encroachment by
39
the federal power.
37 U.S. v. Lewis, 445 U.S. 55, 65 (1980) (quoting Mier,307 U.S. at 178); see also
Rodriguez, supra note 35, at 798-803 (analyzing original intent of Second Amendment);
Wayment, supra note 35, at 222 (explaining Framers' intent in drafting Second
Amendment).
38 131 F.2d 261 (3d Cir. 1942), revid, 319 U.S. 463 (1943).
39 To, 131 F.2d at 266 (emphasis added) (intimating that in addition to vast majority
of federal courts, state courts have also largely concurred); see, e.g., People v. Bergstrom,
544 P.2d 396, 397-98 (Colo. 1975) (affirming defendant's conviction for "felon with a gun"
statute); People v. Blue, 544 P.2d 385, 387 (Colo. 1975) (affirming charges of gun
possession); People v. Barger, 732 P.2d 1225, 1226 (Colo. Ct. App. 1986) (agreeing that
right to bear arms is limited); People v. McCloskey, 244 P. 930, 930-31 (Cal. Ct. App.
1926) (stating that "It is a well-recognized function of the legislature in the exercise of the
police power to restrain dangerous practices and to regulate the carrying and use of
firearms and other weapons in the interest of the public safety... "); People v. Gonzales,
237 P. 812, 812-13 (Cal. Ct. App. 1925) (dealing with "Firearms Act"); People v.
Camperlingo, 231 P. 601, 604 (Cal. Ct. App. 1924) (discussing that "It therefore becomes
apparent that the right of a citizen to bear arms is not acquired from any constitutional
provision... ").
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The second interpretation, which no court of appeals decision
has yet adopted, is the apparent view of some members of the
Gun Lobby. The advocates of this view argue that current militia
40
law applies to "literally the entire body of armed citizenry."
Unfortunately for these advocates, the law does not define the
militia as the body of armed citizenry. Rather, the militia
consists of all able-bodied males between the ages of 17 and 45
years of age who are not members of the National Guard or the
Naval Militia.41 This creates a dilemma for the broad based
advocates, for they:
are at a loss to explain how the broad-based definition of the
"militia" in the statute books or the colonial model of a
militia - supports the assertion of an individual right of gun
ownership for all citizens. ... Are the theorists who
advocate a broad second amendment right willing to pursue
their argument to its necessary conclusion that women and
older males have no constitutional right to own guns?42
Part II will examine several of the most obvious difficulties of
this second interpretation, not the least of which is that no
appeals court has ever adopted it. The following questions are
explored with regard to this second interpretation: 1) If only
arms which are useful for military application are covered by the
Second Amendment, could the United States then ban all
40 Marietta Pennsylvania Militia, http://www.mariettapa.com/marietta militia.html
(visited March 2, 2001) (stating unorganized militia is protected under Second
Amendment); compame U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 (stating Congress has right to organize
militia) with Bogus, supra note 36, at 321 (suggesting Madison provided significant key to
constitutional construction when he said nothing in Bill of Rights can alter text of
Constitution).
41 See 10 U.S.C.S. § 311(a) (2000). In fact, militia laws in this country have never
recognized the universal right to possess firearms. The first Militia Act enacted in 1792
provided that the militia consisted of white males between 18 and 45. accord Resnick,
P'vateArms as the Palladiumof Liberty The Meaningof the Second Amendment; 77 U.
DET. MERCY L. REV. 1, 34 (1999). Furthermore, some have argued that the right of a
citizen to bear arms is not acquired from any constitutional provision, accord
Camperlingo,231 P. at 604.
42 Keith A. Ehrman and Dennis A. Henigan, The Second Amendment in the
Twentieth Century: Have You Seen Your Militia Lately?, 15 U. DAYTON L. REv. 5, 49-50
(1989) (arguing present-day National Guard is modem equivalent of 18th century state
militia, thus rendering Second Amendment anachronistic and its protections
unnecessary); see also Don B. Kates, Jr., Handgun Prohibitionand the OrginalMeaning
of the Second Amendment, 82 MICH. L. REv. 204, 225 (1983) (stating Second Amendment
was response to perceived lack of individual rights guarantees, not as state's right
proponents contend, reaction to standing army and militia control provisions of Art. I, §
8); David E. Vandercoy, The Historyof the Second Amendment, 28 VAL. U. L. REV. 1007,
1009 (1994) (arguing Second Amendment recognizes not only individual right to arms, but
right to be armed at level equal to government).
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weapons which would not be useful to any militia, such as
"Saturday Night Specials"? 2) Would the Second Amendment
then guarantee to every citizen all weapons that a militia might
use, such as canons, tanks, hand grenades, high explosives,
bazookas, or even small tactical nuclear weapons? 3) How does
one apply this interpretation if in fact it can be shown that no
militia in fact exists today in the U.S.?
Part III explores the public policy aspects of Second
Amendment applications.
While acknowledging that public
policy has no direct or formal role in purely statutory or
constitutional construction, it is noted that many U.S. Supreme
Court decisions have considered public policy in constitutional
interpretation. 43 Also addressed is the extent to which public
policy and safety should be considered in constitutional
interpretation. For example, should the fact that there were
20,000 handgun deaths in the U.S. compared to 93 in Japan,
which has strict gun laws, be considered in Second Amendment
analysis?44
Finally, Part IV sets forth conclusions to the questions raised
45
in the first four parts.

43 See, e.g., Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 888 (1992) (striking down
requirement of notification of husband prior to obtaining abortion for fear requirement
would provoke physical abuse against wife or children); Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S.
483, 493 (1945) (ordering desegregation of schools, because no one reasonably may be
expected to succeed in life if denied opportunity of education), modified, 349 U.S. 294, 300
(1955) (specifically noting equity has been characterized by practical flexibility in shaping
its remedies and by facility for adjusting and reconciling public and private needs); U.S. v.
Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 122-23 (1940) (upholding working wage and hours regulation to
prevent substandard labor conditions); Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412, 420-21 (1908)
(upholding state law limiting number of hours women may work based on need to
preserve health of women).
44 See John R. Lott, Jr. and David B. Mustard, Crime, Deterrence, and Right-toCarry Concealed Handguns, 26 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 1 (1997) (stating that 'Using crosssectional time-series data for U.S. counties from 1977 to 1992" to argue that allowing
citizens to carry concealed weapons would cause marked decrease in crimes committed
while forcing criminals into property crimes where interaction with victims is unlikely).
But cf Albert W. Alschuler, Guns & Violence: Two Guns, Four Guns, Six Guns, More
Guns: Does Arming the Public Reduce Crimeg 31 VAL. U. L. REv. 365, 367 (1997)
(criticizing Lott and Mustard); Dan A. Black & Daniel S. Nagin, Do Rigbt-to-CarryLaws
Deter Violent Crime, 27 J. LEGAL STuD. 209, 209-12 (1998) (attacking Lott and Mustard
on methodological grounds).
45 The conclusions are those of lead author Robert Hardaway. Co-authors Liesl
Gormley and Bryan Taylor, who prepared respectively preliminary drats of Parts I and
II, do not necessarily agree with all of the conclusions of the primary author in Part IV.
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I. HISTORY OF THE SECOND AMENDMENT
In 1789 the House of Representatives and the U.S. Senate
drafted the Bill of Rights. By 1791, the States had ratified the
Bill of Rights, which was subsequently incorporated into the
United States Constitution as the first ten amendments. Despite
the interceding two hundred years, there is little consensus
regarding even the most basic meaning of the Second
There may be no provision in the entire
Amendment.
Constitution from which such great consequences flow but about
which such little unanimity has been achieved.4 6 Part of the
confusion arises from the structure and wording of the
amendment itself. A facial reading would suggest that the
provision is internally contradictory: the first clause appears to
be a guarantee of arms only to state militias; the second clause
may be read as an absolute right of every individual to keep and
bear arms.4 7 The purpose of this section is to clarify and
reconcile these clauses. This effort is grounded in the belief that
the Constitution is to be interpreted according to the intent of
those who drafted and ratified the document. 48
This article will address three schools of Second Amendment
thought. These three schools will be referred to as "the narrow
individual right" view and the "broad individual right" view.4 9
The broad individual right view pictures the Second Amendment
as guaranteeing an "individual right to bear arms for all legal
private purposes - barring virtually all regulations of

46 See generally David E. Vandercoy, The History of the Second Amendment 28 VAL. U.
L. REV. 1007, 1009 (1994) (arguing Second Amendment recognizes not only individual
right to arms but right to be armed at level equal to government); But cf Ehrman &
Henigan, supra note 42, at 57 (arguing intent behind Second Amendment in framers
mind was to have states retain right to organize and maintain militia "armed guard,"
rather than granting ample right to each individual).
47 See U.S. CONST. amend. II. (stating "[a] well regulated Militia, being necessary to
the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be
infringed"); see also Ralph J. Rohner, The Right to Bear Anms: A Phenomenon of
ConstitutionalHistory,16 CATH. L. REV. 53, 55 (1966) (arguing, "is there any individual
right to keep and bear arms for purposes other than collective security through a wellorganized militia?").
48 See Ralph J. Rohner, supra note 47, at 53-54 (rejecting notion of living
Constitution in which despite Second Amendment protection for traditional right to bear
arms, "times may change to such degree that no such basic right can be justified in
present circumstances," even based on our constitutional heritage).
49 See Herz, supra note 17, at 61-62 (explaining "narrow individual right" view and
"broad individual right view").
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firearms..."50 The more narrow individual right school views
the Second Amendment as guaranteeing an individual right to
arms only when possession of the weapon is related to
participation in a state militia.5 1 A third school, called the states
right or collective rights view, sees the Second Amendment as
guaranteeing the ability of the states to raise a militia but
secures no right to the individual.
Many scholars and at least one federal court have ignored the
narrow right school. In place of a narrow individual right theory,
broad right advocates assert a state or collective right to possess
or bear arms. One writer, for example, frames the question as
follows: "whether the Second Amendment recognizes the right of
each citizen to keep and bear arms, or whether the right belongs
solely to state government and empowers each state to maintain
a military force."52
By demonstrating that the Second
Amendment was intended to apply to individuals and not states,
gun rights proponents can claim that individuals have an
absolute right to gun ownership. It will be submitted that such
analysis does little to resolve issue of which of the three schools
of thought is valid.
There are two relevant Second Amendment questions.5 3 The
first question is whether the right belongs to the individual.
Professor Yassky believes the question to be confused because
"[all constitutional rights - even those most obviously concerned
with government structure rather than individual freedom ultimately belong to individuals in the sense that individuals can
sue to vindicate them."5 4 The proper question assumes that the
50 Herz, supranote 17, at 62.
51 See Herz, supranote 17, at 61- 62.
52 Vandercoy, supra note 46, at 1009 (arguing Second Amendment provides
guarantee that individuals acting collectively could throw off yokes of any oppressive
government which might arise by exercising their right to be armed at level equal to
government).
53 See David Yassky, The Sound of Silence: The Supreme Court and the Second
Amendment - A Response to ProfessorKopel, 18 ST. Louis U. PUB. L. REv. 189, 190
(1999) (debating scope of individual's rights under Second Amendment).
54 Yassky, supra note 53, at 193 (describing case of I.N.S. v. Chadha in which
individual sued federal government for violating bicameral and presentment
requirements of U.S. Constitution); see also I.N.S. v. Chadha 426 U.S. 919, 928 (1983)
(holding Jagdish Chadha's claim that congressional action harming him violated
bicameral passage and presentment requirements of Article I of U.S. Constitution);
Rohner, supra note 47, at 55 n.10 (arguing, "[the better question being couched in terms
of the purposes for which arms may be kept and borne... [i]f... the only keeping and
bearing encompassed by the amendment is that which has the collective security of the
people as its purpose, then the keeping and bearing may properly be limited to those
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Second Amendment recognizes some individual right but asks
what the scope of the right is. This article argues that the scope
of the individual right is limited to those circumstances in which
the individual participates in a government militia.
Until recently, the'courts have unanimously viewed the Second
Amendment either as a state right or narrow individual right.55
Many legal scholars, lawyers, and the American Bar Association
56
concur that there is no broad individual right to gun ownership.
Many civil libertarian organizations, which usually protect an
individuals right against government, such as the American Civil
Liberties Union (ACLU) and the National Coalition to Ban
Handguns, take the position that the Second Amendment does
not grant an unlimited individual right to gun ownership.5 7
Unfortunately, the broad individual rights view seems to have
been accepted by the public, thus leading to Chief Justice
Burger's concern about the deliberate misrepresentation of

individuals exercising that function").
55 See, e.g., Kates, supra note 42, at 206 (describing polarizing debate between
individual rights theory and exclusively state's right view); Vandercoy, supra note 46, at
1009 (arguing that Second Amendment recognizes not only individual right to arms but
right to be armed at level equal to government). But see, e.g., David I. Caplan, Restoring
the Balance: The Second Amendment Revisited, 5 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 31, 40-41 (1976)
(contending that first Congress maintained that well-regulated militia was "necessary" to
security of free state as opposed to merely "sufficient," because normal process may be
insufficient to protect people all the time); Ehrman & Henigan, supra note 46, at 57
(arguing that intent behind Second Amendment in framers mind was to have states
retain right to organize and maintain militia "armed guard," rather than granting ample
right to each individual); Peter B. Feller & Karl L. Gotting, The Second Amendment: A
Second Look, 61 NW. U. L. REV. 46, 67-70 (1966) (stating that Second Amendment is
collective right rather than individual right, where every state would be protected by
independent state militia). But see Robert Dowlut, The Rikt to Arms: Does the
Constitution or the Predilection of Judges ReignZ 36 OKLA. L. REv. 65, 65-67 (1983)
(arguing that collective right to bear arms does not exclude individual right to bear arms);
Richard E. Gardiner, To PreserveLiberty-A Look at the Right to Keep and BearArms,
10 N. KY. L. REV. 63, 64 (1982) (arguing individual right to bear arms originated in
English Common Law and individual right to bear arms does not depend on Second
Amendment); Stuart R. Hays, The Right to Bear Arms, A Study in Judicial
Misinterpretation, 2 WM. & MARY L. REv. 381, 381-821 (1960) (tracking historical
development of restriction of arms); Robert A. Sprecher, The Lost Amendmen4 51 A.B.A.
J. 554 (1965). See generally SENATE SUBCOMM. ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE COMM. ON
THE JUDICIARY, 97TH CONG., 2D SESS., The R'ght To Keep And Bear Arms (Comm. Print
1982).
56 See Kates, supra note 42, at 207-08 (quoting ACLU's summary of its national
board action during 1980 meeting view towards Second Amendment agreeing with
Supreme Court's long-standing interpretation of Second Amendment); see also A.B.A.,
PolicyBook (Aug. 1975).
57 See Kates, supra note 42, at 207-08 n. 15 (quoting ACLUs summary of its national
board action during 1980 meeting view towards Second Amendment agreeing with
Supreme Court's long-standing interpretation of Second meeting).
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existing law to the American people.5 8
The Supreme Court's standard for constitutional interpretation
is as follows:
in the construction of the language of the Constitution... we
are to place ourselves as nearly as possible in the condition
of the men who framed that instrument. Undoubtedly, the
framers... had for a long time been absorbed in considering
the arbitrary encroachments of the Crown on the liberty of

the subject..

.59

In order to determine the intent of the framers and ratifiers of
the Second Amendment, three areas should be examined: first,
English history and the broad right to possess arms; second,
colonial history and the process of the Second Amendment's
proposal and ratification; third, the primary arguments of the
broad right theorists. These arguments include whether the
Amendment embraces a "right of insurrection", the chronological
placement of the Amendment in the Bill of Rights, and
arguments relating to the Amendment's construction.
A. The HistoricRight to BearArms in England
The common law of England directly influenced the
development of law in the United States. To the extent that it
was appropriate to the circumstances of the colonies, the body of
the common law "crossed the Atlantic with the colonists." 60 The
charters that created the colonies assured the settlers that they
would have the same rights and immunities as if they had
remained in England. 6 1 This is particularly true with regard to
the possession of arms. The dangers posed by the unsettled
lands "made the common law tradition of an armed citizenry both

58 See generally 121 CONG. REC. 42, 112 (1975) (stating seventy percent of
respondents endorsed individual rights alternative, while 3% said it applied to both
individual citizens and National Guard).
59 Ex parte Bain, 121 U.S. 1, 12 (1887).
60 See Joyce Lee Malcolm, The Baght of the People to Keep and Bear Arns: The
Common Law Tradition, 10 HASTINGS CONST. L. Q. 285, 289 (1983). See generallyKates,
supra note 42, at 235 (discussing English gun prohibition and English Bill of Rights).
61 See Malcolm, supra note 60, at 289. Connecticut's charter assured the colonists
that they would "have and enjoy all Liberties and Immunities of free and natural
Subjects... as if they and everyone of them were borne within the Realms of England."
Id.; see also SCHWARTZ, supra note 35, at 280 (stating colonists entitled to English
common law).

ST JOHN'SJOURMAL OFLEGAL COMNTARY

[V€ol 16:41

appropriate and crucial to the survival of plantations." 62
Ultimately, many of the liberties and rights recognized in the
common law were incorporated into the American Bill of
Rights.63 It is argued that the right to possess arms as it existed
in the ancient English system deeply influenced the right as it
If it can be
was codified under the Second Amendment.64
demonstrated that the common law encompassed only the right
to possess arms that related to a military function, then this is
compelling evidence of the scope of the right incorporated into
65
the American Constitution.
62 Malcolm, supra note 60, at 289; see also Kates, supra note 42, at 231 (stating that
"[T]he very character of the people... was related to the individual's ability and desire to
arm himself against threats to his person, his property and his state.").
63 See ENGLISH BILL OF RIGHTS (1689), 1 W. & M.; see also The Avalon Projectat the
at
Yale
Law
Shool" Englih
Bill
of" Rights
1689,
available
http:/www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/england.htm (last modified Nov. 25, 2001). Among the
rights recognized by the English Bill of Rights of 1689 that appear to have influenced the
American Bill of Rights are the following: "That it is the right of the subjects to petition
the king, and all commitments and prosecutions for such petitioning are illegal... ,
[Tihat excessive bail ought not to be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and
unusual punishments inflicted..." Malcolm, supra note 60, at 289-90 (arguing that, with
some significant modifications, this document also influenced drafting of Second
Amendment).
64 See Malcolm, supra note 60, at 289 (finding that "Nearly all writers agree... that
an accurate reading of the Second Amendment is indispensable to resolving current
debates over gun ownership, and that a clarification of the common law tradition is
necessary to that reading."); see also Brief for Appellant at 9, U.S. v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174
(1939) (Robert Jackson, acting as Solicitor for United States, said: "In determining the
nature and extent of the Second Amendment, we must look to the common law on the
subject as it existed at the time of the adoption of the Amendment.").
65 See Kates, supra note 42, at 238 n.144 (arguing founders believed English law too
severely restricted right to possess arms and Second Amendment expanded right). But
see WILLS, supra note 5 (making case for narrow individual rights interpretation with
minimal reference to English common law). Two of the cases cited by Kopel acknowledge
an individual right to bear arms specifically referring to the English common law. See
Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591, 635 (1896) (Field, J., dissenting) (noting that "The
freedom of thought, of speech, and of the press; the right to bear arms... are, together
with exemption from self-crimination, the essential and inseparable features of English
liberty." (citing Bradley, J. in: Boyd v. U.S., 116 U.S. 616, 635 (1886)). Kopel says that
"Justice Field's paragraph is not a list of state power, it is a list of personal rights won at
great cost - rights which may never be trumped by the legislature's perceived needs of the
moment." See Kopel, supra note 12, at 167-68. However, the court in Robertson v.
Baldwin, 165 U.S. 275, 281 (1897), listed a number of rights in the Bill of Rights that are
not absolute, including "the right of the people to keep and bear arms (Article 2) is not
infringed by law prohibiting the carrying of concealed weapons." Kopel says, "the laws did
not forbid state militias from carrying concealed weapons. The prohibitions on concealed
carry are the exceptions that prove the rule. Only if the Second Amendment is an
individual right does the Court's invocation of a concealed carry exception make any
sense." See Kopel, supra note 12, at 166. But the Robertsonopinion also says that the Bill
of Rights "were not intended to lay down any novel principles of government, but simply
to embody certain guarantees and immunities which we had inherited from our English
ancestors..." Robertson, 165 U.S. at 281. Since English law never recognized an
individual right to weapons for private purposes, neither would the Second Amendment.
The reference to concealed weapons laws is simply stating a truism: the concealed carry
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1. The Duty and the Right to Have Weapons
Prior to the Glorious Revolution, 66 the people of England were
required to bear arms in order to participate in military and
police action. There is no question that this duty was rooted in
antiquity.
Some analysts argue that, prior to the Norman
conquest, the Saxons developed a system in which every free man
must have weapons suitable to the infantry and was obligated to
serve in the militia. 67 According to Blackstone, King Alfred, ruler
of England from 871 to 901 A.D., decreed that "all subjects of his
dominion were the realm's soldiers."68 The militia system was
used primarily for defensive purposes, being called out only in
those districts that were threatened with attack. 69
This
limitation was probably a reflection of the nature of the militia
itself. Under this system, military obligations are of short
duration; members would not be available for the long sieges
necessary to project power against other countries. 70 During this
time, the great expense of maintaining a standing army
demanded a relatively heavy reliance on the militia.
For
instance, in the Battle of Hastings, King Harold could muster a
force of only 2,200 professional soldiers, but the total size of the
militia at the time numbered about 50,000.71
The militia system was formalized and expanded under the
Angevin monarchs. In 1181, Henry II instituted the Assize of
Arms. This decree stated that every freeman was to keep arms
laws are not unconstitutional because they apply to individuals in their private functions;
the constitutional right to arms applies to those performing military functions.
66 See infra note 334 (finding that Glorious Revolution was brought about by James
II abusive conduct on throne and resulted in William and Mary taking power).
67 See David T. Hardy, Armed Citizens, Citizen Armies: Towards a Jurisprudenceof
the Second Amendment 9 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POLY 559, 562 (1986) (stating that every
free man was obliged by law to keep weapons and armour and serve in fyrd, and he was
unable to sell or alienate his weapons in any way). See generally CHARLES WARREN
HOLLISTER, ANGLO-SAXON MILITARY INSTITUTIONS ON THE EvE OF THE NORMAN
CONQUEST (Clarendon Press 1962).
68 Vandercoy, supra note 46, at 1009; see also Hardy, supra note 67, at 562-63 n.14
(distinguishing Anglo - Saxon system from Continental system on grounds that where
English system was more open, Continental system limited duty of fighting and right to
armaments to wealthier classes).
69 See William S. Fields and David T. Hardy, The Militia and the Constitution: A
Legal History, 136 MIL. L. REV. 1, 3 (1992) (stating militia was reserved for emergency
situations). See generallyHOLLISTER, supra note 67.

70 See generally Fields and Hardy, supra note 69, at 3 (discussing military
obligations and durational times generally).
71 See Fields and Hardy, supranote 69, at 3 (citing D. HOWARTH, 1066 THE YEAR OF
THE CONQUEST 80-1 (1970)).
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to aid in the defense of the kingdom. 72 The individuals were
responsible for providing their own arms, according to the value
73
of their chattels, and to serve the King at their own expense.
Another Assize of Arms in 1253 expanded the military duties
beyond freemen to include serfs. 74 In 1285, Edward I passed the
Statute of Winchester. 75 This imposed two relevant duties on the
English people. First, the law dictated "What Armour each
Person shall have in his House." 76 The general duty was that
"Every man between Fifteen Years of Age, and Sixty Years, shall
be assessed and sworn to Armor according to the Quantity of
Secondly, however, the law
their Lands and Goods.. ."77
imposed police duties on the people. 78 Upon hearing the hue and
cry of one of the townspeople, the others were obliged to pursue
72 See Ehrman &Henigan, supra note 42, at 8; see also 2 ENGLISH. HISTORICAL
DOCUMENTS, The Assize ofArms416 (1953).
73 See Hardy, supranote 67, at 562 (stating weapons could not be sold, pledged, or in
any way alienated); see also Vandercoy, supranote 46, at 1010.
74 See Hardy, supra note 67, at 564 (obliging even poorest Englishmen to obtain
dagger and halberd, eight foot pole mounted with axe-head); compare L.F. SALZMAN,
EDWARD 1206-07 (1968) (requiring every Englishman, depending on wealth, to keep ready
certain weapons), with A_ PATMORE, THE SEVEN EDWARDS OF ENGLAND 29-30 (1971)
(explaining political dynasty of Plantagenet family).
75 See Statute of Winchester, 1285, Edw. III; see also JOHN CHANCELLOR, THE LIFE
AND TIMES OF EDWARD I 139 (Wedenfield and Nicolson 1981) (noting that Statute of
Winchester codified and strengthened English police system); EDWARD JENKS, EDWARD
PLANTAGENET (EDWARD I): THE ENGLISH JUSTINIAN 220-22 (Freeport, NY 1969) (1901)
(describing origin of Statute of Winchester).
76 Statute of Winchester, 1285, Edw. III; see also JOYCE LEE MALCOLM, To KEEP AND
BEAR ARMS: THE ORIGINS OF AN ANGLO-AMERICAN RIGHT 4 n. 13 (Harv. Univ. Press 1994)
(asserting that Statute of Winchester organized military prowess of England). See
generally E.L.G. STONES, EDWARD I 31-38 (Oxford Press 1968) (recounting diplomatic
problems faced by English crown).
77 Statute of Winchester, 1285, Edw. III. The law followed the model of the earlier
assizes by requiring a larger cache of weapons from the wealthier individuals. For
instance, those with lands worth 15 pounds and goods worth 40 marks were required to
have a "Hauberke, a Breast - plate of Iron, a Sword, a Knife, and an Horse; but those
whose lands were worth 5 pounds were to possess a Doublet, a Breast - plate of Iron, a
Sword, and a Knife..." The supply of weapons were subject to inspection by constables;
compare Jonathan Rose, The Legal Profession in Medieval England: A History of
Regulation, 48 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1, 3-18 (1998) (explaining development of legal system

in Medieval England), with Abraham Abramovsky, et al., Challenges for Cause in New
York Criminal Cases, 64 ALB. L. REV. 583, 587 n.28 (2000) (applying Medieval English
common law to modem New York Criminal law).
78 See Statute of Winchester, 1285, Edw. III. Most of the statute appears to have been
a response to an increase in crime. CAP. I of the law recites: "Forasmuch as from Day to
Day, Robberies, Murthers, Burnings, and Theft, be more often used than they have been
heretofore, and Felons cannot be attainted by the Oath of Jurors, which had rather suffer
Strangers to be robbed and so pass without Pain, than to indite the Offenders [sic] ...");
compare MICHAEL PRESTWICH, EDWARD I 280-81 (Univ. of Cal. at Berkeley 1988)
(discussing that properly armed law-abiding people might deter crime), with JOHN
HUDSON, LAND, LAW AND LORDSHIP IN ANGLO-NORMAN ENGLAND 265 (1994) (comparing
legal reforms of Henry II in twelfth century and Edward I in thirteenth century).
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the criminal. 79 During this period, it is clear that the English
people had a duty to possess arms to act on behalf of the common
good in military and police actions. It is much less clear that
they had a right to possess weapons. Even if such a right were
implied, it surely did not extend to the possession of weapons for
whatever purpose the people wished. As one scholar argues,
there was clearly a recognized dutyto keep and bear arms which
had long been ingrained in the political and social structure of
the country.. . These "duties" implied no corresponding "right"
on their face, but it seems a fair conclusion that they may have
been so understood by the citizens of the day: if they were
required to keep arms to held assure public tranquility, did they
not have a right to that tranquility, and hence a right to the
weapons needed to assLre it? Even if this inference is allowed, it
does not expand the "right" beyond the purpose of collective
security in its broadest sense. 80
The next four hundred years amply demonstrated that the
English people had no private right to the unrestricted
possession or use of weapons. In 1328, Edward III enacted the
Statute of Northampton, prohibiting the carrying of arms in a
public place.8 1 Similarly, laws were passed forbidding thee use of
79 See Statute of Winchester, 1285, Edw. III c. 4 (noting that part of title of CAP. VI
is: "A Hue and Cry shall be followed... " That same statute requires: "And from
henceforth let Sheriffs take good Heed, and Bailiffs, within their Franchises and without,
be they higher or lower, that have any Bailiwick or Forestry in Fee, or otherwise, that
they shall follow the Cry with the Country, and after, as they are bounden [sic]... ");
WIuS, supra note 5, at 68 (arguing that membership in militia was necessarily
circumscribed because of its police function).
80 See Rohner, supra note 47, at 60 (noting origin of right to bear arms); see also
Andrew D. Herz, supra note 17, at 61 n.11 (arguing some authors espouse narrow
individual right to bear arms). See generallyAnthony J. Dennis, Clearingthe Smoke from
the Right to Bear Arms and the Second Amendment 29 AKRON L. REV. 57, 65 (1995)
(mentioning authors who argue scope of Second Amendment should be limited).
81 See Statute of Northampton, 1328, Edw. III c.3 s. 3. The law reads:
Item, it is enacted, That no Man great nor small, of what Condition soever he be,
except the King's Servants in his Presence, and His Ministers in executing of the
King's Precepts, or of their Office, and such as be in their Company assisting them,
and also upon a Cry made for Arms to the Peace, and the same in such places where
such Acts happen, be so hardy to come before the Kings Justices, of the King's
Ministers doing their Office with Force and Arms, nor bring no force in affray of the
peace, nor to go nor ride armed by Night nor by day, in fairs, Markets, nor in the
Presence of the Justices or other Ministers, nor in no part elsewhere, upon Pain to
forfeit their Armour to the King, and their bodies to Prison at the King's Pleasure.
See also 87 ENG. REP. 75, 76 (1686) (construing statute in Sir John Knight's case where
accusation was that: "the defendant did walk about the streets armed with guns, and that
he went into the Church of St. Michael, in Bristol, in the time of divine service, with a
gun, to terrify the King's subject." The defendant was acquitted. The statute was
construed as a codification of the common law that forbade terrifying others with
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hunting 2 Gun restrictions were not always related to hunting.
In 1541, Henry VIII decreed which weapons may be held by
whom. No one with an annual income of less than 100 pounds
was permitted to "use to keep in his or their houses or elsewhere
any cross-bow, hand-gun, hagbut or demi-hake... "83 This was
specifically a decree aimed at criminals, those of "evil disposed
minds and purposes, [who] have willfully and shamefully
committed, perpetrated, and done divers detestable and shameful
murders, robberies, felonies, riots, and routs.

. ."

with the aid of

the prohibited weapons.8 4 Thus, the law did not restrict
ownership of all weapons; it "merely limited the use of those
weapons most common in crime."8 5
The reign of James I witnessed a flurry of weapons law. Three
games laws, in 1604, 1605, and 1609, were passed. 86 These acts
increased the property requirements for hunting, prohibited the
use of certain weapons in hunting, and permitted homes to be
searched for the prohibited weapons.8 7
One writer has
weapons: "The Chief Justice said, that the meaning of the Statute of Northampton, 1328,
Edw. III, c. 3, was: 'to punish people who go armed to terrify the king's subjects. It is
likewise a great offence at the common law, as if the king were not able or willing to
protect his subjects; and therefore this act is but an affirmance of that law'"); Solicitor
General Robert Jackson, in his brief to the Court in U.S. v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174 (1939)

(stating that Solicitor General Jackson takes statute, as construed by English court, to be
"derogation of any supposed right to possess weapons conferred by the English common
law... ").
This reading is arguably overbroad since nothing in the statute or the Court's
reading thereof inhibits the possession of arms; rather, only carrying arms in public and
specifically using them to terrify others is prohibited.
82 See MALCOLM, supra note 76, at 13. (stating title of law was: "None shall hunt
except they which have a sufficient living."); see also LOUISA DESAUSSURE DULS, RICHARD
II IN THE EARLY CHRONICLES 29-70 (Mouton 1975) (discussing Richard's relationship with
Parliament).

83 33 Hen.VIII c. I. (1541). See generally G. R. ELTON, POLICY AND POLICE: THE

ENFORCEMENT OF THE REFORMATION IN THE AGE OF THOMAS CROMWELL 292 (Cambridge
Press 1972) (noting Henry VIII's desire to bring all matters under rule of law).

84 See 33 Hen. VIII c. I. (1541).
85 33 Hen. VIII, c.6 (prohibiting use of cross-bows and small hand-guns); see also
MALCOLM, supra note 76, at 9 (noting Act intended to prohibit concealable weapons
typically used in crimes). See generaly Elton, supra note 83, at 292 (discussing Henry
VIII's role in forming English common law).
86 See II Jac., c.27 (1604); III Jac., c.13 (1605); VII Jac., c.13 (1609); see also
MALCOLM, supra note 76, at 13 (explaining that 1604 Act prohibited use of guns, crossbows, stone-bows, or long-bows to kill fowl or rabbits; 1605 Act prohibited deer hunting
with gun or bow; 1609 Act prohibited "unlawful hunting and stealing of deer and conies").
See generallyBRUCE GALLOWAY, THE UNION OF ENGLAND AND SCOTLAND 145-47 (1986)
(comparing English and Scottish law under reign of James I).
87 See MALCOLM, supra note 76, at 13 (stating that, according to act, all men below
certain income were forbidden to hunt or to keep dogs and equipment for hunting); see
also DEREK HIRST, AUTHORITY AND CONFLICT: ENGLAND, 1603-1658 96-97 (1986); cf
JOHN DYKSTRA EUSDEN, PURITANS, LAWYERS, AND POLITICS IN EARLY SEVENTEENTH-

CENTURY ENGLAND 114-15 (1968) (comparing rules implemented by Tudor and Stuart
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speculated that these acts were made not only to preserve game
but because James I lived in fear of being attacked by his
subjects.8 8 The use of games acts were also a customary means
to curb lower class violence. 89 In 1603, James eased the duty to
be armed by repealing the State of Winchester, "eliminating the
special obligations to possess arms, and simultaneously enacted a
requirement that magazines of arms and provisions shall be
collected in one place in each county."90
Perhaps the most onerous restrictions were decreed during the
reign of Charles II. The Militia Act of 1672 authorized the
militia to disarm subjects at their discretion. 9 1 The Act was
regarded by the people as a blatant use of law to disarm the
people to enhance the power of the army and, hence, the Crown.9 2
kings).
88 MALCOLM, supranote 76, at 13 (stating that James I had mixed motives in passing
these hunting laws as he was hunting zealot and obsessed with fear of being killed). See
generally, Michael A. Bellesiles, Gun Laws in EaryAmerica: The Regulation ofFirearms
Ownership, 1607-1794, 16 LAw & HIST. REv. 567, 572 (1998) (stating purpose of game
laws were to prevent insurrections); Lois G. Schwoerer, Symposium on the Second
Amendment: Fresh Looks: To Hold and Bear Arms: The English Perspective, 76 CIE.KENT. L. REv. 27, 35 (2000) (stating game laws are intended to protect monarch).
89 See MALCOLM, supranote 76, at 75 (stating that acts used for preservation of game
also acted as means of lowering lower-class violence); see also T. Markus Funk, Is the
True Meaning of the Second Amendment Really Such a Riddle? Tracing the Historical
"Originsof an Anglo-American Right" Joyce Lee Malcolm, To Keep andBear Arms: The
Origins ofan Anglo-American Right; 39 How. L.J. 411, 421 n.36 (1995) (discussing game
acts as means of curbing violence). See generally David B. Kopel, Courts and
Constitutions: It Isn't about Duck Hunting:. The British Origins of the Rrkigt to Arms, 93
MICH. L. REv. 1333, 1340 (1995) (indicating game law was enacted in response to lower
class uprising).
90 Ehrman and Henigan, supra note 42, at 8; see also Ingram and Ray, supranote 4,
at 495-96 (indicating King James I repealed Statute of Winchester in 1603); Kevin D.
Szczepanski, Searehingfor the Plain Meaning of the Second Amendment; 44 BUFF. L.
REV. 197, 205 (1996) (stating King James repealed statute to eliminate freemen from
keeping arms).
91 See MALCOLM, supra note 76, at 116 (stating that Militia Act has given crown
"power to disarm all England"); see also Roland Docal, The Second, Fifth, and Ninth
Amendments-The PrecariousProtectorsof the American Gun Collector,23 FLA. ST. U.
L. REV. 1101, 1104-05 (1996) (discussing Charles II order for Militia to disarm all
subjects); Jeremy Rabkin, CostitutionalFirepower: New Light on the Meaning of the
Second Amendment to Keep and BearArms, The Origins of an Anglo-American Right, 86
J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 231, 239 (1995) (indicating Militia Act of 1662 permitted
army to disarm at discretion).
92 See MALCOLM, supra note 76, at 116 (stating that Act allowed militia to disarm
and imprison men without cause); see also Thomas B. McAffee and Michael J. Quinlan,
Bringing Forward the Right to Keep and Bear Arms: Do Text, History, or Precedent
Stand in the Way?, 75 N.C. L. REV. 781, 836 n.173 (1997) (discussing placing of militia
under crown's direct authority). See generally, Robert Harman, The People's Right to
BearArms - - What the Second Amendment Protects:An Analysis of the CurrentDebate
Regarding What the Second Amendment Really Protects,18 WHrrIIR L. REv. 411, 416
(1997) (discussing interrelation between Militia Act and building up of crown's army).
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The 1670 Games Act also disturbed the people of England.
Although ostensibly a game act, the law "deprived the great
majority of the community all legal right to have firearms." 93
Where previous game acts were enforced by justices of the peace
and local constables, this law empowered the gentry to enforce
the law on their own estates. 94 Not only did the law prohibit
ownership of a gun for any reason, including personal protection,
it "effectively transferred nearly exclusive power of the sword to
95
the county gentry."
The political needs of James II prompted the attempt to
actually disarm the English people. When James ascended to the
throne in 1685, he was a practicing Catholic in a country that
was overwhelmingly Protestant. At the time, England operated
under the 1673 Test Act that was designed to preclude Catholics
from public office by requiring all public officials to take the
Anglican sacrament. 96 During his short reign, James II devoted
himself to increasing the power of Catholics in the army and the
royal governing system. The Test Act proved no impediment to
these designs as he appointed large numbers of Catholics to
positions of power. 97 James's reign also witnessed a huge
93 MALCOLM, supra note 76, at 65. Malcolm and other commentators refer to this law
as the 1671 Game Act. Statutes at large indicate that the law was passed in 1670. The
law specifies that those not having lands of a yearly value of 100 pounds "are hereby
declared to be persons by the laws of this real not allowed to have or keep for themselves,
or any other person or persons, any guns, bows. .. but shall be and are hereby prohibited
to have, keep or use the same." 22 Car. 2, ch. 25, § 2; see also Schwoerer, supra note 88,
at 35 (discussing this restrictive measure). Malcolm argues that this was the first law to
criminalize possession of firearm per se; "[i]t was no longer necessary to prove illegal use
or intent... " Malcolm, supra note 60, at 304.
94 MALCOLM, supra note 76, at 70 (stating that "the new class of gentry-appointed
officials placed the task of game preservation directly in the hands of the gentry .. ");
see also Kopel, supra note 89, at 1346 (discussing use of law by gentry to search
selectively). See generally Schwoerer, supra note 88, at 52 (indicating games act were
enforced according to attitude of local gentry).
95 22 Car. 2, ch. 25 (setting forth language of statute); MALCOLM, supra note 76, at
76; see also Ingram and Ray, supra note 4, at 496 (indicating no one lower in rank than
son could carry gun).
96 See Malcolm, supranote 60, at 95 (describing Act as requiring all public officials to
swear to oaths of allegiance and supremacy to Anglican Church); see also 25 Car. 2, ch. 2
(giving actual language of statute); Laura Zwicker, Note, The Poitics of Toleration: The
Establishment Clause and the Act of Toleration Examined, 66 IND. L.J. 773, 776 (1991)
(indicating Test Act of 1673 made church Anglican domain).
97 See MALCOLM, supra note 76, at 101 (indicating these appointments included at
least one hundred Catholic army officers); see also Hardy, supra note 67, at 578 n.88
(stating at one point, dispensations from Test Act included 2 generals, 6 colonels, 9
majors, 24 captains, and 30 lieutenants). By 1688, half the lieutenants and 800 justices of
the peace had been relieved of their duties and replaced by Catholics or Protestant
ministers. MALCOLM, supra note 76, at 103; Schwoerer, supra note 88, at 44 (stating
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increase in the size of the army. 98 The combination of the larger
army and its increasingly Catholic influence led people to fear
subjugation to Catholicism.99
James II also pursued the tactic of disarming his opponents.
In 1686 he ordered the militia "to cause strict search to be made
for such muskets or guns and to seize and safely keep them until
further order" because "a great many persons not qualified by
law, under pretense of shooting matches keep muskets or other
guns in their houses." 100 The orders were issued under the
authority of the Militia Act or the 1670 Games Act.101 Because of
the size of the project and the fear of alienating the people, it is
possible that the militia failed to carry out the orders on a large
scale.102 Further, as the case of Sir John Knight illustrates, the
courts were not always compliant with regard to James'
disarmament scheme.1 0 3 But the public had little doubt that, as
James II appointed Catholic officers to army and armed Catholic subjects).
98 See MALCOLM, supra note 76, at 101 (indicating these appointments included at
least one hundred Catholic army officers); see also Hardy, supra note 67, at 578 n.88
(stating at one point, dispensations from Test Act included 2 generals, 6 colonels, 9
majors, 24 captains, and 30 lieutenants). By 1688, half the lieutenants and 800 justices of
the peace had been relieved of their duties and replaced by Catholics or Protestant
ministers. Malcolm, supra note 60, at 103; Schwoerer, supra note 88, at 44 (stating
James II appointed Catholic officers to army and armed Catholic subjects).
99 See Vandercoy, supra note 46, at 1016-17 (arguing fear was further exacerbated by
James' policy of quartering new troops in private homes violating public enactments). See
generalyNelson Lund, The Past and Future of the Individual'sRight to Arms, 31 GA. L.
REV. 1, 9 (1996) (noting Declaration complained of keeping of standing armies and
legislation regarding militia); Ann-Marie White, A New Trend in Gun Control: Criminal
Liability for the Negligent Storage of Firearms, 30 Hous. L. REv. 1389, 1393 (1993)
(indicating James II maintained strong army to advance Catholicism).
100 Fields and Hardy, supra note 69, at 13; see also Kopel, supra note 89, at 1347
(discussing James II mass searches for firearms); Joseph E. Olson and David B. Kopel, All
the Way Down the Shppery Slope: Gun Prohibitionin England and Some Lessons for
Civil Liberties in America, 22 HAMLINE L. REV. 399, 402 (1999) (discussing searches
ordered by James II without warrants).
101 See Fields and Hardy, supra note 69, at 13 (stating that James II followed
disarming initiative started by his brother, using Militia Act and Hunting Act); Kates,
supranote 42, at 236 (arguing this disarmament policy had added benefit of discouraging
dissent because, in crime plagued England not many people were courageous enough to
want to live without weapons needed for defense of themselves and their families); see
also Ingrain and Ray, supra note 4, at 496 (setting forth orders issued under Militia Act
and Games Act of 1670); Olson and Kopel, supra note 100, at 403 (stating loss of liberty
resulting from actions authorized under Militia Act and Games Act).
102 See MALCOLM, supra note 76, at 105 (stating that James had given up on his
militia enforcing Acts); see also Malcolm, supra, note 60, at 105 (discussing laws in
England prohibiting ownership of guns). But see Hardy, supra note 67, at 577 (stating at
least one contemporary Londoner said James officers went from house to house to search
for arms, and at some places quantities were seized).
103 See 87 ENG. REP. 75, 75 (1686) (discussing acquittal of defendant accused of
terrifying Kings subjects with weapons); Malcolm supra note 60, at 105 (arguing
defendant was ultimately released because Kings Bench was not prepared to approve use
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James tilted the balance of power towards Catholics, the prospect
of general disarmament loomed greater.104
James's downfall may ultimately have been precipitated by the
birth of his son. The English people may have endured the reign
of one Catholic king, now they were faced with the prospect of a
long line of Catholic rule.10 5 James's eldest daughter, Mary, was
married to William of Orange; both were devoutly Protestant and
fighting for that cause on the continent.10 6 William and Mary
appeared to be the best candidates to reverse England's slide into
Catholic rule. Within a month of the birth of James's son, seven
prominent Englishmen sent a letter to William assuring him the
support of the English people should he lead an invasion. 107 The
strength of James's army was purely illusory. Defections were so
numerous, and those who joined the invaders so great, that
within 6 weeks of landing on England, William had forced James
to flee to France.'08
The Glorious Revolution had been a
bloodless coup. 109
2. The English Declaration of Rights
As a condition to taking power, Parliament required William
of [the Statute of Northampton] to disarm law-abiding citizens).
104 See MALCOLM, supra note 76, at 106 (discussing James's attempt to impose Game
Act and largely Catholic militia as signs of general disarming).
105 See Bogus, supra note 36, at 378-83 (discussing James' desire to restore
Catholicism to England); Malcolm, supra note 60, at 109 (arguing English people were
patient with James because, due to his age, he was unlikely to have another child and,
upon his death, throne would pass to his Protestant daughter, Mary).
106 See MALCOLM, supra note 76, at 109 (discussing William and Mary's fight from
abroad to keep England from falling into Catholic rule); see also HENRY HALLMAN, THE
CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF ENGLAND, volume 2, 245-46 (1978) (explaining William's
diligent preparation for his successful invasion).
107 See MALCOLM, supra note 76, at 110 (stating that invitation to William urged him
to "save the realm"); see also HALLMAN, supra note 106, at 246-47 (discussing invitation to
invade England and pledge of support of English sent to William). See generallyBRIAN L.
BLAKELEY & JACQUELIN COLLINS, DOCUMENTS IN ENGLISH HISTORY: EARLY TIMES TO THE
PRESENT 217 (John Wiley & Sons, Inc. 1975) (describing terms of invitation to William
and Mary to invade).
108 See MALCOLM, supra note 76, at 111-12 (explicating ease and expediency of
William's victory); H. Richard Uviller & William G. Merkel, Symposium on the Second
Amendment: Fresh Looks: The Second Amendmentin Contextz The Case ofthe Vanishing
Predicate,76 Cm.-KENT. L. REv. 403, 449 (2000) (stating that different English factions,
once in opposition, joined forces to support William and Mary's Glorious Revolution); see
alsoHALLMAN, supranote 106, at 252-53 (stating that James' flee to France was favorable
circumstance to revolution).
109 See Hardy, supra note 67, at 579 (discussing James' flee to Continent from
daughter Mary and son-in law, William of Orange); Uviller & Merkel, supra note 108, at
451 (affirming that Glorious Revolution was bloodless victory). See generally Schwoerer,
supranote 88, at 31 (describing events of Glorious Revolution).
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and Mary to accept certain limits on monarchical power. These
limits were set forth in the Declaration of Rights.l"0 The
Declaration of Rights consists of a grievance section and a rights
section. The general grievance was that James II "did endeavor
to subvert and extirpate the Protestant religion and the laws and
liberties of this kingdom..."111 The means utilized by James to
accomplish this end was "[bly causing several good subjects being
Protestants to be disarmed at the same time when papists were
both armed and employed contrary to law..."112 The right that
was intended to address this grievance was set forth as follows:
"That the subjects which are Protestants may have arms for their
defense suitable for their conditions and as allowed by law.. ."l113
Commentators differ in their interpretation of this English
document. The broad right advocates emphasize the absence of
Thus, it is asserted that this
any mention of a militia.114
document transformed the possession of weapons from feudal
duty to individual right.115 Alternatively, it is argued that the

110 See Fields & Hardy, supra note 69, at 20 (describing formulation and goals of
Declaration of Rights); David B. Kopel, The Second Amendment in the Nineteenth
Century, 1998 BYU L. REV. 1359, 1539-40 (1998) (stating that English Declaration of
Rights placed restrictions on government as check on its power); see also Uviller &
Merkel, supra note 108, at 451 (noting that English Declaration of Rights shifted power
from Crown to Parliament).
111 ENGLISH BILL OF RIGHTS (1689), 1 W. & M. (Eng.); BLAKELEY & COLLINS, supra
note 107, at 218-20; The Avalon Project, httpJ/www.yale.edu/lawweblavalon/england.htm
(2001) [hereinafter The Avalon Project]; see also Uviller & Merkel, supra note 108, at 450
(quoting English Declaration of Rights).
112 BLAXELEY & COLLINS, supra note 107, at 119; The Avalon Project, supra note
111; see also Uviller & Merkel, supra note 108, at 449 (stating that English Protestants'
major grievance with James' rule was his royal establishment of army composed
disproportionately of Catholics and Catholic sympathizers).
113 BLAKELEY & COLLINS, supra note 107, at 219; The Avalon Project, supra note
111; see also Kopel, supra note 110, at 1539-40 (quoting English Declaration of Rights).
114 See Fields and Hardy, supra note, 69 at 22 (arguing Declaration recognized
individual right to keep and bear arms that was separate and distinct from related
concept that militia was especially appropriate way of defending free republic).
115 See id.(stating notions of individual rights would spread rapidly throughout
liberal colonies); Kates supra note 42, at 238 (stating right must have been granted to
individuals because there were no states in England to be protected against
disarmament); Malcolm supra note 60, at 306 (stating right was recognized to protect
individuals against militia, precisely because militia had been instrument used to disarm
law-abiding citizens).
This argument is further buttressed by the modification of the wording of the
document in Parliament. The original wording was "[Ilt is necessary for the public safety
that the subjects which are Protestants, should provide and keep arms for their common
defense... " Hardy supra note, 67 at 582. By omitting the reference to common defense,
the final version is consistent only with the view that an individual right was intended.
Id. at 583.

ST JOHN'SJOURNAL OFLEGAL COMMENTARY

document codified "the common law liberty to possess

[Vol. 16:41

arms."

1 16

That this right is explicitly subject to laws passed by Parliament
does not deter the broad rights advocates from their argument.
They argue that existing laws, especially the most offensive
Militia Act and Games Act, were modified at the time of the
declaration to exclude firearms."l 7 This was required to make
the laws compatible with the allegedly newly declared right.118

Furthermore, legislative and judicial acts subsequent to the
Declaration recognize that possession of certain arms for certain

purposes was beyond current government regulation. Several
eighteenth century court cases acknowledge that "a man may
keep a gun for the defense of his house and family. .. " or that
current laws "do not prohibit a man from keeping a gun for his
own necessary defense..." 119 Similarly, unlike previous game
acts, the 1692 Game Act did not specifically list firearms as one
of the prohibited weapons.120 When interpreting this law, the
courts specifically excluded guns from the coverage of the

regulation.121 According to the broad rights interpretation of the
Declaration, the document implicitly put possession of firearms
beyond the reach of the government. One advocate of this view

concludes her analysis as follows:
The English Bill of Rights of 1689, however, not only
116 Kates, supra note 42, at 240; see Fields & Hardy, supra note 69, at 20 (noting
that Declaration was not intended as "radical statement" of rights of individuals); Hardy,
supra note 67, at 580 (stating that Declaration was codification of existing law and not
introduction of new rights).
117 See Fields & Hardy, supranote 69, at 21 (stating that Militia and Game/Hunting
Acts were changed to conform to Declaration of Rights); Malcolm supra note 60, at 309
(noting purposeful exclusion of firearms from Game and Militia Acts). See generally
HALLMAN, supra note 106, at 271 (opining that Declaration and new laws made it
impossible for government to usurp established liberties of people).
118 See Malcolm, supra note 60, at 308 (discussing changes in English laws
subsequent to Declaration of Rights); see also Hardy, supra note 67, at 581-82 (stating
that "firearms were pointedly excluded" from existing laws so as to be consistent with
Declaration of Rights).
119 Kates, supra note 42, at 240 (quoting Mallock v. Eastly, 7 Mod. 482, 489, 87 Eng.
Rep. 1370, 1374 (IB. 1744)) (holding "the mere having a gun was no offense within the
game laws, for a man may keep a gun for the defense of his house and family" and Rex v.
Gardner, 7 Mod. 279, 280, 87 Eng. Rep. 1240, 1241 (K.B. 1739) holding that these Game
Acts do "not extend to prohibit a man from keeping a gun for his necessary defense").
120 See Malcolm, supra note 60, at 309 (discussing prohibitions listed in Game Act of
1692). See generaly Fields & Hardy, supra note 69, at 20-22 (noting that changes in
English law were due to Declaration of Rights).
121 See Malcolm, supra note 60, at 311 (opining that English courts interpreted Acts
so as to exclude use of guns). See generally Fields & Hardy, supra note 69, at 20
(proposing that right to bear arms was recognized as existing law).
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reasserted, but guaranteed, the right of Protestant subjects
to be armed. The qualifying clauses of the Bill that appear
to limit arms ownership were, in fact, interpreted in a way
that permitted Catholics to have personal weapons and
allowed Protestants, regardless of their social and economic
status, to own firearms. The ancillary clause "as allowed by
Law" merely limited the type of weapon that could be legally
owned to a full - length firearm, enforced the ban on shot,
and permitted legal definition of appropriate use. 122
There are several difficulties with this analysis. First, it
evaluates the provision in isolation from the context of history
and the other provisions of the document. The grievance was not
mere disarmament but disarmament of Protestants "at the same
time when papists were both armed and employed." 123 The
declaration was a response to "rulers who disarmed their political
opponents and who organized large standing armies which were
obnoxious and burdensome to the people."124 The declaration
was not a response to the harms that individuals inflicted upon
each other but a response to the harm inflicted upon them by a
monarch.125
In historical context, there is no basis for the
conclusion that the provision was intended to protect the right of
individual self-defense. It was intended to protect the common
needs of the people against an abusive government. 126
The declaration protected the rights of Protestants from
abusive monarchy in two ways. First, it protected their right to
participate in the militia. Although the right to arms provision
122 Malcolm, supra note 60, at 313.
123 Aymette v. State, 21 Tenn. 154, 156 (Sup. Ct. 1840) (quoting English Declaration
of Rights); see also Ehrman & Henigan, supra note 42, at 9 (noting right to bear arms
provision is result of Protestant and Catholic tensions over their respective roles in militia
and army); Kates, supranote 42, at 236 (quoting English Declaration of Rights).
124 Brief for Appellant at 9, U.S. v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174 (1939); see also Stephen P.
Habrook, That Every Man Be Armed The Evolution of a ConstitutionalRight, 54 GEo.
WASH. L. REv. 452, 456 (1986) (noting Declaration of Rights was in response to
dissatisfaction with policies of disarmament and standing armies); Kopel, supra note 89,
at 1349 (quoting draft of British subjects' grievances regarding disarmament and
standing armies).
125 See Aymette, 21 Tenn. at 157 (finding that "The complaint was against the
government The grievances to which they were forced to submit were for the most part of
a public character... "); see also Habrook, supra note 124, at 456 (discussing
dissatisfactions that prompted Declaration of Rights); Kopel, supra note 89, at 1349
(noting grievances of English subjects).
126 See Bellesiles, supra note 88, at 571 (discussing limitations on English right to
bear arms as indicia of collective right to arms); Ehrman & Henigan, supra note 42, at 910 (noting English right to bear arms is limited). But see Malcolm, supra note 60, at 313
(arguing that English right to bear arms is broad, not limited right).
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does not contain the word militia, it is no accident that it
immediately follows the provision against standing armies.127
The provision acts as a militia clause permitting access to
weapons to fulfill the functions of an army without the oppressive
tendencies of an army. 28 Read together, the two provisions
codify the ancient right of possession of weapons collective
security. Two scholars agree that putting the provision into
context makes it clear that the right of Protestants to have arms
was designed to assure that Protestant participation in military
affairs, and related only to the preservation of the Protestant
religion. In that sense, it comprehended what might be termed a
class right rather than an individual right; individual selfdefense was not within its protective purpose.129
The second means of protecting the interests of Protestants
was by transferring power over the militia from the monarch to
Parliament. 130 Because only Parliament had the power to pass
laws regulating access to arms, the security of the people would
no longer be subject to the abusive and self-serving
proclamations of a king. Both the grievance and the right
127 See generally Lund, supra note 99, at 9 (noting wide belief that James II wanted
to impose his religion through standing army); Schwoerer, supra note 88, at 33 (noting
provision of Declaration read as follows: "[tihat the raising or keeping of a standing army
within the kingdom in time of peace, unless it be with the consent of Parliament, is
against law."); The Avalon Project, supranote 111.
128 See Lawrence Delbert Cress, An Armed Community. The Originsand Meaningof
the Rzghit to BearArms, in 71 No. 1 J. OF AM. HIST. 22, 26 (1984) ("[g]uaranteeing access
to arms for Protestants, which was linked in the same sentence to the prohibition against
standing armies, was intended to ensure a stable government free from the disruptions
caused by Catholic Jacobites and the ambitious intrigues of future monarchs."); see also
Ehrman & Henigan, supra note 42, at 14 (arguing English Bill of Rights was restatement
of preference of militia and rights of Protestants to participate in military); Schwoerer,
supranote 88, at 38-39 (noting that provision guaranteed collective right).
129 Feller & Gotting, supra note 55, at 481; see Aymette, 21 Tenn. at 157 (stating that
when, therefore, Parliament says, "that subjects which are Protestants may have arms for
their defense, suitable for their condition as allowed by law", it does not mean for their
private defense, but being armed, they may as a body, rise up to defend their just rights,
and compel their rulers to respect the laws).
130 See Bogus, supra note 36, at 383 n.365 (quoting JACK RAKOVE, ORIGINAL
MEANINGS: POLITICS AND IDEAS IN THE MAKING OF THE CONSTIrTIION (1996), for the
proposition that "[tihe Declaration asserted both parliamentary and popular rights; but
its crucial feature was that all the rights it proclaimed were to be protected against abuse
by the Crown, the great and even sole danger to English rights and liberties."); Joyce Lee
Malcolm, Gun Control and the Constitution: Sources and Exploration of the Second
Amendment, 62 TENN. L. REV. 813, 813 (1995) (citing U. S. Supreme Court Justice Joseph
Story for statement that Second Amendment was people's protection against "the
usurpation and arbitrary power of rulers"); David S. Williams, Civi Republicanism and
the Citizen Militia: The Terrifying Second Amendment 101 YALE L.J. 551, 560(1991)
(describing citizenry as "structure" ready to defend liberty against state and federal
governments).
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demonstrate that the Declaration was intended to protect the
people from abusive government, not as a means of individual
self-defense.
The second problem for broad rights advocates is more serious.
Whatever right is recognized by the provision, it is specifically
subject to government control. This is subversive to their view of
the Second Amendment in which the right to arms is beyond all
government control.131 The first restriction is that the people
have a right to arms only as "suitable to their conditions."'132 But
the right to arms had always been subject to this restriction. For
example, the 1670 Game Act restricted possession of arms to
those of sufficient wealth.13 3 The Declaration thus codified the
historic English principle that access to arms was specifically not
a universal right.134 Secondly, the Declaration makes clear that
it is within the province of Parliament to decide what the
conditions to possess are. 135 Prior to the Declaration, Parliament
131 See Kates, supra note 42, at 237-38 (arguing that qualification of Parliamentary
control is manifestly unimportant in interpreting Second Amendment, which was
expressly intended to restrict legislative as well as executive branch); Id. at 237 (opining
that importance of English Bill of Rights is undeniable support for individual right
position); Id. at 238 (declaring that contextual analysis of document suggests that right
existed only for common defense, not individual or self-defense purposes); see also supra
text accompanying notes 123-130.
132 See Herd, supra note 7, at 202 (stating that true purpose of Games Act of 1671
was to permit selective disarmament based on social class); Wayment, supra note 35, at
212 (declaring that American colonists carried from England deep-seated belief that right
to bear arms primarily served as defense against despotic attempts to subvert liberty);
Kevin J. Worthen, The Right to Keep and Bear Arms in Light of Thornton: The People
and EssentialAttributes ofLiberty, 1998 BYU L. REV. 137, 165 (1998) (stating that right
protects sovereignty of people and is not necessarily constitutional right to possess arms
for any other purpose).
133 See MAICOLM, supra note 76, at 120 (recognizing that "for generations, citizens
had been required to contribute arms to the militia according to their condition, that is,
according to their rank and income."); see also Herd, supra note 7, at 202 (pointing out
that restricting arms to land-owning class gave King control of militia loyal to him);
Kopel, supra note 89, at 1345 (stating Act's purported concern with deterring poachers
was pretext in pursuit of Crown's policy of disarmament).
134 See Aymette, 21 Tenn. at 154, 157 (stating "the law, we have seen, only
allowed persons of certain rank to have arms, and consequently this declaration of right
had reference to such only. It was in reference to these facts, and to this state of English
law, that the second section of the amendment to the Constitution of the United States
was incorporated into that instrument."); Funk, supra note 89, at 425 (referring to law's
ancient origins as dating back to 1300's). But see Docal, supranote 91, at 1105-06 (stating
that English Declaration of Rights adopted by Parliament in 1689 recognized historical
right of individuals to bear arms).
135 See Aymette, 21 Tenn. at 157 (affirming that English Declaration of Rights gave
Parliament right to grant privilege to bar arms to certain people); Bogus, supra note 36,
at 385 (arguing that because Declaration was intended to restrain power of monarchy,
this phrase must refer to power of Parliament); The Avalon Project, supra note 111
(stating King may not suspend or execute any laws without consent of Parliament).
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could enact a law that effectively disarmed all Englishmen. 36
This power remained unchanged by the document; it was the
power of the crown that was diminished. As law professor Carl
Bogus has argued, the document "did not give Protestants an
individual right to have arms; it decreed that Parliament, and
not the crown, would determine the right of Protestants to have
arms." 137
Both before and after the Glorious Revolution,
individuals had a right to be armed only at the forbearance of
government.
3. Conclusion from English History
Prior to the Glorious Revolution, the English people had no
right to be armed. Access to arms was permitted as a means of
providing for their common defense. It was always recognized to
be within the power of the Parliament or the Crown to restrict
ownership of arms to whatever degree necessary or expedient.
All participants in the Second Amendment debate agree that the
Declaration of Rights did not create any new rights for the
English people.13 8 Read in the context of the document, the arms
provision was in actuality a militia provision, permitting
individual access to arms for the limited reason of common
defense. The provision shifted the right to control the militia
from the monarch to the Parliament, which presumably would be
less abusive of the rights of the people in general and Protestants
There has never in English history been
in particular.
recognized an individual right to possess arms that transcended
the power of the government to restrict arms. As one scholar has
136 See Kates, supra note 42, at 237 (stating Parliament intended phrase "allowed by
law" to preserve its power to disarm citizens); Joyce Lee Malcolm, That Every Man Be
Armed: The Evolution ofa ConstitutionalRighzt 54 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 452, 456 (1986)
(pointing out that 1688 English Bill of Rights required Parliamentary approval for
maintaining professional armies during peacetime); see also Bellesiles, supra note 88, at
571 (declaring that right to bear arms under English Bill of Rights was limited by

religious belief, social condition, and law).
137 Bogus, supranote 36, at 384.
138 See Bogus supra note 36, at 378 n.330 (quoting British historian Thomas
Babington Macaulay as follows: "Not a single new right was given to the people. The
whole English law, substantive and adjective, was, in the judgment of all the greatest
lawyers, of Holt and Treby, of Maynard and Somers, exactly the same after the
Revolution as before it."); Olson & Iopel, supra note 100, at 402 (stating that Declaration
of Rights was prepared by Parliament in haste and viewed as statement of existing rights
of Englishmen); Wayment, supra note 35, at 208 (declaring that Parliament sought to
codify the right to keep and bear arms as one among many of people's ancient rights and
liberties).
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said:
the first "right to bear arms" to achieve constitutional
recognition was penned in an age, and by men, well-knowing
that there were inherent limitations on such a right limitations properly derived from essential power of their
government, and limitations which had, and could have, no
relation to the political oppressions which engendered the
right. The right to bear arms, therefore, was established as
a "fundamental principle" by nations well aware of the
- i.e., the protection of the
parallel principle of police power 139
public health, safety, and welfare.
The proposition that all gun ownership is within the power of
the Parliament to regulate has surely been confirmed by the
history of England subsequent to the Declaration of Rights.
Firearms have been stringently regulated,' 4 0 and "for all
practical purposes the average citizen cannot lawfully obtain
firearms in Great Britain at the present time."14 1 The broad
rights advocates must therefore argue that the Second
Amendment prohibits American law making bodies from
regulating guns when English legislators have come to the
opposite conclusion regarding the Declaration of Rights. It is an
argument of surpassing irony that American law respects the
fundamental rights established by British history better than the
British do. 142

139 Rohner, supranote 47, at 63.
140 See Rohner, supra note 47, at 63 (stating some of more significant British
regulations are Gun License Act of 1870, Pistols Act of 1903, and Firearms Act of 1937).
See generallyBellesiles, supra note 88, at 573 (stating that careful circumspection of gun
ownership in early New England colonies was based on English common law); Herd,
supra note 7, at 199-204 (reviewing history of English firearm regulation).
141 Feller & Gotting, supra note 55, at 49.
142 See Kates, supranote 42, at 237-38 (arguing that this position completely misses
distinction between American system of constitutional rights and nonconstitutional
English system in which even most sacrosanct rights guaranteed by one Parliament may
be abrogated by its successors); see also Randy E. Barnett and Don B. Kates, Under Fire:
The New Consensus on the Second Amendment, 45 EMORY L.J. 1139, 1220 (1996)
(pointing out courts, under Necessary and Proper Clause of U.S. Constitution, would be
empowered to decide constitutionality of act of Congress prohibiting any person from
bearing arms even as means of preventing insurrection). But see Hers, supra note 17, at
57-58 (arguing that Second Amendment right to bear arms is limited by Supreme Court
decision to well- regulated militia and law-making bodies have abrogated their duty and
prerogative to create viable anti-gun legislation).
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B. The American Right to BearArms
1. Militias and Standing Armies in the Colonies
Law and tradition traveled across the Atlantic with the
colonists. The number of dangers facing the colonists demanded
an active militia system. 43 The English army was far too remote
to provide any means of defense when needed.144 The system
essentially mimicked the English militia concept by requiring
that everyman of military age and capacity was enrolled for
military service and was required by law to provide and keep at
his own expense specified arms and equipments for such use. 145
As in England, the militia acted as both a police force and a
military force.14 6 Use of the militia system was a consequence of
both political and economic considerations. Undoubtedly, the
history of abuses suffered by the English people at the hands of a
standing army were well known to the colonists. But even had a
standing army been desired, the colonies were too poor to muster
either the manpower or the finances to maintain one. 147
Sentiment against standing armies grew as the colonies
143 See David T. Harry, Armed Citizens, Citizen Armies: Toward a Jurisprudenceof
the Second Amendment, 9 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POLY 559, 587-88 (1986) (stating colonists
in New World needed private armament to degree unknown in their motherland due to
shortage of fighting manpower, external danger in form both of Indians and of rival
Dutch, French, and Spanish colonists, and heavy dependence upon hunting for their meat
supply); Herd, supra note 7, at 204 (declaring that natural threats present in colonies
inspired colonists to duplicate militia system developed under their English heritage);
Kates, supra note 42, at 214 (pointing to colonists inability to afford cost of maintaining
standing army as primary motive for adoption of English militia system).
144 See Kates, supra note 42, at 215 (stating England was too far away to defend
colonies). See generallyHerd, supranote 7, at 204-05 (noting need for colonists to protect
themselves); Ingram & Ray, supra note 4, at 497 (discussing need for colonists to protect
themselves).
145 But see Kates, supra note 42, at 215 (arguing duty applied to all households, not
just those with males of military age and capacity). See generallyHerd, supra note 7, at
205 (noting duty imposed on colonist to keep arms and participate in militia).
146 See Kates, supra note 42, at 215 n.46 (stating "[uin Virginia in 1623, it was
forbidden to travel without being 'well armed;' in 1631, colonists were required to engage
in targeting practice on Sunday, and then 'bring their pieces to Church.' A 1658 statute
required every household to have a functioning firearm; in 1673, it was required that
anyone who was too poor to purchase a firearm would have one purchased for him.
Massachusetts required both citizens and indentured servants to possess arms"); Id at
215 (discussing duties of colonial militia); see also Fields & Hardy, supranote 69, at 23-24
(discussing role of colonial militia).
147 See Herd, supra note 7, at 204 (discussing lack of funding and manpower for
colonial standing army); Kates, supranote 42, at 214 (noting colonists did not have funds
or manpower to maintain standing army); Encarta Encyclopedia, Mil'tia, available at
http:llencarta.msn.com/index/conciseindex/AC/OAC75000.html (last visited Oct. 21, 2001)
(noting lack of colonial funds for army).
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became restless under British rule. The Seven Year War 48 was
the colonies first experience with a standing army of professional
troops. 49 The presence of the army generated hostility among
those citizens who initially refused to pay for lodging and
supplies for the troops. 150 They capitulated only after being
threatened with the presence of yet more troops.151 Victory in
the war created a larger frontier that England was now forced to
defend.152 This, of course, required more men and greater
expenses forced upon the colonists.
In 1765, the British
Parliament enacted both the Quartering Act, requiring
Americans to pay for lodging and supplies for the soldiers, and
the Stamp Act, to raise revenue to cover the costs of maintaining
the army. 153 As the number of troops increased, so did tensions
with the citizens; "the newspapers of the time were filled with
reports of insults, fights, robberies, and rapes attributed
(correctly or not) to the British troops." 5 4 The hostilities grew
more intense due to the Boston Massacre in 1770 in which
148 See BRITANNICA

ENCYCLOPEDIA,

French and Indian War, available at

http://www.britannica.com/eb/article (last visited November 20, 2001) (discussing portion
of Seven Years War that involved British colonies in America); Lectures on American
at
and
Indian
Wars,
available
History,
The
French
http'/www.cs.unm.edu/sergiy/amhistory/ (last visited November 20, 2001) (discussing
history and nature of Seven Years War).
149 See Fields & Hardy, supra note 69, at 24 (noting use of standing army in colonies
during war); Herd, supra note 7, at 205 (discussing English use of standing army in
colonies); Ingram & Ray, supra note 4, at 497 (noting England sent standing army to
colonies during Seven Years War).
150 See Ehram & Henigan, supra note 42, at 14-15 (discussing colonial objections to
standing armies); see also JOHN DERRY, Engi'sh PoliticsandAmerican Revolution 51 (St.
Martin's Press 1977) (noting objections to standing army); Fields and Hardy, supra note
69, at 24 (noting colonial dissatisfaction with having to pay for standing army).
151 See Fields & Hardy, supranote 69, at 24. See generailyDERRY, supra note 130, at
51 (stating same); Ehram & Henigan, supra note 42, at 14-15 (noting colonial
dissatisfaction with paying for standing army).
152 See Fields & Hardy, supra note 69, at 24 (noting that England's territory
increased after war); see also DERRY, supra note 130, at 51 (listing additional territories
England acquired after war); Lectures on American History, supra note 148 (discussing
additional territories acquired by England as result of war).
153 See Fields & Hardy, supra note 69, at 24-25 (discussing Stamp and Quartering
Acts); see also C.A. WESLAGER, The Stamp Act Congress 34-35 (Univ. Del. Press 1976)
(describing passage of Stamp Act); The American Revolution, The Stamp Act, The
at
Act;
available
Quartezng
http//www.cit.usfca.edu/AuthEd/A.Revolution/StampQuart.html (last visited November
20, 2001) (discussing Stamp Act and Quartering Act).
154 Hardy, supra note 67, at 589; see 0. DICKERSON, BOSTON UNDER MILITARY RULE
xi (1936) (discussing how British soldiers were encouraged to be insolent, abusive and act
criminally without repercussions within Boston); see also Joseph C. Sweeney, The
Admiralty Law ofArthurBrowne,26 J. MAR. L. & COM. 59, 67 (1995) (noting that Samuel
Adams, "that genius of revolutionary communication," developed incident of March 5,
1770 into Boston Massacre).
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killed

five

The mounting likelihood of violence caused the British to
attempt to disarm the colonists. The fear that the Americans
were arming and organizing themselves for war led to a ban on
the British export of muskets and ammunition to the colonies.
The British troops confiscated stores of weapons used by the
militias at a number of sites, including Williamsburg, Salem and
Concord.1 56 The efforts ultimately had the opposite of the desired
effect; the raids precipitated the battles of Lexington and
Concord and directly led to the Revolutionary War.157 There is
no doubt that the mind of the American colonist linked the
presence of the standing army to the evils that they had
suffered.158 According to the Declaration of Independence, one of
155 See Leonard J. Long, The Life and Death ofLaw: Law's Role as the Bastardin
William Shakespeare's the Life andDeath of King John, 18 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 1, n. 196
(1998) (noting soldiers on trial for Boston Massacre received either acquittals or releases
by pleas of "benefit of clergy"). But see Cress, supra note 128, at 28 (asserting that this
event "left little doubt that hired soldiers could be the agents of political oppression" and
this political oppression and Boston Massacre in general, made revolution inevitable for
many colonists). See generally,Stephanie A- Doria, Adding Bite to the Watchdogs Bark:
Reforming the California Civil Grand Jury System, 28 PAC. L.J. 1115, n.64 (1997)
(indicating that after Boston Massacre there is some evidence suggesting that Boston
grand jury may have indicted four innocent civilians suspected of being British
sympathizers after Boston Massacre); L. Kinvin Wroth, TraditionalForms of Sub Federal
Institutions:Article: Notes for a Comparative Study of the Origins of Federalism in the
United States and Canada,15 ARIZ. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 93, 107(1998) (explaining that
Boston Massacre of 1770 made revolution inevitable for many colonists).
156 See Ingram and Ray, supra note 4, at 497 (asserting that British attempts to
disarm colonists following Stamp Act in 1765 culminated with their seizure of stores of
ammunition and weapons in 1775); see also Feller & Gotting, supra note 55, at 53
(observing there is no record of any individual having been disarmed by British nor any
evidence that either populace or revolutionary leaders conceived that any individual right
to bear arms was violated by British colonial policy and noting that battles of Lexington
and Concord were not engendered by British intentions to disarm single man, but rather
their move to disarm militia); Hardy, supra note 67, at 590-92 (noting various ways
British attempted to disarm colonists, including banning exports of guns and ammunition
to colonies, seizing stores of weapons and ammunition, and even offering to allow trade
outside of Boston if Bostonians surrendered all firearms).
157 See Ingram and Ray, supra note 4, at 497 (indicating these seizures led to battles
of Lexington and Concord and eventually Revolutionary War); see also Hardy, supranote
67, at 591 (asserting that confrontation with local militiamen forced British column to
back off to avoid bloodshed at Salem, Massachusetts and British column was forced to
withdraw into Boston with heavy casualties at Concord); David E. Murley, Private
Enforcement of the Social Contract:DeSahney and the Second Amendment Right to Own
Firearms, 36 DuQ. L. REV. 827, 832-833 (1998) (noting that repression and seizure of
colonist's weapons led to colonial militia preventing English from seizing firearms at the
armory in Salem, Massachusetts and two months later the English were driven back at
Concord).
158 See Feller & Gotting, supra note 55, at 49 (discussing British transgressions of
quartering troops in private homes, independence and superiority of military power over
civil power, court-martialing of citizens, use of mercenary soldiers, and seizure of militia
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the "injuries and usurpations" committed by King George was
that "[h] e has kept among us, in times of peace, Standing Armies,
without the consent of our legislators.' 59 The colonial experience
thus essentially confirmed the English experience with regard to
the relationship between standing armies and militias. First,
standing armies were instruments of oppression and must
remain under "control of the civil authority and only under
Second, in ordinary
extraordinary circumstances.. ."160
circumstances, a militia was "the proper instrument in a free
society to provide for the defense of individual states."1 61 But
there appears to have been little notion of the right of the
individual to the possession of guns. The emphasis was on the
need of a militia to substitute for a standing army to protect the
collective security of the people.
2. State Constitutions and Declarations of Rights
With the prospect of independence from England looming,
many colonies began drafting constitutions. These documents
shed light on the rights of the people deemed important enough
to codify in a constitution. 162 Initially, it should be noted that the
original twelve state constitutions had provisions relating to the
military. Most of the documents prohibited standing armies and
arms). See generally GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERIcAN REPUBLIC 82
(Univ. N.C. Press 1969) (stating Crown had become scapegoat for all colonial ills); Murley,
supra note 157, at 833 (asserting that resentment evoked by British in attempting to
disarm colonists had lasting effect); Robert W. Scheef, 'Pubibc Citizens" and the
Constitudon: Bridging the Gap between Popular Sovereignty and Oriinal Intent, 69
FORDHAmI L. REv. 2201, 2209 (declaring that regardless of what they had actually done,
English Crown came to bear "full load" of colonist's dissatisfactions and frustrations).
159 Ind. Univ. Sch. of Law, Bloomington, The Declaration of Independence of the
Thirteen Colonies, available at http:/www.law.indiana.edu/uslawdocs/declaration.html
(last visited November 20, 2001).
160 Feller & Gotting, supra note 55, at 53; see also Captain John A. Carr, Free
Speech in the Mli'tary Community Striking a Balance between Personal Rights and
Mi'litay Necessity, 45 A.F. L. REV. 303, 312 (1998) (stating that Founding Fathers
favored militia to standing army because of restraint on civil liberties in military
environment); Major Kirk L. Davies, The Imposition ofMartialLaw in the United States,
49 A.F. L. REv. 67, 75 (2000) (stating historically strong dislike of strong military roles in
society).
161 Feller & Gotting, supra note 55, at 53. See generallyMajor J. Davidson & Major
Steve Waiters, Neither Man nor Beast: The National Guard Technician, Modern Day
Mlitary Minotaur, 1995 ARMY LAW. 49, 50 (1995) (stating National Guard serves as
today's modem militia with duties limited to defense of states); Kevin D. Szczepaski,
Comment, Searchingfor the PlainMeaning of the Second Amendmen4 44 BUFF. L. REV.
197, 197-98 (1996) (discussing purpose of militia is for security of free states).
162 See Hardy, supranote 67, at 597 (stating that these documents contained all pre1787 American guarantees of rights available).
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set forth the militia as the proper defense of a free state. 163 Only
four of the constitutions specified a right to bear arms. 164 Among
these states, Massachusetts also included a right to keep arms. 165
It will be argued that even these states did not intend to
recognize a broad individual right to firearms. But even if such a
broad right were codified by these documents, that only a
minority did so militates against the conclusion that there was

"strength and universality of contemporary sentiment.. ."166 in
favor of a right to possess arms for any purpose.
The Virginia Constitution is widely regarded as the most
influential. It was the first drafted and hence became the model
for other states. 167 Further, this document had the most
dramatic impact on the drafting of the federal Bill of Rights.168
Article XIII of the Virginia Declaration of Rights set forth the
following:
That a well-regulated Militia, composed of a body of the
people, trained to arms, is the proper, natural, and safe
defense of a free State; that Standing Armies, in time of
peace, should be avoided as dangerous to liberty; and that, in
all cases, the military should be under strict subordination to
and governed by civil power.169 It is argued by broad rights
163 See Ehrman & Henigan, supra note 42, at 15-16 (discussing establishment of
state constitutions). See generally Davidson & Walters, supra note 161, at 50 (stating
National Guard serves as today's modem militia with duties limited to defense of states);
Szczepanski, supra note 161, at 197-98 (discussing purpose of militia is for security of free
states).
164 See Feller & Gotting, supra note 55, at 54-56 (stating that Pennsylvania, North
Carolina, Massachusetts and Vermont were only states providing for right to bear arms).
See generally Ehrman & Henigan, supra note 42, at 15 (discussing establishment of state
constitutions).
165 See Feller & Gotting, supra note 55, at 56 (pointing out that Massachusetts had
extended right to bear arms).
. 166 Kates, supra note 42, at 222. But see Lois G. Schwoerer, Symposium on the
Second Amendment: Fresh Looks: To Hold and Bear Arms: The English Perspective, 76
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 27, 28 (2000) (discussing how individuals had right to bear arms for
any purpose); Wayment, supra note 35, at 212-19 (discussing historical background that
prompted forefather to grant right to bear arms for any purpose).
167 See Ehrman & Henigan, supra note 42, at 16 (addressing influential nature of
Virginia Constitution); see also, Feller & Gotting, supra note 55, at 54 (focusing on
influence of Virginia due to outstanding leaders and thinkers such as George Mason,
James Madison, Thomas Jefferson, Patrick Henry, George Washington, and John
Marshall).
168 See Ehrman and Henigan, supra note 42, at 16 (stating that Virginia's influence
can be seen in six amendments being adopted in federal Bill of Rights which were first
expressed, at least partially, in Virginia's Declaration of Rights and in James Madison,
who participated in Virginia's Convention and later authored federal Bill of Rights).
169 Erhman & Henigan, supra note 42, at 16; see also Robert Dowlut, Gun Control
and the Second Amendment, 15 U. DAYTON L. REV. 59, n.2 (1989) (stating that California,
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advocates that this declaration is an "inclusive statement"
that combines four Second Amendment issues: "the right of
the individual to possess arms, the fear of the professional
army, the reliance on militias controlled by individual states,
and the subordination of the military to civilian to
control." 170 The plainest meaning of the declaration is to
establish a militia in place of a standing army.171 If there is

any grant of an individual right, it is only that the body of
the people have a right to access arms in order to fulfill this
military function. Even this right is only implicitly granted,
as necessary to secure "the proper, natural, and safe defense
of a free State.

..

"

There is no basis for reading this

provision as recognizing an individual right beyond a
military function.
A majority of states followed Virginia's lead. New Jersey's
Constitution made no reference to a right to bear arms. 172 The
Delaware document provided that "a well - regulated militia is
the proper, natural and safe defense of a free government."173
The Maryland declaration was virtually the same. 174 Both
Delaware and Maryland's documents stand for the proposition
that substituting a militia in place of a standing army is an
Iowa, Maryland, Minnesota, New Jersey, New York, and Wisconsin do not have specific
guarantees to bear arms); David B. Kopel, RationalBasis Anaysis of 'Assault Weapon"
Prohibition,20 J. CONTEMP. L. 381, 382-83, (1994) (noting that New Jersey is one of seven
states that does not have state constitutional right to bear arms).
170 Feller & Gotting, supra note 55, at 55. See Jeremy Rabkin, Constitutional
FirepowerNew L'ght on the Meaning of the Second Amendment to Keep andBearArms,
the Origins of an Anglo-American RPgh 86 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 231, 241 (1995)
(noting that Delaware Constitution of 1776 stated implicit endorsement of individuals'
right to bear arms).
171 Feller & Gotting, supra note 55, at 55; see also Robert J. Cottrol & Raymond T.
Diamond, Freedom: Constitutional Law: 'Never Intended to Be Applied to the Wb'te
Population" FirearmsRegulation and RacialDisparity -The Redeemed South's Legacy to
a National Jurisprudence, 70 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 1307, 1314-15 (1995) (stating that
Maryland Constitution declared militia as "proper and natural defence of free
government").
172 See Feller & Gotting, supra note 55, at 55; see also Cottrol & Diamond, supra
note 171, at 1314-15 (stating that Maryland Constitution declared that militia is "proper
and natural defense of free government").
173 Cress, supra note 128, at 30; see Dowlut, supra note 169, at 27 (noting that New
York ratified U.S. Constitution while expressing belief that people have right to bear
arms).
174 See Cress, supra note 128, at 30. New Hampshire also exempted from militia
service those "conscientiously scrupulous about the lawfulness of bearing arms.. ." Id. at
31. It is argued that this clause demonstrates that militia clauses were not to permit
broad access to arms but to guarantee the efficacy of militias, thus, "the individual right
of conscience was asserted against the collective responsibility of the citizenry for the
common defense." Id. Pennsylvania, Delaware, Vermont, and New York also recognized
exemptions from service in the militia due to objections of the conscience. Id. at 30-31.
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"essential right in maintaining governments of free men." 175
New Hampshire's Constitution declared that "[a] well regulated
militia is the proper, natural, and sure defense of a state."176 It is
indisputable that a majority of states followed Virginia's lead in
guaranteeing the existence of a militia in place of a standing
army. If there is any right associated with this principle, it is
only the right to have arms for the cause of common defense.177
The constitutions of Pennsylvania, Massachusetts, Vermont,
and North Carolina all make reference to the right to bear
arms.1 7 8 Pennsylvania is generally regarded as the leader of this
group.' 79 The Pennsylvania Constitution recognizes:
That the people have a right to bear arms for the defense of
themselves and the state; and as standing armies in the time
of peace are dangerous to liberty, they ought not to be kept
up; And that the military should be kept under strict
subordination to, and governed by, the civil power.180
175 Hardy, supranote 67, at 594 argues:
It has been claimed that the Second Amendment's choice of words... indicates a desire to
protect the States against federal infringement of their right to possess an organized
militia, no individuals in their right to own arms. The inclusion of parallel guarantees in
the state bill of rights entirely refutes this view. There was at this period no federal
government; these state bills of rights were intended, not to grant power to the state
governments, but to reserve indiv dual rightsfrom among the grants of state powers.
There is no textual basis for Hardy's view that these state declarations acted to reserve
individual rights. It is true that essentially the same provision serve essentially different
functions: the state declarations establish that militias will serve in place of a standing
army;, the Second Amendment put the militia beyond the power of Congress to disarm it.
But there is no reason why the same provision cannot address different concerns in the
state constitutions compared to the federal constitution. Hardy also seems to have
changed his mind. In a later article, he recognizes that the Virginia Constitution (and
presumably those constitutions based on it) does not explicitly recognize an individual
right to bear arms. See Fields and Hardy, supra note 69, at 27-28.
176 Cress, supra note 128, at 30; see also Thomas B. McAffee & Michael J. Quinlan,
Bringing Forward the Right to Keep and Bear Arms: Do Text, History, or Precedent
Stand in the Way?, 75 N.C.L. REV. 781, 843 (1997) (stating that Pennsylvania's 1776
Declaration of Rights included first provision guaranteeing right to bear arms and
subsequent state constitutions used similar language for similar guarantees); Wayment,
supra note 35, at 214 (stating that Pennsylvania, North Carolina, Vermont, and
Massachusetts have adopted provisions guaranteeing right to bear arms).
177 See Feller & Gotting, supra note 55, at 54; see also Dowlut, supra note 169, at 26
(stating same proposition).
178 See Herd, supra note 7, at 206 (discussing Pennsylvania and Virginia's
constitutional provisions regarding right to bear arms); Szcepanski, supra note 161, at
211-12 (comparing Pennsylvania and Virginia's arms provisions).
179 See Ehrman & Henigan, supra note 42, at 18; see also Steven J. Heyman,
Symposium on the Second Amendment: Yresh Looks.- Natural Rights and the Second
AmendmenA 76 Cma.-KENT L. REV. 237, 266-68 (2000) (discussing Article XIII of
Pennsylvania Declaration of Rights).
180 "Only the citizenry, trained, armed and organized in the militia, could be
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A facial reading of the language seems to suggest a broad right
for individual self-defense, as distinct from defense of the state.
Many commentators do not agree. Comparing the Pennsylvania
with the Virginia provisionl8l indicates that only the first clause
is substantially different. Given that both provisions are written
in the context of limiting the influence of standing armies, it
seems reasonable to conclude "that the arms clause [in the
Pennsylvania Constitution] was, in effect, a substitute for the
militia clause [in the Virginia Constitution.]"18 2 Thus, the
reference to "defense of themselves" is permitted only in
connection with participation in the militia.18 3
depended on to preserve republican liberties for 'themselves' and to ensure the
constitutional stability of 'the state.'" Cress, supra note 128, at 29. A more thorough
explanation of the difference between defense of themselves and defense of the state is as
follows:
under Lockean social contract theory, it would be appropriate to emphasize the
separation between government and the governed. In other words, "defense of
themselves" referred to the collective defense of lives and property of the inhabitants
of the state; "defense of... the state," on the other hand, referred to the protection of
the state political framework and the perpetuation of state sovereignty.
Feller & Gotting, supra note 55, at 55.
These scholars acknowledge that the Pennsylvania provision can reasonably be
interpreted in different ways. They conclude that the right applies only to the collective
defense of the people, "similar to the concept of a militia 'composed of a body of the people'
as found in the Virginia counterpart." Feller & Gotting, supra note 55, at 54. Their
analysis ultimately depends on a comparison to the Virginia provision, and they argue
that "no substantive change was intended by the different wording of the first clause."
Feller & Gotting, supranote 55 at 55.
181 See Feller & Gotting, supranote 55, at 56; see also John V. Orth, "The Law of the
Land'" The North Carolina Constitution and State ConstitutionalLaw: North Carolna
ConstitutionalHistory,70 N.C.L. REV. 1759, 1797 (1992) (comparing right to bear arms
provisions of North Carolina Declaration of Rights and Declaration of Rights of
Pennsylvania, Maryland, and Virginia).
182 Ehrman & Henigan, supra note 42, at 18; see Kopel, supra note 110, at 1359,
n.662 (citing to Pennsylvania Constitution's language that "as standing armies in the
time of peace are dangerous to liberty, they ought not to be kept up"). But see Calvin
Massey, Guns, Extremsts and the Constitution,57 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1095, 1102-1103
(2000) (noting that historian Saul Cornell examined the Pennsylvania Constitution as
well as both private and public comments of its drafters to conclude that there was
considerable conflict over interpretation of the right to bear arms guarantee).
183 See Cress, supra note 128, at 29 notes that "only the citizenry, trained, armed,
and organized in the militia, could be depended on to preserve republican liberties for
'themselves' and to ensure the constitutional stability of 'the state."' However, a more
thorough explanation of the difference between defense of themselves and defense of the
state is as follows: under Lockean social contract theory, it would be appropriate to
emphasize the separation between government and the governed. In other words
"defence of themselves" referred to the collective defense of the lives and property of the
inhabitants of the state; "defence of... the state," on the other hand, referred to the
protection of the state political framework and the perpetuation of state sovereignty.
Feller & Gotting, supranote 55, at 55.
These scholars acknowledge that the Pennsylvania provision can reasonably be
interpreted in different ways. They conclude that the right applies only to the collective
defense of the people, "similar to the concept of a militia 'composed of a body of the people'
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The Pennsylvania Constitution contained the most expansive
right to arms provision. The other constitutions that make
reference to a right to bear arms explicitly indicate that the right
is only in conjunction with the common defense. The language
settled on by North Carolina was "[tihat the people have a right
to bear arms for the defense of the State.'1 84 The Massachusetts
Bill of Rights reads "[t]he people have a right to keep and bar
arms for the common defense, and as in times of peace armies
are dangerous to liberties, they ought not to be maintained
without consent of the legislature."18 5 These states clearly
recognize the right to possess arms only on the condition that
they be used for common defense. There is, in fact, not a single
state constitution at the time that unambiguously recognized the
right to arms for private purposes.18 6 These constitutions grew
out of the historic development that militias were favored over
standing armies due to the oppressive tendencies of the latter.187
There may have been an individual right to bear arms, but the
as found in the Virginia counterpart." Feller & Getting, supra note 55, at 54. Their
analysis ultimately depends on a comparison to the Virginia provision, and they argue
that "no substantive change was intended by the different wording of the first clause."
Feller & Getting, supranote 55, at 55.
184 Feller & Gtting, supranote 55, at 56; see Cottrol & Diamond, supra note 171, at
1315 (noting that North Carolina explicitly recognized right to bear arms in its
Constitution). See generally Murley, supra note 157, at n.32 (affirming that
Pennsylvania, North Carolina, Vermont and Massachusetts all explicitly recognize right
to bear arms).
185 The Massachusetts Constitution of 1780 provided:
The people have a right to keep and to bear arms for the common defence. And as in
time of peace armies are dangerous to liberty, they ought not to be maintained
without the consent of the legislature; and the military power shall always be held in
an exact subordination to the civil authority, and be governed by it.
Uviller & Merkel, supra note 108, at 403, n.682; see Christopher Chrisman,
ConstitutionalStructure and the Second Amendment: A Defense of the IndividualRight
to Keep andBearArms, 43 ARIZ. L. REV. 439,450 (2001); see also Szczepanski, supranote
161, at 220.
186 See McIntosh, supra note2, at 673-74 (asserting that constitutional right of
Congress to raise standing army was considered grave threat to popular liberty, and was
only justified by its necessity for defense against foreign aggressors, therefore, right to
bear arms was intended to check potential abuses of federal government that can raise
standing army). While, Malcolm may be conclusory, her conclusion is shared by other
commentators. See Dennis, supra note 80, at 79 (claiming that attempts to limit
individual right to use and bear arms using theory that Second Amendment only
guarantees arms bearing within context of militia service must inevitably fail).
187 See Davies, supra note 160, at 75 (stating that one renowned commentator noted
that anti-militariam arose in colonial America partly because of belief that professional
soldiers were agents of oppression); see also Stanley H. Friedelbaum, TraditionalState
Interests and ConstitutionalNorms: Impressive Cases im ConventionalSettings, 64 ALB.
L. REV. 1245, 1279 (claiming Ohio Constitution went beyond "a preference for a militia
over a standing army, and the deterrence of governmental oppression that might result
from a pronounced role of the standing army).
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scope of the right was limited to participation in the common
defense.
3. The Constitution and the Second Amendment
In recognition of recent history, the first national document did
not allow for a standing army. All military functions under the
Articles of Confederation were to be performed by state
The weakness of the militia system was easily
militias. 8 8
apparent during the Revolutionary War. 8 9 The weaknesses
became more glaring when the militias struggled to put down
Shay's Rebellion.190 Specific provisions in the Constitution were
intended to rectify these deficiencies. Most importantly, the
Constitution provides for congressional power "[t]o raise and
support Armies but no Appropriation of Money to that Use shall
be for a longer Term than two years..."191 Further, and equally
188 See ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION, art. VI (stating that while it is forbidden to
keep any vessel or any body of forces in times of peace, "every State shall always keep up
a well regulated militia, sufficiently armed and accoutered.. ."); see also LT. James T.
Lang, JAGC, USN, Should I Stay or Should I Go: The NationalGuardDances to the Tune
Called by Two Masters, 39 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 165, 167 (asserting that Articles of
Confederation withheld military power from central government and bestowed powers
upon states); Sam Ruby, "Don'tAsk Don't Tell" and the National Guard-FederalPolicies
on Homosexuality in the Militazy vs. the Milita Clauses of the Constitution, 85 CAL. L.
REV. 955, 960 (1997) (noting nation's military affairs were controlled by state
governments).
189 See Bogus, supra note 36, at 340-41 (stating that Minutemen usually are
regarded as having performed very poorly during war. They were not well trained and
were not good shots. As a result, Minutemen "deserted in droves;" regular soldiers were
positioned behind militia members "with orders to shoot the first militiaman to run."); see
also id. at 340 (commenting that historian Charles Royster notes that as early as 1776,
militia concept had lost all supporters and all states preferred to be defended by
Continental Army); Hardy, supranote 67, at 592 (noting that even broad rights advocate
admits that "[tihe militia generally acquitted themselves poorly during the major
organized battles of the war, and were the subject of constant and bitter criticism."). But
see id at 592 (suggesting that militia played enough of role in small skirmishes that they
helped determine the war's outcome).
190 See Paul Finkelman, A Well-Regulated Militia: the Second Amendment in
HistoricalPerpsective, 76 CH.-KENT L. REV. 195, 211-212 (2000) (stating that in 1786,
group of Massachusetts farmers, led by Daniel Shays, took up arms to protest economic
effects of war. They were able to shut down courts and threatened a civil war with help of
some militiamen that joined their cause. Militiamen from eastern Massachusetts
eventually thwarted Shays' Rebellion, but political leaders took note and supported a
stronger national government); see also Ruby, supra note 188, at 961 (noting that this
was one of situations that proved Articles were too weak); Bruce Ackerman and Neal
Katyal, Our Unconventional Founding,62 U. CRI. L. REV. 475, n.66 (1995) (citing David
Szatmary that "the rebellion convinced the elites of the foreign states that the proposed
gathering at Philadelphia must take place").
191 U.S. CONST. art. 1, §8, cL 12. (finding that Madison and Hamilton convincingly
argued need for a standing army due to failings of militia during Revolutionary War). In
Federalist 25, Hamilton said:
Here I expect we shall be told that the militia of the country is its natural bulwark
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distressing to those opposing centralized power, the militia had
been federalized. Congress was authorized "[t]o provide for
organizing, arming, and disciplining, the Militia, and for
governing such Part of them as may be employed in the Service
of the United States..."1 92 The only militia power reserved to
the states was "the Appointment of Officers, and the Authority of
training the militia according to the discipline prescribed by
Congress."19 3 In the eyes of the Federalists, the past had proven
that the militia, to be effective, had to be federalized. The
discipline of militia members, in particular, was of paramount
concern. 194 Federal authority over the militia would also create
and would be, at all times, equal to the national defense. This doctrine in substance
had like to have lost us our independence. It cost millions to the United States that
might have been saved. The facts, which form our own experience forbid a reliance of
this kind, are too recent to permit us to be the dupes of such a suggestion. The steady
operations of war against a regular and disciplined army can only be successfully
conducted by a force of the same kind.
Federalist 25. WILLS, supranote 5, at 112.
In the Virginia ratifying convention, Madison asserted that relying on militias for
national defense was an open invitation to other countries to attack: "If,Sir, Congress be
not invested with this power, any powerful nation, prompted by ambition or avarice, will
be invited by our weakness to attack us; and such an attack, by disciplined veterans,
would certainly be attended with success when only opposed by irregular, undisciplined
militia." WILLS, supranote 5, at 116. Thus, as Madison argued in Federalist 41, the new
constitutional structure could not possibly prohibit a standing army "unless we could
prohibit in like manner the preparation and establishments of every hostile nation."
WILLS, supranote 5, at 116. See Alan Hirsch, The Militia Clauses of the Constitution and
the NationalGuard 56 U. CIN. L. REV. 919, 933 (1988) (discussing Hamilton's comments
in Federalist 25 of standing army serving "common defense" and "peace or safety of the
community" lest enemies "encircle the union" and nation be at "mercy of foreign
invaders," and that Madison in Federalist 41 declared standing armies necessary to
present "forbidding posture" and for "repelling foreign enterprises on our safety"); see also
Currie, The Constitution in Congress: Substantive Issues in the First Congress, 1789-

1791, 61 U. CHI. L. REv. 775, 815 (1994) (commenting that standing armies in peace time
was major concern of Anti-Federalists).
192 U.S. CONST. art. 1, §8, cl. 16. See generallyAnthony Gallia, Your Weapons, You
Will Not Need Them, 33 AKRON L. REV. 131, 138 (1999) (noting that there was debate

before ratification of Second Amendment over whether provision guarding against
standing armies was necessary); McIntosh, supra note 2, at 673-74 (stating that ability to
raise standing army was considered grave threat to popular liberty and was only justified
when it was necessary against foreign invaders).
193 U.S. CONST. art. 1, §8, cl. 16; see Dennis, supra note 80, at 57 (explaining that
Anti-Federalists wanted decentralized government where federal government did not
have too much power or ability to gain more power over time); Hirsch, supra note 191, at
n.12 (explaining that state's militia control is not reserved 10th Amendment power, but
can be found in Article I §8, clauses 15 and 16 where former specifies only conditions
which justify federal control over militia and latter provides states with authority to train
militia).
194 See Roy G. Weatherup, Standing Armies and Aimed Citizens: An Historical
Analysis ofthe Second Amendment 2 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 961, 983 (1975) (stating that
Madison argued primary object is to secure effectual discipline of Militia and quoting
Madison: "[tihis will no more be done if left to the states separately than the requisitions
have hitherto paid by them. The states neglect their militia now, and the more they are
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uniformity in arms and training.1 95 But of the two means of
military power recognized by the document, a standing army and
a militia, both were put under federal control.
Structuring the military institutions along these lines caused
grave concerns for the Anti-Federalists. These concerns fit with
their "unifying theme... that the new government would
overreach its powers, destroy the states, deprive the people of
their liberty, and create an aristocratic or monarchical
tyranny."196 The Anti-Federalists had two specific concerns with
regard to the military structure of the new country. First, the
document established a standing army, historically a means of
oppression; second, it gave nearly exclusive jurisdiction over the
militia to the federal government.197 Given that the federal
government had been conferred "the crushing power of a
standing army", any resistance by the states against the
government would be futile. 98 But the Second Amendment,
which did not prevent the federalization of the militia, did
consolidates into one nation, the less each will rely on its own interior provisions for its
safety, and the less prepare its militia for that purpose .... The discipline of the militia is
evidently a national concern, and ought to be provided for in the national Constitution.");
see also Uviller & Merkel, supra note 108, at 474 (stating that militia's previous
ineffectual efforts became most compelling impetus to formation of stronger union with
more vigorous executive, reliable military, and effective judicial system); David Yassky,
The Second Amendment: Structure,History and ConstitutionalChange, 99 MICH. L. REv.
588, 608 (2000) (stating that Federalists argued that best security against standing army
was to make militia as available as possible to Federal Government).
195 See Ehrman & Henigan, supra note 42 at 20 (stressing that Federalists
desperately felt that country needed strong central government); see also Bogus, supra
note 36, at 368 (noting that Federalists wanted Congress to have authority to organize
militia as it saw fit); Szczepanski, supra note 161, at 247 n.61 (citing Ehrman & Henigan
and commenting that Federalists argued that in order to have effective militia, extensive
national authority over militias was necessary to en-sure more national uniformity in
arms, discipline and training).
196 Weatherup, supra note 194, at 984; see also Don Higginbotham, The Second
Amendment in Historical Conte4 16 CONST. COMMENT. 263, 268 (1999) (stating that
Anti-Federalists' concern was with states having to share control of their militias with
federal government); Hirsch, supra note 191, at 925 (stating that many framers feared
that federally controlled militia would be used against individual states).
197 See Weatherup, supra note 194, at 987 (commenting that small portion of totally
militia would be made into select unit, much like standing army, and it would also place
exclusive jurisdiction over the militia in hands of general government); see also WILLs,
supranote 5, at 13 (stating that specific provisions that gave rise to concern, according to
Garry Wills, were creation of standing army (Article I, §8, cl. 12), federalizing state
militias through authority to arm, discipline, and call them for national service (Article I,
§8, cl. 15 and 16), and, by making president the commander in chief, combining civil and
military authority "in a way redolent of monarchism.").
198 WILLS, supra note 5, at 120. See generallyDavid Harmer, Second Amendment
Symposium: Securing a Free State: Why the Second Amendment Matters, 1998 BYU L.
REV. 55, 101 n.42 (1998) (noting that Weatherup rejects individualistic view of Second
Amendment).
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nothing to alleviate this concern. Even under the amended
Constitution, the militia was subject to congressional will for pay,
training, equipment, and being called for national service.19 9 The
second concern related to Congress' exclusive ability to "arm"the

militia under Article I, ' 8, clause 16, thus "prevent[ing] the
states from doing so themselves." 200 The combination of the
standing army provision and the militia provision thus
potentially gave the federal government a monopoly on military
force. 201 This was the fear that the Second Amendment, by
putting the militia's access to arms beyond congressional reach,
was intended to address. 20 2 Interestingly, in the discussion
199 See WILLS, supra note 5, at 113 (noting that among four objectionable provisions
of Constitution, Second Amendment did not eliminate, alter, or weaken a single one; thus,
he argues that Amendment did not address this fear of standing armies as threat to
freedom). See generally Paul E. McGreal, UnconstitutionalPolitics, 76 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 519, 542-48 (2001) (discussing the history. of the Constitution, the Congressional
power to create a standing arming, and the Second Amendment); Rodriguez, supra note
35, at 801 (discussing argument set forth by Gary Wills regarding Second Amendment).
200 Ehrman and Henigan, supra note 42, at 28. A [F]ederal control of the militia's
arms would mean that arsenals might go unstocked, that arms not be kept in supply, or
not updated, or not to be kept in repair. Id. See WILLS, supra note 5, at 120; Bogus, supra
note 36, at 340-41. Professor Carl Bogus makes a compelling argument that the purpose
of the Second Amendment was to permit southern states to arm militias as a means of
suppressing slave rebellions. Id. Militias had already proven themselves to be totally
ineffective in fighting war. Id. It is a valid question, then, why militias were conceived to
be necessary at all. Id. Bogus explains that the only active militias in the country were in
the South where they acted as slave patrols. Id. at 336. Such patrols were necessary to
prevent uprisings such as occurred in Stono, South Carolina in 1739 when a slave
insurrection killed twenty one whites. Id. at 333. The Constitution was drafed during a
rime of growing northern antipathy toward slavery. Id at 330. The southern states, and
in particular, foresaw a possibility under the Constitution in which Congress may disable
the militia, leaving the slavery states defenseless against a mass uprising. Id. at 350. The
Second Amendment was thus part of the Constitution's slavery compromise: Congress
was prohibited from emasculating the South's primary instrument of slave control. Id. at
371. Under this interpretation, the constitutional provision defended by broad rights
advocates as a bulwark against government tyranny was ironically intended as a
constitutional codification of the slavery system. Id
201 See Ehrman and Henigan, supra note 42, at 33 (explaining traditional fear of
standing armies in hands of powerful central government had instilled in Americans
belief that militia was proper form of defense, and stating proposed Constitution
authorized standing armies and granted Congress sweeping power over militia, arguing
many saw possibility of Congress failing to maintain militias effectively and were unsure
if states retained authority to do so, and discussing concern from viewpoint of individual
citizen as right to keep and bear arms in his capacity asstate militiaman). See generally
Rodriguez, supra note 36, at 799 (discussing argument by Dennis Henigan regarding
Second Amendment).
202 See WILLS, supra note 5, at 120-121 (stating that amended Constitution would
assure militias could continue their past role, but now with federal support; Madison was
implying that militias were subordinately useful, as he said states would be); see also
Ehrman and Henigan, supra note 42, at 29 (noting that this meaning of Second
Amendment would seem to demonstrate that militia was not viewed as armed citizenry at
large but were instead state-organized bodies, because states, or Congress, failure to
train, organize and arm militias could only have such devastating impact if government
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regarding the concerns with the Constitution and the need for a
Second Amendment solution, there is not a single word spoken
203
about ownership of guns for private purposes.
The Virginia ratification convention is particularly helpful in
was largely responsible for them); Reynolds, supra note 36, at 467-69 (discussing
argument by scholars that Framers of Constitution intended Second Amendment to
protect individual right to arms).
203 See Ehrman and Henigan, supra note 42, at 33:
[I1n none of the conventions, writings, or debates preceding the Second Amendment was
there any discussion of a right to have weapons for hunting, target shooting, self-defense,
or any other non-militia purpose. No such discussion appears in the Constitutional
Convention records, the Anti-federalist writings, Virgina's ratifying debates, state
constitutions of the 1770s, or Congressional debates on the Bill of Rights. Id.
Compare Stephen P. Habrook, To Keep and Bear Their Private Aims: The Adoption of
the Second Amendment, 1787-1791, 10 N. KY. L. REV. 13, 18, 39 (1982) (stating that
typical response of broad right advocate is that right to have weapons is for non-political
purposes, such as self-protection and hunting, but never for aggression, arguing this is
part of heritage of free people; also continuing, stating that those who adopted Bill of
Rights were not willing to clutter it with details such as non-political justifications for
right, or list of what everyone knew to be common arms, such as muskets, scatterguns,
pistols and swords), with WILLS, supra note 5, at 259 (showing that such argument
appears to be extremely dubious, not least because of its schizophrenic logic). If Halbrook
is right, the founders considered the private possession and use of guns to be among the
most important rights, the heritage of a free people. Why then would codifying this most
precious right in the Constitution be considered clutter? Id. As Garry Wills notes, if
Congress had intended the Second Amendment to cover possession of guns for private
uses, it could, with great verbal economy, have said keep at home and bear. Id. Moreover,
the failure to clarify this meaning stands in stark contrast to English history from which
the Second Amendment comes. Id. The right to have arms for non-political purposes was
hardly obvious; English history is replete with examples of forbidding access to guns for
hunting. Id. Given this history, it is exceptionally odd that not a single person put on
record a clarification that the ownership of guns for private purposes was beyond
legislative reach. Id.
But see Edmund S. Morgan, In Love with Guns, N.Y. REV., at 30 (2000) (commenting
that Edmund S. Morgan discuses article written by Michael A. Bellesiles, entitled Arming
America: The Oriins of a National Gun Culture). Arguing perhaps the reason the issue
was never raised at the convention is the exact opposite as the one proposed by Professor
Halbrok. Id. At the time of the founding, guns were not common arms, used widely for
such purposes as self-protection and hunting. Id. As historian Michael A. Bellesiles
demonstrates, guns were far too scarce and cumbersome to be much use to anyone,
including the militia. Id. Muzzleloading muskets were the only kind of gun available until
almost the end of the Civil War. Id. These took minutes to reload and had less range
(about 8 to 10 yards) and accuracy compared to the bow. Id Given this limited military
efficacy, no one is sure why the musket replaced the long-bow as the primary weapon of
the English military. Id. Military practice at the time was to fire a single volley and then
make a charge for hand to hand combat. Id. at 31. Private ownership of arms was simply
not widespread. Id. Most Americans were farmers who did not rely on hunting for meat.
Id. Probate records suggest that only 14% of estates included a gun, and about half of
these were not in working order. Id. at 30. Familiarity with guns was so limited that
those joining the militia had to be taught how to fire. Id. Among those joining the
Massachusetts militia during the French and Indian War only 25% brought their own
guns. Id. The myth of the American gun owner was a means of creating an American
identity from our English forbears. Id. at 32. But it was not until the Civil War that
reality finally reflected this myth. Id.
See generally Bellesiles, supra note 88, at 580-81 (noting that colonies efforts arm
colonists).
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understanding the meaning of the Second Amendment. Among
all of the conventions, Virginia focused on the militia issue most
intensively; further, James Madison, a native Virginian who
participated in the convention, constructed the Amendment
based on the arguments offered in the debate.204 Unfortunately
for the broad rights advocates, the debate focused exclusively on
the fear of federalizing the militia. Anti-federalists such as
George Mason argued that the document allowed Congress to
disarm and render the militia useless: "Congress may neglect to
provide for arming and disciplining the militia; and the state
governments cannot do it for Congress has an exclusive right to
arm them .... "205
Thus, Mason insisted on "an express
declaration that the state governments might arm and discipline
them."206 The critical exchange regarding the jurisdiction over
the militia occurred between James Madison and Patrick Henry.
When Madison responded to the Anti-Federalist challenge by
asserting that the authority to provide arms was concurrent,
Henry noted that this would render the constitutional allocation
of powers over the militia nonsensical:
[Ihf the power be concurrent as to arming them, it is
concurrent in other respects. If the states have the right of
arming them, and concurrently, Congress has a concurrent
power of appointing the officers, and training the militia. If
Congress has that power, it is absurd. To admit this mutual
concurrence of powers will carry you into endless absurdity:
that Congress has nothing exclusive on the one hand, nor the

204 See Henigan, Arms, Anarchy and Second Amendment, 26 VAL. U. L. REV. 107,
117 (1991) (discussing writings by Carl Bogus that describe Virginia as crucial state in
ratification struggle, and not only among most populous and wealthiest states, but
intellectual stature of its leaders - James Madison, Thomas Jefferson, John Marshall,
George Washington, Patrick Henry, George Mason, Edmund Randolph); see also Bogus,
supra note 36, at 326 (discussing Virginia's role in ratification of Constitution);
Vandercoy, supra note 42, at 1024-25 (discussing role of Virginia in ratification of
Constitution).
205 Henigan, supra note 204, at 117-118. See generalyBogus, supranote 36, at 32627 (discussing anti-federalist strategy against ratification of Constitution); Vandercoy,
supra note 42, at 1025 (discussing Mason's assertion that "history has demonstrated that
[an] effective way to enslave a people is to disarm them").
206 Bogus, supra note 36, at 348 (discussing views of Manson with regard to creation,
discipline and arming of militia); compare Vandercoy, supra note 42, at 1025 (discussing
Manson's view of relationship between arms and liberty), with Feller and Gotting, supra
note 55, at 60 (discussing views of John Marshall, who claimed it was obvious that states
retained concurrent right to arm their militias, for "[I]f Congress were to neglect militia
we can arm them ourselves... cannot Virginia import arms?").
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states on the other. 207
Madison was forced to concede that the Constitution did not
grant states the right to arm their militias. He was also forced to
concede that no harm would be incurred if the federal
government did not have this exclusive power. The Second
Amendment thus recognizes the need to guarantee alternative
means of arming the militia "to relieve some of the antiFederalist paranoia about Congress emasculating" the
institution.208 Again, however, the debate strictly concerned
207 Bogus, supra note 36, at 351. Patrick Henry is commonly used by broad rights
advocates to argue in favor of a right to arms for personal reasons. Id.
Gary Wills, To Keep and BearArms, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, Sept. 21, 1995 at 62. Wills notes
that Henry's use of the word arms is cognate with regimentals, such as military
equipment. Id. Wills argues that Henry is saying that if the states could not do this
heretofore, how is the federal government to do it? Id. Wills demonstrates that Henry was
not in favor of the Second Amendment. Id. But if he wanted a broad right to arms, and
this is what the Second Amendment guaranteed, he should have been happy with it and
supportive. Id.
Further, although it is argued that the Second Amendment is a response to Henry's
argument regarding concurrent powers over the militia, his failure to support ratification
should bar him as a source to understand the Constitution. WILLS, supra note 5, at 253.
Jefferson said that the meaning of the Constitution should be located in the words of
those who voted for it, not those who voted against it. Id. at 254. Many of the AntiFederalists quoted by broad rights advocates - Patrick Henry, Richard Whitehill, Richard
Henry Lee, and William Grayson - did not support the amended Constitution, at least in
part, because they lost'the militia argument: they wanted militias instead of a standing
army, not militias and a standing army. Id. at. 121. To attempt to understand the
meaning of the Second Amendment through the words of these people is to violate the
Jeffersonian maxim. Id. at 121.
Thus, Wills argues that use of Henry's words in this manner is an example of the broad
rights school's tendency to use quotes that turn out to be truncated, removed from
context, twisted, or applied to a debate different from that over the Second Amendment.
WILLS, supranote 5, at 62.
208 Bogus, supra note 36, at 352-86. Building on his argument that the Second
Amendment was intended to placate the slave holding states, Bogus asserts that there is
a perfect parallel between the adoption of the Amendment and the adoption of the English
Bill of Rights:
In 1689, Parliament needed to address the fear that Protestants might be disarmed
and left defenseless against Catholics. In 1789, Madison needed to allay the fear that
the militia might be disarmed, leaving whites defenseless against blacks. Madison
followed Parliaments solution. Both the Declaration and the Second Amendment
resolve the problem by transferring the power to disarm the favored group
(Protestants and the militia) from the distrusted arm of government (the Crown and
Congress) to a more trusted authority (Parliament and the states).
See generallyKopel, supranote 12, at 182.
Kopel asserts a case, Houston v. Moore, which is relevant to the concurrence debate.
Id. Houston v. Moore, 18 U.S. 1 (5 Wheat) (1820). In this case, Houston was indicted
under Pennsylvania law for failure to appear for failure to appear for federal militia duty
during the 1821 war. Id. Pennsylvania argued that it had the power to punish militia
members under the Tenth Amendment. Id.; Kopel, supra note 12, at 182. Kopel argues
that if the Second Amendment granted state power over the militia, this would have been
the argument used. Id. However, concurrent power over militia members did not extend
to discipline. Id. The federal government retained exclusive power to discipline under Art.
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arms in the context of a militia and never addressed arms for
personal uses. 209
Following the practice of most states, Virginia appended to
their ratification resolution both a declaration of principles and
suggested amendments. The amendments were "designed to
secure these principles." 210 One principle reads as follows:
Seventeenth, That the people have a right to keep and bear
arms; that a well-regulated Militia composed of the body of
the people trained to arms is the proper, natural and safe
defense of a free state. That standing armies in time of
peace are dangerous to liberty, and therefore ought to be
avoided, as far as circumstances and protection of the
community will admit; and that in all cases the military
should be under
strict subordination to and governed by the
Civil Power. 2 11
The amendment designed to protect these principles reads as
follows:
"Eleventh, That each State respectively shall have the power
to provide for organizing, arming and disciplining it's (sic)
1, §8, cl. 16. Id. The states had concurrent jurisdiction under the Second Amendment only
with regard to providing arms. Id.
But see David Yassky, supranote 53, at 190 (responding to and distinguishing arguments
made by Professor Kopel); Vandercoy, supra note 46, at 1035 (discussing anti-federalist
argument that retention of power by states was necessary to secure rights of people).
209 See Robert Dowlut, The Right to Bear Arms: Does the Constitution or the
PredilectionofJudges Reign , 36 OKLA. L. REV. 65, 91 (1983). Dowlut states:
One author contends that the Second Amendment was not addressing state militias
because [tihe Second Amendment did not grant the states any powers over their militia
that the article 1, section 8 militia clause did not already grant. The power of the states to
legislate on militia matters existed prior to the formation of the Constitution and, not
being prohibited by the Constitution, remains with the states.
This argument ignores the ratification debate in which Anti-Federalists express a fear
that the federal government may have the exclusive power to provide arms to the militia.
In this light, the Second Amendment is intended to mollify these fears by guaranteeing
access to arms in the event of congressional neglect. Id. See generally Rodriguez, supra
note 35, at 803. (discussing proposition that Second Amendment does not guarantee each
individual a right to keep and bear arms for private, non-militia purposes); Steve
Bachmann, StartingAgain With the Mayflower.. .England's Civil War andAmerica s Bill
of Rbts,
20 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 193, 227-31 (2000) (noting development of Second
Amendment).
210 Weatherup, supra note 194, at 992. See generallyHerbert B. Chermside, Jr., JD,
ConstitutionalRight to Bear Arms, 79 AM. JUR. 2D. WEAPONS & FIREARMS 4 (1975)
(discussing Second Amendment); McGreal, supra note 199, at 542-48 (discussing history
of Constitution, Congressional power to create standing army and Second Amendment).
211 Weatherup, supra note 194, at 993. See generaly Chermside, supra note
210(discussing Second Amendment); McGreal, supra note 199, at 542-48 (discussing
history of Constitution, Congressional power to create standing army and Second
Amendment).

2002]

THE INCONVENIENT MILITIA CLAUSE

own Militia, whensoever Congress shall omit or neglect to
2 12
provide for the same."
In isolation, it is perhaps possible to read the first clause of
the seventeenth declaration as endorsing a broad, private
right to arms. 2 13 In the context of the ratification resolution,
however, this interpretation is not tenable. Obviously, the
eleventh right grants no personal right to possess a gun for
non-militia purposes.
In light of the amendment, the
declaration must be limited to the same principle; any
ownership of guns for non-militia purposes would be
unsecured by the amendment. This is also the meaning of
the seventeenth declaration read as a whole.
The
declaration is plainly concerned with defining the ability of a
state to raise and arm a militia as a defense of its
sovereignty against an oppressive federal standing army.2 14
As would be expected, the resolution is a mirror reflection of
212 Weatherup, supra note 194, at 993. See generally Chermside, supra note
210(discussing Second Amendment); McGreal, supra note 199, at 542-48 (discussing
history of Constitution, Congressional power to create standing army and Second
Amendment).
213 This interpretation is only possible if one ignores the eighteenth century
understanding of the phrase "keep and bear arms". The common interpretation of the
term "bear arms" at that time period was a term of art meaning "participating in military
affairs, not merely carrying weapons." Carl T. Bogus, supra note 36, at 357. Garry Wills
describes this same concept in the following manner: "(O)ne does not bear arms against a
rabbit." WILLS, supra note 5, at 64. It has also been noted that to "bear arms" means "to
serve in the armed forces of the state." John Levin, The Right to Bear Arms: The
Development of the American Experience,48 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 148, 153 (1971).
214 Laurence Tribe endorses the view that the purpose of the Second Amendment is
the protection of state sovereignty:
[T]he sole concern of the [Slecond [A]mendment's framers was to prevent such federal
interferences with the state militia as would permit the establishment of a standing
national army and the consequent destruction of local autonomy.
Thus the
inapplicability of the [Slecond [A]mendment to purely private conduct to state action,
and to congressional firearms controls not shown to interfere with the preservation of
state militia, comports with the narrowly limited aim of the (Second Almendment as
merely ancillary to other constitutional guarantees of state sovereignty.
LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 299 n.6 (2d ed. 1988).
Tribe's view has changed in his third edition of AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, in
which he expresses greater sympathy for the individualized right to own guns. H. Richard
Uviller & William G. Merkel, supra note 185, at n.8. Another view is that those who
advocate a states rights explanation of the Amendment "have not attempted any
explanation as to why a purely structural limitation to preserve state power would have
been drawn from the pre-existing constitutional provisions that served to limit state
government." Thomas B. McAffee & Michael J. Quinlan, supra note 92, at 826. Another
interesting view is that: "[M1ears about whether the federal government would attempt to
destroy the slave system were voiced at the ratifying conventions in the other Southern
states, as were apprehensions about federal control over the militia. But it was at
Richmond that concerns about slave control and federal authority over the militia were
united, producing a new rationale for a right to bear arms." Bogus, supra note 36, at 35758.
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the issues discussed in the debate. Both are concerned with
the ability to arm a militia when Congress refuses to do so.
Neither makes any mention of a right to arms for non-militia
purposes.
The Second Amendment endured a number of permutations
before it reached its final form. Madison's original version
combined and modified the seventeenth and nineteenth
declarations of the Virginia resolution: "The right of the people to
keep and bear arms shall not be infringed; a well armed and well
regulated militia being the best security of a free country; but no
person religiously scrupulous of bearing arms shall be compelled
to render military service in person." 2 15 Given the ratification
context from which these clauses came, it should be
noncontroversial that the proposal did not embody a right to the
private, non-militia possession of arms.

2 16

The broad rights

school nevertheless insists that Madison intended the proposal to
embrace a broad right to the personal ownership of firearms. 2 17
215 See WILLS, supra note 5, at 63 (laying out Madison's proposed Second
Amendment). But see Resnick, supranote 41, at 13 (quoting Madison's notes which state
proposed Amendments to Constitution "relate first to private rights"). See generally
Glenn Harlan Reynolds, supranote 36, at 473 (1995) (discussing Madison's proposal).
216 Given the context of the Virginia ratification process, it is reasonable to conclude
that the Second Amendment does not embody an individual right, unlike other
Amendments in the Bill of Rights which were designed to do so, such as the First, Fourth,
Fifth, and Sixth Amendments. Uviller & Merkel, supra note 185, at 435. If Madison had
intended a broad right to own firearms, there were certainly proposals available that he
could have proposed to express this proposition. In Massachusetts, Sam Adams suggested
an amendment that the "Constitution never be construed to authorize Congress to...
prevent the people of the United States, who are peaceable citizens from keeping their
own arms. New Hampshire recommended an amendment that "Congress shall never
disarm any citizen unless such as are or have been in Actual Rebellion." Levin, supra note
213, at 159. A minority of the Pennsylvania ratification convention supported a proposal
"[t]hat the people have a right to bear arms for the defense of themselves and their own
State or the United States, or for the purpose of killing game; and no law shall be passed
for disarming the people or any of them unless for crimes committed, or real danger of
public injury from individuals." Kates, supranote 42, at 222 (emphasis added). Moreover,
in light of only four state constitutions containing the right to bear arms, and only a
minority of those states adopting an individualized right to do so, "[t]here is little reason
to believe that, in rummaging among a collection of more than four hundred different
provisions, Madison would have selected one embraced by a small and divided minority of

states." Bogus, supranote 36, at 364-65.
217 Madison first conceived of amendment by interlineation. This amendment was
initially to be inserted, along with the right to freedom of the press, religion, and speech,
between clauses 3 and 4 in Article I, ' 9. It is asserted that this proves the broad right
character of the proposal because:
[A]rticle I, Section 9.. .concerns limitations on Congress's (sic) power over citizens,
namely, no suspension of habeas corpus, no ex post facto laws, and no bills of
attainder. Madison's suggested placement of this amendment demonstrates that he
understood the right to bear arms to be an individual right. Had Madison viewed the
right to be as the state's right, the more logical placement of the right would have
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Wills notes that this interpretation ignores the context of the
entire amendment: "The whole sentence looks to military
matters, the second clause giving the reason for the right's
existence, and the third giving an exception to that right ....
Every part is explained in relation to every other part."218
The versions subsequently adopted by Congress endorsed
Madison's basic language but altered the emphasis. The House
approved wording as follows: "A well regulated militia, composed
of the body of the people, being the best security of a free state,
the right of the people to keep and bear arms, shall not be
infringed; but no one scrupulous of bearing arms shall be
compelled to render military service in person."2 19
The
significant alteration was the transposition of the militia clause
and the right to bear arms clause. But most commentators,
including some of the broad rights school, acknowledge that this
"strengthened the military context... "220 The Senate further
tightened the language, dropped the religious scruples clause,
and ratified the version that became part of the Constitution: "A
well regulated militia, being necessary to the security of a free
state, the right of the people to keep and bear arms, shall not be
infringed." 22 1 The deletion of the religious scruples clause again
been in Article I, Section 8, clause 16, which reserves to the states the power to
appoint the officers of the militia and provides authority to train the same.
Vandercoy, supranote 46, at 1036.
Another article articulates the same argument: "suggested placement of the Second
Amendment reflected recognition of an individual right rather than a collective right of
states or a right dependent upon the existence of a militia." Resnick, supra note 41, at
n.24. Moreover, commentators, such as Levinson, Lund, and Ehrman & Henigan have
often cited Madison as standing for the proposition that the Framers intended a broad
right to bear arms. Szczepanski, supranote 90, at 207 & n.63.
218 See WILLS, supranote 5,at 63.
219 See Nelson Lund, The Ends of Second Amendment Jurisprudence: Firearms
Disabibties and Domestic Violence Restraining Orders,4 TEX. REV. L. & POLITIcS 157,
181 (1999) [hereinafter The Ends of Second Amendment] (quoting language of House
version of Second Amendment); see alsoNelson Lund, supra note 99, at 34 & n.77 (stating
House version was devised by committee of James Madison, Roger Sherman, and John
Vining,citing 1 ANNALS OF CONGRESS 749 (Joseph Gales ed., 1789)).
220 WILLS, supra note 5, at 63. Wills notes that Joyce Lee Malcolm, a broad rights
advocate, agrees with this interpretation because the change "perhaps intentionally put
more emphasis on the militia. Id. at n. 12. Similarly, another argument is that the
replacement of the semicolon with a comma, along with the transposition of the two
clauses, "tighten[ed] the connection between the militia and the right to keep and bear
arms." Bogus, supranote 36, at 370.
221 Lund, The Ends of Second Amendment, supra note 219, at 181. Broad rights
advocates make much of the fact that the Senate rejected a proposal to include the words
"for the common defense after to keep and bear arms. Professor Halbrook argues that the
rejection of the proposal to limit the amendments recognition of the right to bear arms for
the common defense meant to preclude any limitation on the individual right to have
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strengthens the militia orientation of the Amendment. In the
constitutional convention, Elbridge Gerry expressed the fear that
the clause would be a means to disarm the militia, because the
rulers could "declare those who are religiously scrupulous and
prevent them from bearing arms." 222 Under a broad right theory,
those declared "religiously scrupulous" would nevertheless have a
constitutionally guaranteed right to arms. Disarmament could
occur only if the right to arms applied strictly in the military
context and some portion of the population were declared
ineligible for militia service. The concerns about the clause make
sense only if the right to arms is limited to militia participation.
Thus, from the origination of the wording in the Virginia
ratification debate through the final changes to the Amendment,
the concept was never intended to embrace a broad right. 223 Or,
arms... ." Halbrook, supra note 203, at 35. Another writer reiterates the claim, arguing
that "[tihe Senate refused to libit the right to bear arms by voting down the addition of
the words 'for the common defense." David I. Caplan, Handgun Contro" Constitutionalor
Unconstitutional?- A Reply to Mayor Jackson, 10 N.C. CENT. L.J. 53, 55 (emphasis
added). But Wills argues that the term common defense:
was used in the Articles of Confederation to mean for the joint action of the states,
not (as Halbrook would maintain) for any military use at all. Including the phrase [in
the Second Amendment] would have given the state militias power to bear arms only
in conjunction with other states - which was clearly not the aim.
WILLS, supra note 5, at 256 (emphasis added).
Wills also notes that the military context of the Second Amendment is the obvious
meaning even without the addition: The military sense is the obvious sense. It does not
cease to become the obvious sense if something that might have been added was not
added. Id. at 64 (emphasis added).
222 Vandercoy, supra note 46, at 1037 (quoting Gerry); see also Kopel, supra note
110, at n.118 ( (noting Gerry's disapproval of "religious scruples" language); Uviller &
Merkel, supra note 185, at 501 (noting Gerry's fear that such discretionary authority to
declare whole segments of population ineligible for service would vitiate the militia and
noting his proposal to confine clause to "religious sect[s] scrupulous of bearing arms").
223 Nelson Lund maintains that [all the major changes made during the
congressional process increased the clarity with which the Second Amendment protects
an individual right, not a right of the states to maintain military organizations. Lund,
The Ends of SecondAmendm en4 supra note 219, at 181. Lund points to the elimination of
the conscientious objector clause, the phrase the well armed militia and the description of
the militia as composed of the body of the people. Each of these phrases could have
suggested that the right to keep and bear arms was somehow restricted to the context of
military service. Id. But Lund deigns not to describe how these changes actually support
his argument. It has already been shown that deleting the religiously scrupulous clause is
supportive of the narrow rights theory. Well armed" was probably dropped because well
regulated includes well armed. WILLS, supra note 5, at 63. And given the insistence of the
broad rights theorists that a militia includes the entire citizenry, one fails to see how
dropping composed of the body of the people strengthens Lund's case.
An argument has also been advanced regarding the change of best security of a free
state to necessary to the security of a free state:
The proposal for what was to become the second amendment initially stated that a
well-regulated militia was the best" security of a free state, but this was later to read
"necessary" to the security of a free state. It is important to note that the Congress
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as Garry Wills notes, "[tihe whole context of the amendment was
22 4
always military."
C. The BroadRights Arguments
1. The Constitutional "Right" of Insurrection
One of the most commonly made arguments by the broad
individual rights advocates is that the Second Amendment
embodies some sort of right of insurrection. 225 This is a difficult
argument to sustain given the numerous, and sometimes explicit,
provisions against insurrection in the Constitution. 226 Perhaps
did not advance a proposal which would have held a well-regulated militia to be
"sufficient to the security of a free state. Quite to the contrary, the first Congress
recognized that the ordinary processes of law might not offer sufficient protection to
the people during the period between the outbreak of violence and the mobilization of
the organized militia. The right to keep and bear arms for purposes other than
militia service thus seems to have been clearly contemplated by the second
amendment.
Caplan, supranote 55, at 40-41.
It is not clear from the argument, however, that an unorganized militia could respond
more quickly to violence than an organized militia, and nowhere is this concern reflected
in the discussion of the Second Amendment. Garry Wills suggests that the change from
"best" to necessary might demote the right to bear arms by comparison with other rights
(perhaps, say, free speech is the very best security of freedom), but it does not alter the
thing being discussed. WILLS, supranote 5, at 63 (emphasis added).
224 WILLS, supranote 5, at 64 (containing quote); see also Ehrman & Henigan, supra
note 42 at 32 (stating "[tihe background of the Amendment indicates that Congress did
not intend to confer a broad 'individual' right to carry arms, outside of the military
context"); Jonathan E. Lowy, Symposium: The Second Amendment, 10 SETON HALL
CONST. L.J. 839, 844 (2000) (noting framers' view of Second Amendment as revolving
around military). But see Brannon P. Denning, Professional Discourse, The Second
Amendment And The "Talking Head Constitutionalism" Counterrevolution:A Review
Essay, 21 S. ILL. U. L.J. 227, n.29 (1997) (characterizing Wills' use of Latin etymology of
"bear" and "arms" to reach that conclusion as "curious").
225 This view is illustrated in the following quotation: The revolutionary
understanding of the Second Amendment is founded on the idea that "the right to bear
arms exists to protect the American populace from governmental tyranny." McIntosh,
supranote 2, at 679. Another embracing this view is Carl Bogus, who states that "[Ijittle
effort is made to put those statements [of insurrectionist theory] in context or connect
them to the drafting, proposing, or ratifying of the Second Amendment." He illustrates
this point by referring to Thomas Jefferson, an insurrectionist who is often cited to
support this view. However, he did not even play a role in the drafting of the Second
Amendment. Insurrectionists, of course, were a minority among the Framers. Bogus,
supranote 36, at 395-96.
226 Garry Wills counts no less than five such constitutional prohibitions against
insurrection. In addition to the fairly explicit prohibitions discussed above, Wills asserts
that the subordination clause and the extradition clause were made, in part, in response
to the threat of insurrection. Wills refers to subordinating the militia to federal control in
Art. 1, §8, cl. 15 and 16 was made in order to provide for general protection and defense.
WILLS, supra note 5, at 213. In this way, militias would actually be used to suppress
insurrections, not foment them. One purpose behind the extradition clause in Art. IV, § 2,
cl. 2 was to extradite insurrectionists like the Shays rebels; thus, insurrection was not an
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the most obvious constitutional prohibition against insurrection
is the treason clause which forbids making war against the
United States. 2 27 Armed insurrection obviously is making war on
the United States. Therefore, far from embodying a right of
insurrection, the Constitution explicitly criminalizes the act.
Further, the militia clauses themselves deny any right of
insurrection. One of the constitutional functions of the militia is
to suppress insurrection. 228 It strains credulity to believe that
the same institution would be empowered with the right to
engage in insurrection and the duty to suppress them. As one
writer expresses, the Constitution cannot view the militia both as
a means by which government can suppress insurrection and as
an instrument for insurrection against the government. It must
be one or the other. "The Militia Clauses make clear which one it
is."229
Lastly, the militia was intended to implement the
guarantee clause.2 30 This provision reflects Madison's desire to
option allowed in individual states. WIlIs, supra note 5, at 214. Another article lists the
five constitutional provisions relating to revolution as Art. I §8, Art. I §9, Art. IV §4. Art.
III §3, and Art. IV §2. Robert J. Spitzer, Lost and Found: Researching the Second
Amendment, 76 Cmi.-KENT L. REV. 349, 359-60 (2000).
227 See U.S. CONST. art. III, §3, cl. 1 (reading, in part, "[tireason against the United
States shall consist only in levying war against them, or in adhering to their enemies,
giving them aid and comfort"); see also Taylor Flynn, Of Communism, Treason and
Addition: An Evaluation ofNovel Challenges to the Military's Anti-Gay Poicy,80 IOWA L.
REV. 979, 1031 (1995) (arguing treason clause has been used to suppress dissenting
views); James G. Wilson, Chaining the Leviathan: The Unconstitutionalityof Executing
Those Convicted of Treason, 45 U. Prrr. L. REv. 99, 104-129 (1983) (providing in depth
analysis of evolution and meaning of treason clause).
228 The United States Constitution sets forth the purpose of the Militia as follows:
"[tihe Congress shall have the power... to provide for calling forth the Militia to execute
the Laws of the Union, suppress Insurrections and repel Invasions." U.S. CONST. art. I,
§8, cl. 15. The second (and only other) Militia Clause provides "ftlhe Congress shall have
the power to... provide for organizing, arming and disciplining, the Militia.... " U.S.
CONST. art. I. §8, cl. 16.
229 Henigan, supra note 204, at 115-16 (arguing that to embrace both right of
insurrection and government authority to punish such acts would "leave us with a
Constitution very much at war with itself, a conclusion that suggests a profound
weakness in theory [of the Constitution]"); see also Patrick Todd Mullins, Note, The
Militia Clauses, the National Guard and Federalism:A Constitutional Tug of War, 57
GEo. WASH, L. REV. 328, 330-37 (1998) (discussing development of Militia Clauses and
stating "since the beginning of the United States the organized militia system has
steadily evolved from one of almost no federal regulation to a modern system of virtually
complete federal control"). But see Brannon P. Denning, Palladium ofLiberty? Causes
and Consequences of the Federalizationof State Militias in the Twentieth Century, 21
O=LA. CITY U.L. REv. 191, 230-31 n. 193 (1996) (arguing that Constitution provides State
Militias with right to disobey and revolt against federal overreaching).
230 See U.S. CONST. art. IV, §4 (stating "[tihe United States shall guarantee to every
State in this Union a Republican Form of Government, and shall protect each of them
against Invasion; and on Application of the Legislature, or of the Executive (when the
Legislature cannot be convened) against domestic Violence."); see also Gregory v.
Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 462 (1991) (noting that Guarantee Clause provides States with
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expressly guarantee the "tranquility of the states against
internal as well as external dangers." 23 1 The primary concern
underlying the provision was to secure the ability to put down
insurrections such as Shay's Rebellion. 232 Taken together, these
clauses "make it overwhelmingly clear that the Constitution was
framed to forbid, prevent, and punish insurrection against its
own laws - as, indeed, any constitution that claims legitimate
authority must do."233
basis for determining qualifications of their government officials); John C. Coffee, Jr.,
Modern Mail Fraud: The Restoration of the Pubhlc/PrivateDistinction, 35 AM. CRIM. L.
REV. 427, 431 (1998) (noting that Guarantee Clause was established to give Congress
authority to regulate state and local corruption).
231 WILLS, supra note 5, at 221; see also N.Y. v. U.S., 505 U.S. 144, 186 (1992)
(White, J., dissenting) (discussing what role Guarantee Clause plays in preserving state
institutions from federal standards), a/fd,978 F.2d 705 (2d Cir. 1992); see also Clovegrove
v. Green, 328 U.S. 549, 556 (1946) (plurality opinion) (Black, J., dissenting) (stating
"violation of the great guaranty of a republican form of government in States can not be
challenged in the courts" because of political question doctrine).
232 See WILLS, supra note 5, at 211 (discussing necessity of provision); see, e.g.,
Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. 1, 42 (1849) (Woodbury, J., dissenting) (deciding which of two
rival governments was legitimate in Rhode Island after Dorr's Rebellion. The Court
stated, "it rests with Congress [and not judiciary] to decide what government is the
established one in a State. For as the United States guarantee[s] to each State a
republican government, Congress must necessarily decide what government is established
in the State before it can determine whether it is republican or not").
233 See WILLS, supranote 5, at 115, 214. Wills acknowledges the differences between
English and American systems which mitigated need for militias to defend people by
stating:
[Tihe British use of armies on its own island had mainly been for internal purposes,
in dynastic struggles of rival houses for the throne, or in religious wars - between
Protestants and Catholics, or between Presbyterians and Anglicans. This experience
had led to a national fear of armies as repressive. In America, not only would the
army be under legislative control, but there was no Crown to be struggled for, no
establishment of national religion in need of repressive power.
Id.
This constitutional prohibition against insurrection is a significant departure from
English and colonial history in which arms were held to oppose government obnoxious to
the people. Prior to the Revolutionary War, most state constitutions embraced the
principle of revolution but after the War "the need for stable and orderly government
grew, and the philosophy of rebellion withered", id. see also Fields & Hardy, supra note
69, at 30-31. Hardy discusses the evolution of protection and notes:
(Bly 1780, Americans had begun to reassess the legal and functional nature of the
militia along lines similar to what had occurred in England a century before. The
ancient concept of the general militia as a "constitutional institution," serving as a
check on governmental excesses was starting to erode. In its place was emerging the
belief that the interests of the people now could be protected effectively by the
establishment of democratic governments, offering legal guarantees of individual
rights.
Id.
Even broad rights advocates acknowledge that the Founding Fathers nurtured the
concept that democratic, not military, mechanisms were seen as the proper check on
government. John Levin, supra note 213, at 154 (stating "the fundamental problem facing
the [constitutional] convention was not to support and nourish a revolutionary situation,
but to create a viable federal government out of the jealous and independent states.")
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To assert a constitutional right of insurrection is
fundamentally illogical. The Constitution could not embrace the
means of its own destruction. As Lincoln said in his first
inaugural address, "[i]t is safe to assert that no government
proper ever had a provision in its organic law for its own
termination.., it being impossible to destroy it except by some
action not provided for in the instrument itself."2 34 The right of
insurrection inheres intrinsically in all people, regardless of the
government under which they live; "it does not derive its sanction
from a disputed interpretation of an amendment with an
2 35
altogether different purpose."
The right is also functionally unworkable.
Broad right
advocates do not argue that every attempt of insurrection is
"lawful."236 But if some insurrections are lawful and others not,
234 See WILLS, supra note 5, at 217-18 (noting other great American thinkers have
made same point). James Madison said that, "resorts within the purview of the
Constitution are not the same as the 'ultimate ratio of revolution." Andrew Jackson said,
"[s]ucession, like any other revolutionary act may be morally justified by the extremity of
oppression; but to call it a constitutional right is to confound the meaning of terms...
THE FEDERALIST No. 46, at 601-02 (James Madison).
Besides the advantage of being armed, which the Americans possess over the people of
almost every other nation, the existence of subordinate [state] governments.., forms a
barrier against the enterprises of ambition ....
Notwithstanding the military
establishments in the several kingdoms of Europe, which are carried as far as the public
resources will bear, the governments are afraid to trust the people with arms.... A
militia amounting to near half a million of citizens with arms in their hands, officered by
men chosen from among themselves fighting for their common liberties and united and
conducted by government possessing their affections and confidence. It may well be
doubted whether a militia thus circumstanced could ever be conquered by such a
proportion of regular troops; see also Hardy, supra note 67, at 600 (explaining that this
excerpt expresses founders' "belief in the virtue of individual citizen armament as a
guarantee of individual freedom."). However, what the quote, when taken in context, is
referring to is Madison's thought experiment in which a tyrannical government is
threatening the states with the army. Madison stated, "the State governments with the
people on their side would be able to repel the danger". Id. (arguing Madison obviously
was not describing "individual citizen armament." Rather, Madison defined militias as
"the military instrument of state government," not simply as collection of unorganized,
privately armed citizens). Madison saw the armed citizen as important to liberty to the
extent that the citizen was part of a military force organized by state governments. But
see WILLS, supra note 5, at 70 (positing that since passage was written before Second
Amendment was conceived, Madison could not be explicating its meaning). Rather,
Madison was describing conditions that trigger revolution and how the revolution can fall
against established constitutional order. He also states it is not the "well-regulated
militia" under the Constitution that is being described, but the revolutionary effort of a
people overthrowing any despotism that replaces the Constitution and makes it void. In
Madison's dire hypothesis, all bets are off and the pre-government right of resistance.
235 WILLS, supra note 5, at 215-17 (noting Sanford Levinson, proponent of Second
Amendment right of insurrection, refers to right as "appeal to heaven." ). Wills fully
agrees with this notion but notes that "[tihe appeal to heaven is an appeal away f om the
earthly authority of the moment, not to that authority." Id. It makes no sense to say that I
must overthrow this abomination, but only because it has given me permission to do so.
236 See William C. Plouffe, A Federal Court Holds the Second Amendment in an
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there must be some authority to make this decision. This creates
the ludicrous prospect of insurrectionists having to appeal to the
government to determine if their desire to overthrow the
government is legitimate. "Surely the right would be an empty
one if it permitted government authority, in the form of courts, to
substitute its judgment for that of the individual citizen on the
issue of whether the government had abused its power."237 The
right, in effect, is voided, because it is precisely the tyrannical
government that would never recognize a legitimate cause for
insurrection. But if review is not unworkable because it voids
the right, "[h]ow does the theory permit the government to
prevent the formation and use of private armies by extremist
groups, whether of the right or of the left?" 238 Ultimately, of
course, the right of insurrection is a prescription for anarchy.
There is no shortage of groups who sincerely feel that
government has betrayed its constitutional limits. To allow such
groups the right to possess arms for the purpose of exercising
their right of insurrection would soon mean that there is no
nation left to fight over. As one writer has well said,
What is the origin of our liberty under the Constitution? If the
courts are prepared to follow the insurrectionists to the
conclusion that constitutional liberty ultimately comes from the
barrel of a gun, the Second Amendment may prove to be a
23 9
weapon of destruction aimed at the rest of the Bill of Rights.
Individual Right: Jeffersonian Utopia or Apocalypse Now?, 30 U. MEM. L. REV. 56, n.153
(describing right of insurrection and phrases question as follows: "It would seem to be a
legitimate government function to suppress unlawful insurrection, but it also seems
appropriate to revolt against tyranny. So what are the criteria that would justify
revolution?"). Plouffe asserts that the Whiskey Rebellion of 1794 and the Montana
Freeman of 1996 were illegitimate. However, he appears to make this judgment without
consulting any criteria for legitimacy. But see Bogus, supra note 36, at 395 (noting
Founders did not seem to have been concerned about any criteria to justify revolution).
During Shay's Rebellion, Massachusetts Governor John Hancock sent state troops with
instructions "to kill, slay, and destroy if necessary, and conquer by all fitting ways,
enterprises, and means whatsoever, all and every one of the rebels. If there is any
evidence that Governor Hancock or anyone else considered whether this might have been
a legitimate rebellion, or whether they thought there is even such a thing as a Second
Amendment rebellion, it has not been demonstrated by Plouffe.
237 Ehrman & Henigan, supranote 42, at 125.
238 Id. at 129. See, e.g., Captain David C. Rodearmel, Military Law in Communist
China: Development, Structure and Function, 119 MIL. L. REV. 1, 14 (1988) (recognizing
Communist leader Mao Tse-tung first stated mantra "political power grows out of the
barrel of a gun").
239 See Kates, supra note 42, at 230 (interpreting the Second Amendment as follows:
"believing self-defense an inalienable natural right, and deriving from it the right to resist
tyranny, [the Founding Fathers] guaranteed the right of individuals to possess arms"); see
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2. Chronological Order in the Bill of Rights
A common argument is that placing the right to bear arms in
the Second Amendment demonstrates that a broad based
individual right was intended. 24 0 The first and third through
ninth amendments of the Bill of Rights were considered to be
individual rights. It has been argued that if the Framers had
intended the Second Amendment to be a collective right, then it
2
would have been placed towards the end of the Bill of Rights. 41
Under this theory, the organization of Bill of Rights was to list
private rights first. 242 In fact, however, the right of the states to
preserve a "well-regulated militia" and "to bear arms" was
drafted many times. 24 3 By June 8, 1789, an early draft was
fourth on the list of the Bill of Rights. 244 By August it had moved

also THE FEDERALIST NO. 28, at 277 (stating "[ilf the representatives of the people betray
their constituents, there is then no recourse left but in the exertion of that original right
of self-defense. ..").
240 See, e.g., Gallia,supra note 192, at 138.
241 See Kates, supranote 42, at 220 (looking to language and contextual placement of
Second Amendment to argue Framers intended only to create individual rights, and that
states rights appear later beginning with Tenth Amendment); see also 12 PAPERS OF
JAMES MADISON 306-07 (R. Rutland & C. Hobson ed. 1979) (letter of Oct. 20, 1788, from
Madison to Edmund Pendleton) (discussing Anti-Federalists' objections to Constitution.)
These objections were not just limited to lack of individual rights, but about how the
Constitution was being modeled after Blackstone's organization of five most important
principles for the survival of English liberty, and how five principles were well established
in first three articles of the Constitution and the first two amendments. Specifically, first,
how the legislature should function (in the British system Parliament) is found in Article
I; second, what the presidents role was (monarch) is found in Article II; third, the role of
the courts is found in Article III; fourth, the fundamental rights of freedom are
established in the First Amendment; and fifth the right to bear arms is found in the
Second Amendment); see also Gallia, supra note 192, at 140 (stating that despite fact that
Court has never specifically mentioned intent of framers regarding Second Amendment,
all other substantive rights that are enumerated in remaining eight amendments are
"fundamental" individual rights; Second Amendment seemingly should be given same
accord).
242 See PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON, supra note 241, at 306-07; see also Dennis, supra
note 81, at 70 (stating that as Madison was instrumental in drafting Second Amendment,
his personal notes stating that amendments he had written "relate lt to private rights" is
evidence that framers intended Second Amendment to be private right).
243 See Hardy, supra note 67, at 609 (stating that Madison originally conceived that
provisions of Bill of Rights would be interlineated into existing body of Constitution); see
also Vandercoy, supra note 46 at 1036 (discussing Madison's proposal that wording of
Second Amendment, "the right of the people to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed"
be placed, along with rights of free speech, press, and religion in Article I, Section 9,
between Clauses 3 and 4, all provisions limiting Congress' power over citizens (i.e. no
suspension of habeas corpus, no ex post facto laws, and no bills of attainder)). Madison
must have "understood the right to bear arms to be an individual right"; see also Dennis,
supra note 81, at 69-70 (noting that Second Amendment had been edited before it was
ratified).
244 CONGRESSIONAL REGISTER, June 8, 1789, vol. 1, p. 427.
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up to the sixth position. 245 Then, later in August, as the House
was considering the amendment, it had moved back down to
fifth.246 Once the bill was sent to the Senate, it remained fifth on
the list.24 7 On September 9, 1789 the Senate passed a vote to
strike it as the fifth and make it the fourth. 248 After the Senate
had finished and approved the Second Amendment as we know
today, it became the fourth amendment. It finally became the
Second Amendment only because the first two amendments were
not ratified.2 49 Thus, the belief that the Amendments were
placed so individual rights were placed first has no historical
basis. Indeed, the first two amendments which ultimately failed
to be ratified had nothing to do with individual rights.250
3. Construction of the Second Amendment
The reason the Drafters precede the "right to bear arms" clause
with "a well regulated Militia" was because it was to be a
preamble that was to set out its purpose. 25 1 The history of the
Second Amendment "indicate[s] that the central concern of [the]
framers was to prevent such federal interferences with the state
militia as would permit the establishment of a standing national
army and the consequent destruction of local autonomy."2 52 The
historical meaning indicates there was no strong notion of an
245 GAZETTE OFTHE U.S., August 22, 1789, at 249, col. 3.
246 See THE COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS: THE DRAFTS, DEBATES, SOURCES & ORIGINS,
(Neil Cogan ed., 1997) (outlining issues federal government is prohibited from imposing
on individuals).
247 Id. at 174.
248 Id. at 176.
249 See Vandercoy, supra note 46, at 1038 (discussing numbering of Amendments);
see also Peter Suber, Population Changes and ConstitutionalAmendments.: Federalinm
Versus Democracy, 20 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 409, 440 (1987); see generally Maeva
Marcus, The Adoption of the Bill of'Rights, 1 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 115, 118 (1992).
250 Marcus, supra note 248, at 218 (stating that first two Amendments concerned
taking of property without compensation and protection of individual rights).
251 Sanford Levinson, The EmbarrassingSecond Amendment, 99 YALE L.J. 637, 644
(1989) (citing one broad right theorist who contends that construction of Second
Amendment must not be so limiting; that right to keep and bear arms cannot be
interpreted into nonexistence by limiting it to one of its purposes and that to hold
otherwise, it would violate the principle that "[c]onstitutional provisions for the security of
a person and property should be liberally construed. A close and literal construction
deprives them of half their efficacy, and leads to gradual depreciation of the right, as
though it consisted more in sound than substance"); see also, Richard E. Gardiner, supra
note 55, at 83 (stating that it is doubtful, however, that Second Amendment should be so
liberally construed that it defies original intent of the framers to limit possession of
firearms to a militia context, and that such a theory of construction becomes even more
doubtful when it imposes massive social costs (see Part III)).
252 LAWRENCE TRIBE, AMERIcAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 299 fn. 6 (2d. ed. 1988).
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individual right "to bear arms."2 5 3 Thus, the right to bear arms is
a qualified right, "recognized only in the context of the people
forming a well-regulated Militia to protect the security of the free
states. It clearly does not provide for an individual right to bear
2 54
arms independent of the militia clause."
Some broad rights advocates assert that the Second
Amendment should be understood as consisting of an operative
clause and a justification clause. Professor Eugene Volokh has
developed the most interesting argument in this regard. Aside
from the Copyright and Patent Clause, the Second Amendment is
the only constitutional provision that contains its own
253 See Levinson, supra note 251, at 644 (taking position taken by American Civil
Liberties Union (ACLU) which says Amendment is protecting only right to maintain "an
effective state militia... IThe individual's right to bear arms applies only to the
preservation or efficiency of a well-regulated [state] militia. Except for lawful police and
military purposes, the possession of weapons by individuals is not constitutionally
protected."); see also WILLS, supra note 5, at 257 (stating that some narrow rights
th
advocates argue that this conclusion is also compelled by 18 century understanding of
specific words used in Amendment). For instance, Wills argues that "[blear arms refers to
military service, which is why the plural is used... one does not bear arm, or bear an
arm, that the word means, etymologically, equipment and that it refers to the 'equipage of
war' and that it does not refer to guns for hunting purposes"; "[o]ne does not bear arms
against a rabbit"). But see Dennis, supra note 81, at 68 (stating that Thomas Jefferson
clearly believed in existence of individual right to bear arms by including language "No
free man shall ever be debarred the use of arms" in his proposed constitution for Virginia
in 1776); Harman, supra note 92, at 413 (stating that National Rifle Association and
majority of legal scholars embrace theory that Second Amendment was intended to be
individual, rather than collective right).
254 See Herd, supra note 7, at 210 (giving fairly comprehensive grammatical
treatment of Second Amendment). By stating that the subject of the Amendment is "the
right of the people to keep and bear arms." The "infringement" phrase is the predicate.
By themselves, the subject and the predicate would clearly indicate a broad individual
right. But this neglects the absolute clause: "[a] well-regulated Militia, being necessary to
the security of a free State.. . ." Thus, "the militia clause of the Amendment modifies or
qualifies the subject. It explains the purpose for the Amendment." Id. Under this
analysis, "the Second Amendment plainly and clearly means: '[Because] [a] well-regulated
Militia, [is] necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and
bear Arms, shall not be infringed." Id. The author says this analysis was completed with
the help of a professional editor. Id. at n.129. But see Resnick, supra note 41, at 5
(stating that in contrast, a broad rights advocate claims that two grammatical experts
reach the opposite conclusion). One of these experts, Roy Copperud, is "on the usage
panel of the American Heritage Dictionary." Copperud's analysis leads to his conclusion
that.
The thrust of the sentence is that the right shall be preserved inviolate for the sake of
ensuring a militia... The right to keep and bear arms is not said by the amendment
to depend on the existence of a militia... The right to keep and bear arms is deemed
unconditional by the entire sentence.
Id. at 7.
These are difficult conclusions to argue against, given that they are unsupported by
any analysis. Undoubtedly, both broad and narrow advocates could bring to the stand an
equal number of experts to support their interpretations. The meaning of the Second
Amendment is probably better understood by its historical context and the logical
ramifications of its construction, not by dueling grammarians).
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preamble. 255 In Volokh's argument, the operative right in the
Second Amendment is "the right of the people to keep and bear
arms" and the justification of the right is to provide for a militia,
"being necessary to the security of a free state."25 6 A facial
construction of these clauses would be that a right should be no
broader than its justification; thus, individuals have a right to
bear arms only to the extent that it is related to a militia or
defense of a state. Or, as Volokh sets forth the issue, "[s]ome
argue that justification clause should be read as a condition on
the operative clause: The right to keep and bear arms is
protected only when it contributes to a well-regulated militia or
only when the well-regulated militia is necessary to the security
of a free State."257
Volokh's response to the question flows from his review of state
constitutional provisions.
Although rarely occurring in the
federal
Constitution,
state
constitutions
often
contain
258
justification clauses.
Volokh explains that there need be no
exact fit between the right and the justification: "one should
255 See Eugene Volokh, The Commonplace Second Amendment, 73 N.Y.U L. R. 793,
821 n. 1 (1998) (citing a number of commentators remarking on this unique feature of the
Second Amendment); see also L.A. Powe, Jr. Guns, Words and Constitutional
Interpretation, 38 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1311, 1335 (1997) (stating same); Sanford
Levinson, supranote 253, at, 644 (stating same).
256 Volokh, supranote 255, at 802 (explaining that Volokh does not explicitly indicate
what he believes is operative clause and what is justification clause but noting that it is
critical to his argument that "[tihe justification clause.., refers to the militia."); see also
Roger I. Roots, The Approaching Death of the Collective Right Theory of the Second
Amendment, 39 DUQ. L. REV. 71, 110, n.15 (2000) (stating that Volokh calls the opening
clause of the second amendment its "justification clause" rather than a "purpose clause"
because the only thing indicated by it is it's drafters' justification for the right to bear
arms, and not any notion that the right is contingent on the purpose of ensuring a wellregulated militia, as some authorities have postulated). See Generally David Yassky,
supra note 194, at 617 (commenting that Volokh's work shows that scope of a
constitutional provision is not necessarily limited by its "purpose clause").
257 Volokh supra note 255, at 801; see also Scott A. Henderson, United States v.
Emerson: The Second Amendment As an IndividualRight - Time to Settle the Issue?, 102
W. VA. L. REV. 177, 200 (1999) (noting that those who espouse the collective rights school
argue that the justification clause places a limitation or a condition precedent on the
right).
258 Volokh supra note 255, at 799 (showing, for instance, that Massachusetts, New
Hampshire and Vermont constitutions contain following provision: "The freedom of
deliberation, speech, and debate, in either house of the legislature, is so essential to the
rights of the people, that it cannot be the foundation of any accusation or prosecution,
action, or complaint, in any other court or place whatsoever.").
The New Hampshire Ex Post Facto Article reads as follows: "Retrospective laws are
highly injurious, oppressive, and unjust. No such laws, therefore, should be made either
for the decision of civil causes, or the punishment of offenses." Id. at 805; see also
Resnick, supra note 41, at 3 (stating that it is not uncommon for state constitutional
provisions to contain justification clauses).
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expect the possibility of a mismatch between justification clause
and operative clauses: The means chosen to serve the end will
often be somewhat broader or narrower than the end itself. But
it's the means that are being made into law." 259 In Volokh's
words, the justification clause does not "trump the meaning of
the operative clause.. ."260 Thus, there may be no law to
"deprive people the right to keep and bear arms, even if their
keeping and bearing arms in a particular instance doesn't further
the Amendment's purposes." 26 1
Volokh has made a convincing case that the breadth of a right
may exceed its justification. It is less convincing that this
premise compels the conclusion he asserts. The questionable
aspect of his analysis is the breakdown of the Amendment into
operative and justification clauses. It is clear that the "right of
the people to keep and bear arms" is justified by the need for
"security of a free state"; but to which clause does the militia
belong? 262 Only if the militia belongs to the justification clause
may the right of the people be broader than participation in a
militia or acting for the preservation of a state.2 63 If the militia
259 Id at 810. For instance, the Speech and Debate Articles in note 260 would
protect "the freedom to defame people with impunity" even though this is not "essential to
the rights of the people." Id. at 799. Similarly, New Hampshire's Constitution "bans all
ex post facto laws, not only the highly unjust ones." Id. at 805.
260 Id. at 807; see also Michael C. Doff, Symposium on the Second Amendment:
Fresh Looks: What Does the Second Amendment Mean Today 76 Cmi. KENT. L. REV 291,
347, n. 57 (2000) (citing same); David C. Williams, Response: The Unitary Second
Amendment, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 822, 824 (1998) (agreeing with Volokh by saying that
"Rather than using the purpose clause to trump the operative clause, I have sought to
interpret the latter in light of the former, so that there is no tension between the two.").
261 Id. at 806. But see Lund, The Ends of Second Amendment, supranote 219, at 176
(commenting argument is made completely without reference to ratification debate or
historical right to bear arms). Another commentator makes the same argument relative
to the Patent and Copyright Clause. He argues that this clause does not authorize
Congress to protect only those writing and inventions that promote the progress of science
and useful arts, as we can easily see from the fact that copyrights are granted to Hustler
magazine and the ravings of racist demagogues, not to mention a wide range of literature
that overtly seeks to retard the progress of science and useful arts. Id.
262 Volokh seems to acknowledge that the Second Amendment requires a three step
analysis that does not occur in his examples from state constitutions: "itihe Framers may
have intended the right to keep and bear arms as a means toward the end of maintaining
a well-regulated militia - a well trained army citizenry - which in turn would have been a
means toward the end of ensuring the security of a free state." Volokh supra note 255, at
806. Even while setting up this framework, Volokh assumes without reason that the
militia belongs more to the third step justification clause and not to the first step
operative clause. Perhaps this is because the first line of the provision generally sets
forth the justification. This is not, however, an ironclad rule. The first clause of the
Speech and Debate Article, for instance, first sets forth the right and then the
justification. Volokh supranote 255, at 806.
263 Volokh and other broad rights advocates must argue that the individual right
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belongs to the operative clause, 2 64 Volokh's conclusion does not
follow. Under this reading, the individual right to own guns
would be constrained by participation in a militia because the
limitation occurs in the operative clause. 265 The broad rights
advocates would then be reduced to arguing the logical absurdity
that the individual right is broader than itself.
Should the reference to the militia be construed as belonging to
the justification or the operation of the Second Amendment? It is
more likely that it belongs to the operative clause.266 The militia
has no independent justification or reason to exist. Its function is
strictly in subservience to larger ends; in this context, it exists to
protect the security of the state. It fulfills this function by
operating as the tool through which armed individuals come to
the aid of the state. The operative right should thus be read as a
conjunction of the right to bear clause and the militia clause: the
right belongs to individuals in a militia.
Under Volokh's
analysis, it is possible that individuals in a militia have rights
broader than relate to the security of a state. It is not possible,
however, that there is any constitutionally protected individual
right to bear arms outside of a militia. To read the Amendment
in this manner would require not that the right is broader than
the justification but that the right is broader than itself. Thus,
Volokh's argument collapses for failure to identify the militia as
belonging to the operative clause of the Amendment.
Volokh's argument is that the militia clause is not qualifying.
A separate argument advanced by broad rights advocates is the
militia clause is actually amplifying. This argument states that
exceeds both stated ends: the participation in a militia and the security of the states.
264 The operative clause would thus essentially mean "the right of the people in a
militia to keep and bear arms, shall not be infringed." This is the typical interpretation
made by narrow rights advocates. See e.g. supra note 7 (regarding Herd's restatement of
right).
265 Volokh cites a list of cases (among which Love v. Pepersack, United States v.
Hale, and United States v. Warin are discussed in Part II) which he says stand for the
proposition that the right is conditioned by the justification. Volokh supra note 255, at
801 n.27. Actually, these cases could be read as incorporating the militia provision into
the rights clause, not as constraining the right to the breadth of the justification.
266 Interpreting the Second Amendment in this way results in a somewhat awkward
and bifurcated phrasing. The Amendment would first partially state the right ("a wellregulated militia"), then a justification ("being necessary for the security of a free state")
and then finish stating the right ("the right of the people to keep and bear arms, shall not
be infringed.") While this phrasing may be awkward, it is not anomalous.
The
Massachusetts, New Hampshire, and Vermont Speech and Debate Article, for instance,
essentially follows the same right-justification-right pattern. Volokh supranote 255.
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both clauses of the Amendment embody a separate right. 2 6 7
However, the argument may also be viewed from the logics of
legal construction. Under the two rights theory, it is odd that the
Framers would have bothered with the recognition of a "collective
right to maintain a militia."
The recognition of a broad
individual right, by itself, prevents Congress from disarming the
militia. Thus, the right to form a general militia is actually a
subset, not an amplification, of the individual right.268 It is
unlikely that the Framers would recognize both the broad
individual right and the smaller collective right when the former
swallows the latter. 269
D. Conclusion
The militia clause is an inconvenient provision of the Second
Amendment for broad rights advocates. The meaning of the
clause is a linear descendent of the right as embodied in the
English Bill of Rights. In England prior to the Bill of Rights,
there was no right to have weapons. Perhaps a large part of the
country was armed, but the purpose was to provide for the
collective purposes of military defense and police duty. The
267 See supra text accompanying notes 65 & 204.
268 Professor Lund makes essentially the same argument from the broad rights
perspective. He contends that a militia oriented right in the Second Amendment is
duplicative of the militia clause in the Constitution because:
Article I already provides the federal government with virtually plenary powers to
organize, train, and maintain a military establishment as efficient and powerful as it can
afford; moreover, by clear implication, article I also provides for the existence of organized
state-based military forces. To all of this, the Second Amendment would add absolutely
nothing if it had been designed to promote the military readiness of the nation.
Nelson Lund, The Second Amendment, Political Liberty, and the Right to Self
Preservation, 39 AiA. L. REV. 103, 114 (1988). But the Second Amendment is only
duplicative if the Constitution allowed the states the authority to arm their own militias.
The silence of the document in this respect was precisely the concern of some AntiFederalists. See supra text accompanying notes 12 & 175. The Second Amendment added
the guarantee that the federal government does not have sole authority to arm the
militias.
269 Malcolm seems to suggest that the militia clause guarantees the ability of the
state to raise a militia. She argues that the Second Amendment continued the tradition of
the colonies forming militias, implying "a people armed and trained to arms." Malcolm,
supra note 60, at 314. First, if the Amendment does guarantee a state right, this is
contrary to the normal broad right argument that the Second Amendment would only
guarantee individual rights. See supra text accompanying notes 12, 35, 42, & 55. Second,
most commentators seem to accept that the purpose of the militia clause was to prevent
Congress from disarming the militia; supra text accompanying notes 36, & 115. This
would have been accomplished by a broad individual right, obviating the need for a
separate militia clause. Under Malcolm's argument, the only unique right recognized by
the militia clause is the state's right to train the militia. This would seem to be a thin reed
upon which to rest the broad individual right argument.
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enactment of numerous laws amply demonstrated that there was
no right to weaponry that was beyond the reach of the
Parliament or the crown. It is also undisputed that the Bill of
Rights created no new rights. That there was no right of
individual possession of arms for private purposes before this
document voids any pretension that such a right existed after the
document.
The Bill of Rights was meaningful because it
guaranteed that Protestants would not be treated unequally
compared to Catholics in terms of possession of arms. It also
transferred control of weapons law to the Parliament so that the
English militia would never again be the tool of royal
machinations.
But the document also codified the central
features of possession of arms in the country: arms were
primarily important as tools of collective safety, and they were
within reach of the law to regulate. The subsequent history of
England shows beyond peradventure that there was no private
right to firearms. The American colonies put great emphasis on
the militia. This was primarily a function of the strong historic
aversion against standing armies.
The aversion intensified
during British occupation of the colonies. But in again the
historical record is devoid of any suggestion of an individual right
to bear arms outside a military function. This is shown in the
original state constitutions, not one of which unambiguously
recognizes such an individual right. The militia itself came
under severe criticism for its performance during the War, and
again during Shay's Rebellion. To the Federalists, agitating for
ratification of the Constitution, it was obvious that the defense of
the country required a standing army. To the Anti-Federalists,
fears of the oppressive tendencies of the standing army was of
the primary reasons for opposing the Constitution. This fear was
compounded by the elusive authority of the Congress to arm the
militia.
The security of the state resided strictly in the
forbearance of the federal government. The Second Amendment
was born from this tension. This provision would assure that the
states could address their own internal strife without concern
that Congress would attempt to disarm them. Again, the record
is strikingly bare regarding evidence that any individual right for
private purposes was intended. The entire ratification process
indicates that it was the security of the state, not the security of
the individual, that was the concern.
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The broad right advocates consistently refer to three
arguments to support their position. Although each argument
could be dismissed for lack of historic support, they are given
more particularized consideration. The first argument is that
private possession of arms is necessary to secure the people's
right to insurrection against oppressive government. But this
right is flatly contradicted by several constitutional clauses.
These include the treason clause, which criminalizes
insurrection; the militia clause, in which the militia, ironically, is
the means by which insurrection is to be put down; and the
guaranty clause, which is a guaranty by the federal government
to aid the states in putting down insurrection. America's greatest
political thinkers have also disputed that the Constitution does,
or could contain the seeds of its own destruction. Lastly, such a
right is not functional, because it depends on the evaluation of
the very government it is attempting to overthrow to determine
whether the uprising is lawful. The second argument is that
placement of the Amendment as second among the Bill of Rights
proves it is a broad, individual right. But the placement of the
Amendment was strictly accidental and reveals nothing about its
meaning. It was originally the fourth in a long list of proposed
amendments, some of which were rejected.
The first two
proposed amendments, both rejected, dealt with state's rights; it
is thus perfectly plausible that the Second Amendment's primary
concern was state sovereignty, not securing an individual right to
arms.
The last argument deals with construction of the
Amendment. One interpretation is that the scope of the right is
not limited to its stated justification. But this argument fails
because it cannot demonstrate that the militia is actually part of
A second
the justification and not part of the right.
interpretation is that the Amendment guaranteed a right to arms
for both personal and military uses. But if the founders had
intended a broad right, this would include use of arms for militia
purposes; the Amendment would not have been written so that
the Second Clause swallows the first.
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II. LEGAL HISTORY OF THE SECOND AMENDMENT
A. Second Amendment Law

Miller is the only United States Supreme Court case directly
addressing the Second Amendment in the 20th Century. This
case came before the Supreme Court concerning §6 of the
National Firearms Act of 1934.270 Jack Miller and Frank Layton
were charged with "unlawfully, knowingly, willfully, and
feloniously transporting in interstate commerce... a double
barrel 12-gauge Stevens shotgun having a barrel less than 18
inches in length... [and] not having registered said firearm as
required."2 7 1 A Kansas district court opinion held that §6 of the
Act violated the Second Amendment to the Constitution, and
took judicial notice that a short-barreled shotgun was a militia
2 73
weapon. 272 Subsequently, the plaintiffs appealed.
The Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case to the
district court. 274 Justice McReynolds, for a unanimous court,
simply held that
In the absence of any evidence tending to show that
possession or use of a "shotgun having a barrel of less than
eighteen inches in length" at this time has some reasonable
relationship to the preservation or efficiency of a wellregulated militia, we cannot say that the Second Amendment
270 48 STAT. 1236 (1934). The law provides that:
It shall be unlawful for any person who is required to register as provided in Section
5 hereof and who shall not have so registered, or any other person who has not in his
possession a stamp-affixed order as provided in Section 4 hereof, to ship, carry, or
deliver any firearm in interstate commerce.
The Act was passed in response to public outrage over the activities of organized crime. It
required a license to transfer or transport interstate short-barreled rifles and shotguns,
machine guns, or silencers. Further, the act imposed taxes on firearms transported in
interstate commerce. Penalties for violation of the act included fines and imprisonment.
Id..
271 U.S. v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174, 175 (1939).
272 Id. at 176-77 (dismissing defendants' indictments).
273 Id. It should be noted that the indictment was quashed in the district court,
making the defendants legally free to go. Miller and Layton were off the hook, and were
unwilling to risk an unfavorable outcome in the Supreme Court. Thus the defendants did
not have counsel appear at the Supreme Court to engage in oral argument, and further
did not submit a brief on their behalf to the Supreme Court. Id. at 174. Further
prejudicing defendant's chances at the Supreme Court, one author contends that the
"government attorneys did not inform the court of holdings clearly in favor of the
individual's right to keep and bear arms independently of militia participation." Caplan,
supranote 55 at 44-45.
274 Miller,307 U.S. at 182 (holding that case should be reversed and remanded).
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guarantees the right to keep and bear such an instrument.
Certainly it is not within judicial notice that this weapon is
any part of the ordinary military equipment or that its use
could contribute to the common defense. 2 75
There are two possible interpretations of this holding. The
first is that the Second Amendment guarantees the right to bear
arms to those who need such arms in order to serve in the
militia. The second is that every citizen has a right to possess a
weapon of the type used by a militia. Under this reasoning,
Miller grants an unrestricted right to possess weapons if these
2 76
are ordinary military equipment of the day.
The first interpretation has been uniformly adopted by all of
the Circuit Courts.277 The second interpretation of Mler,though
not adopted by a single Circuit Court, has nevertheless been put
forth by the Gun Lobby. However, several problems arise under
this interpretation, even for individual gun rights advocates. For
instance, Miler would allow regulation of private possession of
any firearm that would not be of use in a militia.284 This
275 Id. at 178. One commentator urges that this ruling be read narrowly for three
reasons: the holding invites a narrow construction; the rationale would lead to "manifest
absurdities" if followed strictly; and the court did not hear the defendant's oral
arguments. Lund, supra note 219, at 166. Lund believes Miller should be read to approve
restrictions only on weapons that have the special characteristics shared by those in the
National Firearms Act of 1934 "i.e., slight value to law-abiding citizens and high value to
criminals." Id. at 171.
276 See Stephen P. Halbrook, Congress Interprets the Second Amendment:
Declarationsby a Co-Equal Branch on the Individual Right To Keep and Bear Arms, 62
TENN. L. REV. 597, 616 (1995) (noting court did not suggest possessor must be member of
militia or National Guard, but asked only whether firearm could have militia use, stating
that private, individual character of right protected by Second Amendment went
unquestioned); see also David G. Savage, GOP PoliticsStalls JudicialNominations,L.A.
TIMES, Nov. 28, 1997, at Al (discussing judicial activism and political repercussions).
277 See U.S. v. Tomlin, 454 F. 2d 176, 176 (1972) (using Miller as controlling
precedent for Second Circuit); Halbrook, supra note 276, at 637-39 (noting consistency of
circuits in their construction of Second Amendment); see also U.S. v. McCutcheon, 446
F.2d 133, 136 (1971) (citing Miler court's rationale, affirming lower court ruling
dismissing Second Amendment claim).
284 Kopel analyzes the analogy made by treating the First and Second Amendments as
constitutionally identical: guaranteeing an individual right, but not an absolute right, and
describes this reasoning as reckless. Kopel, supra note 12, at 147-48. The Harlan opinion
is most reasonably read as comparing the First and Second Amendments in one respect:
the text grants absolute rights and the Supreme Courts then place limits on the exercise
of the rights. This is an enormous leap of logic supported by a limited comparison that
Amendments are constitutionally identical in all respects and therefore guarantees an
individual right. See also Konigsberg v. State Bar of Cal., 366 U.S. 36, 51, n.1O (1961)
(rejecting Justice Black's absolutist First Amendment philosophy, Justice Harlan noted
Miller case and that absolute exercise of rights was restricted but not unconstitutional);
Baird v. State Bar of Ariz., 401 U.S. 1, 3-4 (1971) (dismissing prior court "formulas" and
applying only "the 45 words that make up the First Amendment" to determine whether
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description applies to many types of firearms which are not used
by national guard units (let alone non-existent militias), such as
shotguns, Saturday Night Specials and antique guns. Yet many
advocates of the individualist view of the Second Amendment
and gun control opponents argue that these are the types of guns
to which they have an individual right to possess. Even if Miller
grants an individual right of possession, such guns, being
without military value, could be regulated or banned by the
state.
The second consequence has more disturbing ramifications. If
Miller is to be read as granting an individual right to own
weapons of military usefulness, this right would seem to be
unqualified. 285
This is the reductio ad absurdum of the
individualist approach, for it would grant the individual the right
to own any weapon of military application, regardless of the
dangers the weapons posed to others. It was this ramification
that led the First Circuit to reject the individualist interpretation
of Miller.286 Thus, the broad individualist interpretation leads to
the remarkable conclusion that the government can ban antique
guns and collection items but cannot ban useful military
hardware such as bazookas, tanks, grenades, or small tactical
weapons.
Communist affiliation constituted adequate basis for school's refusal to admit certain
students).
285 See Lund, supra note 99, at 109-10 (explaining how Court in Miler never raised any
question about status of defendants as members of militia). If the decisive constitutional
factor were the presumed "non-military nature of the shotgun", rather than the
apparently "non-military nature of the defendants," it would seem to follow that private
citizens are entitled under the Second Amendment to possess ordinary military weapons.
Today this would include such items as fully automatic battle carbines and portable
rocket launchers. It is not likely that the MillerCourt intended this logical extension of its
apparent reasoning, and it is virtually inconceivable that today's Supreme Court would
accept it. See also Chuck Dougherty, Development of the Democratic Institutions & The
Rule ofLaw in the FormerSoviet Union: The Minutemen, the National Guard and the
Private Mihtia Movement: Wlfl the Real Militia Please Stand Up?, 28 J. MARSHALL L.
REV. 959, 973 (1995) (explaining Miller Court defined militia according to colonial days,
therefore civilians were determined to be members of militia; however, Court failed to
take into account that in 1938 there was no militia system). See generaly Kates, supra
note 42, at 250 (pointing out United States Supreme Court has turned away every Second
Amendment case since Mi/er).
286 See Cases v. U.S., 131 F.2d 916 (1st Cir. 1942) (dismissing reasonable relationship test
because Supreme Court did not intend to formulate general rule); see also U.S. v. Oakes,
564 F.2d 384, 387 (10th Cir. 1977) (denying protection to defendant as matter of public
policy, even though he was technically member of Kansas State militia but he was not full
member); U.S. v. Warin, 530 F.2d 103, 106 (6th Cir. 1976) (reiterating concern in Cases
and held adult male's possession of weapon that was common in military conferred no
special rights).
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It has been clear to all Circuit Courts interpreting MlIler that
the Second Amendment strongly suggests a narrow right view of
the right to bear arms. 287 Thus, the Amendment must be
interpreted so as to "assure the continuation and render possible
the effectiveness of such forces" 288 (referring to the militia). The
term militia as used in the Second Amendment were those forces
which "the states were expected to maintain and train .... ",289
When a state organized a militia, the "men were expected to
appear bearing arms supplied by themselves and of the kind in
common use at the time." 290 The purpose of calling the militia
was to act "in concert for the common defense." 29 1 There is
nothing in the Miller Court's discussion of the history of the
Second Amendment that suggests an individual right to bear
arms for his own uses. 292 The intent of the Second Amendment
was to give individuals an unrestricted access to firearms when
the individual had been called to serve in a state militia and
when the individual was acting in concert for the common
defense.
The Solicitor General Robert Jackson, later renowned for his
vigorous prosecution of Nazis in Nuremburg, argued a collective
rights interpretation of the Second Amendment in the plaintiffs
brief. The Miller Court found in his favor. 293 His argument
287See Ehrman and Henigan, supra note 42, at 47-48 (acknowledging Second Amendment

embodies individual right, but right is narrow because it is violated only by laws that, by
regulating individual's access to arms, adversely affect states interest in strong militia);
see also Government Policies Associated with the Second Amendment: Hearings Before
the Subcomm. On Crime ofthe House ofRepresentatives,103d Cong. (1993) (statement of
Edward E. Kallgren, cited in Denning, supra note 3, 964-66 (reporting that legislatures
have broad power to regulate firearms, but federal and state court decisions in this
century have been acting with view that Second Amendment permits exercise of broad
power to limit private access to firearms by all levels of government).
288Miler,307 U.S. at 177.
289
290

Id. at 178.
Id. at 179.

Id. at 179 (stating militia exists to serve larger purpose of providing for common
defense and should not be limited to ensuring effectiveness of state militias); see also
Ehrman and Henigan, supra note 42, at 41 (rationalizing if militia becomes justification
for Second Amendment, it is possible to construe right to be broader than justification).
292 See Kates, supra note 42, at 250 n.193 (commenting on Miller's dicta as being far
removed from holding, leaving it to lower courts to reconcile Miller'sdicta and holding by
making gun possession conditional on participation in militia); see also Dougherty, supra
note 279, at 973 (explaining lower courts interoperations of Miler).
293 See Miller, 307 U.S. 174 (1939), Brief for Appellant at 4-5 ("Indeed, the very language
of the Second Amendment discloses that this right has reference only to the keeping and
bearing of arms by the people as members of the state militia or other similar military
organization provided for by law.").
291
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demonstrates that in both England and the United States, "the
right to keep and bear arms has been generally restricted to the
keeping and bearing of arms by the people collectively for their
common defense and security." 29 4 The brief thus concludes that
"[the right to keep and bear arms], however, it is clear, gave
sanction only to the arming of the people as a body to defend
their rights against tyrannical and unprincipled rulers. It did
not permit the keeping of arms for purposes of private
defense." 295 Jackson also advanced the argument that ultimately
became the Court's holding: "The arms referred to in the Second
Amendment are, moreover, those which ordinarily are used for
military or public defense purposes, and the cases unanimously
hold that weapons peculiarly adaptable to use by criminals are
not within the protection of the Amendment. '"296 The opinion
strongly asserts a direct connection between the rights to keep
297
and bear arms and a militia.
B. Legal History Up To Miller
1. U.S. v. Cruikshank
In US. v. Cruikshank,the Supreme Court had the opportunity
to explain its view of the Second Amendment's relationship to the
Fourteenth Amendment. 298 The case involved an indictment that
at 4.
Id. at 15 (stating further, "Indeed, the very declaration that a well-regulated militia,
being necessary to the security of a free State, indicates that the right to keep and bear
arms is not one which may be utilized for private purposes but only one which exists
where the arms are borne in the militia or some other military organization provided for
by law and intended for the protection of the state.").
296 Id. at 5.
297 See U.S. v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174, 178-9 (1930) (advocating militia support, "The Militia
which the States were expected to maintain and train is set in contrast with Troops which
they were forbidden to keep without the consent of Congress. The sentiment of the time
strongly disfavored standing armies; the common view was that adequate defense of
country and laws could be secured through the Militia-civilians primarily, soldiers on
occasion"); see also Ehrman and Henigan, supra note 42, at 41 (explaining how ruling
"directly contradicts the argument that the Second Amendment guarantees a right to
bear arms for individual self-defense, sport-shooting, or other purposes unrelated to
participation in state militias.").
298 See U.S. CONST. Amend. XIV, §1 (quoting pertinent section of Fourteenth Amendment
which states "All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the Untied States and of the State wherein they reside.
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities
of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the
equal protection of the laws."); U.S. v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 554 (1875) (Clifford, J.,
294 Id.
295
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was handed down against over one hundred white individuals,
including William Cruikshank, who had broken up a freedman's
political meeting and deprived them of their arms. Under §6 of
the Enforcement Act of 1870, the white men were indicted and
convicted in the federal courts.2 99
Among the rights and
privileges asserted were the "right and privilege to peaceably
assemble together with each other and with other citizens of the
United States for a peaceable and lawful purpose" 30 0 and the
30 1
right of "bearing arms for a lawful purpose."
The Court acknowledged that the guarantees in the Bill of
Rights restrain governments as opposed to individuals and
states, and here, the necessary element of state action was
missing. 30 2 The Court dismissed the First Amendment count and
dissenting) (discussing how courts have only interpreted Second Amendment relating to
Miler decision, and therefore does not explain legal scholarship involving relationship

between Second and Fourteenth Amendments); see also U.S. v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598,
622 (2000) (including Cruikshank in compilation of Civil Rights cases and applying
Fourteenth Amendment interpretation as protection of citizens from state, not from
private action from another citizen).
299 See Cruikshank,92 U.S. at 560; Robert J. Cottrol & Raymond T. Diamond, The Second
Amendment: Toward an Afro-American Reconsideration, 80 GEo. L.J. 309, 347 n. 189
(1991) (citing 16 STAT. 141 (1870) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 241-42)). This
section made it a crime ifTwo or more persons shall band or conspire together, or go in disguise upon the public
highway, or upon the premises of another, with intent to violate any provision of this
act, or to injure, oppress, threaten, or intimidate any citizen, with intent to prevent or
hinder his free exercise and enjoyment of any right or privilege granted or secured to
him by the Constitution or laws of the United States, or because of his having
exercised the same.
But see State v. Vlacil, 645 P.2d 677, 679 (1982) (ruling state law constitutional that
made it misdemeanor for non-citizen to possess dangerous weapon).
300 Cruikshank, 92 U.S. at 551. See People v. Rodriguez, 159 Misc.2d 1065, 1068-69 (N.Y.
1993) (stressing necessary 'peaceful' factor of assembly, stating assembly alone "is not
absolute under our laws" where authorities interfered with suspect's right to assemble to
investigate alleged shootings). But see New York v. New St. Mark's Baths, 130 Misc.2d
911, 916 (N.Y. 1986) affd, 122 A.D. 2d 747 (1986) (finding abridgment of right to assemble
must be most reasonable and "least intrusive remedy available").
301 Cruikshank, 92 U.S. at 553. See Sanford Levinson, Is the Second Amendment Finally
Becoming Recognized as a Part of the Constitution? Voices from the Courts, 1998
B.Y.U.L. REV. 127, 128 (1998) (discussing court's lack of attention toward Second
Amendment); see generallyDavid Kopel, supra note 110, at 1362 (discussing historical
setting for decisions).
302 See Cruikshank, 92 U.S. at 552 (noting federal government is restrained by Bill of
Rights); Jay S. Bybee, Taking Liberties with the FirstAmendment: Congress, Section 5,
and the Rehious Freedom Restoration Act, 48 VAND. L. REV. 1539, 1599-1603 (1995)
(discussing how Cruiksbank ruling marked onset of trend interpreting First Amendment
rights as implied personal rights, and thereby bridging gap in interpretation between
First Amendment and rest of amendments in Bill of Rights); see also Matthew C.
Porterfield, State and Local Foreign Policy Initiatives and Free Speech: The First
Amendment as an Instrument ofFederaism,35 STAN. J. INT'L L. 1, 9 (1999) (discussing
original intention of First Amendment as protective measure for both citizens and states
from federal limitations).
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found that despite the Fourteenth Amendment, the First
Amendment was "not intended to limit the powers of the State
governments in respect to their own citizens, but to operate on
the National government alone." 30 3 It further held that because
the right of the people to peaceably assemble was not "created"
by the Constitution, the people must look to the states for
304
protection of this right.
The Court then relied on the same reasoning to dismiss the
claim that the defendants collaborated to obstruct the plaintiffs
right to "bear arms for a lawful purpose."30 5 They first noted that
the right to bear arms was "not a right granted by the
Constitution,"3 0 6 and went on to hold that the Second
Amendment's language "means no more than it shall not be
infringed by Congress." 30 7 Therefore, the Court concluded with
the notion that the internal police powers of the states were "not
surrendered or constrained by the Constitution of the United
States." 30 8
Lower courts still cite this case to support the
proposition that the Second Amendment does not hinder state
gun control legislation, even if the legislation goes as far as an
303U.S. v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 552. See also Michael Kent Curtis, Two Textual
Adventures: Thoughts on Reading Jeffrey Rosen's Paper,66 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 1269,
1283 (1998) (suggesting interpretation of Fourteenth Amendment include importation of
plain meaning approach taken from 1866 to 1868). See generally Mark Denbeaux, The
First Word of the FirstAmendment, 80 Nw. U.L. REV. 1156, 1162-64 (1986) (discussing
historical evolution of First Amendment).
304 See Cruikshaak, 92 U.S. at 552 (noting right to assemble should be protected by
States); see also Hack v. Oxford Health Care, Inc., 562 F. Supp. 295, 301 (D. Ind. 1983)
(explaining difference between remedy provided by Congress for violation of individual's
right to petition Federal government and that individual asserting right to petition State
government); Worthen, supra note 132, at 155 (using U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thorton,
514 U.S. 779 (1995) to argue the Cruikshank ruling can be interpreted to mean Congress
should have no means by which to interfere with people's rights).
305 Cruiksbank, 92 U.S. at 553. See Worthen, supra note 132, at 155-56 (interpreting
Cruikshank ruling to mean Constitution does not protect individuals from
"noncongressional interference" of right to assemble for lawful purpose); see also Uviller
& Merkel, supra note 185, at 412-13 (suggesting Second Amendment's conspicuous nonincorporation into Fourteenth Amendment reflects evidence sentiment of Federalism).
3- Cruikshank, 92 U.S. at 553. Cf Eckert v. Philadelphia, 477 F.2d 610, 610 (3d Cir.
1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 843 (1973) (stating "the right to keep and bear arms is not a
right given by the United States Constitution").
307 Cruikshank, 92 U.S. at 553 (allowing "bearing arms for a lawful purpose," but never
defining "lawful purpose", so perhaps it means limited to military purposes.) See Kopel
supra note 110, at n. 118 (interpreting Cruikshank to say individual's right to arms is
protected by Second Amendment, but not created by it, because right derives from natural
law and neither mentions states or militias, nor individual right to bear arms.); see also
U.S v. Hale, 978 F.2d 1016, 1020 (1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 997 (1993) (stressing
possibility of interpreting Second Amendment as individual right triggered when
individual belongs to militia).
308 Cruikshank, 92 U.S. at 553.
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outright ban on certain types of arms.
2. Presser v. Illinois
In Presser, the Supreme Court again addressed the
applicability of the Second Amendment to the states.
Mr.
Presser and 400 other members of a worker's militia 30 9 marched
without a license through the streets of Chicago, with Presser on
310
horseback carrying a sword and the workers carrying rifles.
Mr. Presser was charged with violating an Illinois statute that
made it a crime for "any body of men" other than the organized
militia of Illinois or the troops of the United States "to associate
themselves together as a military company, or organization, or to
drill or parade with arms" in the towns of the state without a
license from the Governor. 31 1 He was convicted and fined ten
3 12
dollars.
Presser appealed the Illinois Supreme Court decision, claiming
that this law deprived him of his Second Amendment right to
keep and bear arms. 313 The United States Supreme Court upheld
the statute forbidding private militias as a valid exercise of the
state's police power, and answered Presser by holding that the
right to gather as a group and hold armed parades was not
included in the Second Amendment. 3 14 The Court further stated
309See Presser v. Illinois, 116 U.S. 252 (1885) (acknowledging that Presser and worker's

militia marched without license through streets of Chicago carrying swords and riffles).
310 See Presser,116 U.S. at 269 (noting that incorporated Illinois society called "Lehr mid
Wehr Verein," or "teaching and defense union" purports to improve "mental and bodily
condition of its members" through "knowledge of... laws and political economy...
and... in military and gymnastic exercises,... for the duties of citizens of a republic.");
see also Robert Dowlut, The Right to Keep and Bear Arms: A Right to Self-Defense
Against Criminalsand Despots, 8 STAN. L. & POLY REV. 25, 31 (1997) (justifying court's
ruling as responsible exercise of properly placed judicial power); David B. Kopel &
Christopher C. Little, Communitarians,Neorepubicans, and Guns: Assessing the Case
for FirearmsProhibition,56 MD. L. REV. 438, 532 (1997) (arguing Presserruling does not
comport with view of "Domestic Disarmament").
311Presser,116 U.S. at 253 (quoting ILL. MI. CODE Art. XI (1879)). See Sayoko BlodgettFord, The ChangingMeaning of the Right to BearArms, 6 SETON HALL CONST. L.J. 103,
116 (1995) (suggesting more deferential attitude toward framers of
Fourteenth
Amendment is necessary to combat shifts in interpretation from the Supreme Court). But
see David Kopel & Paul M. Blackman, Can SoldiersBe Peace Officers? The Waco Disaster
and the Militarizationof American Law Enforcement, 30 AKRON L. REV. 619, 658 (1997)
(arguing dangerous nature of militarized federal law enforcement, stating "the right to
bear arms, after all, is for 'the People' not the government).
312 See Presser 116 U.S. at 254 (acknowledging that Presser was convicted and fined ten
dollars).
313Id.at 264 (stating that Presser claimed deprivation of his Second Amendment rights).
314Id. at 265 (denying private militia as valid exercise of state's police power).
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"the amendment is a limitation only upon the power of Congress
3 15
and the National government, and not upon that of the states.
316
The Court cited Cruikshankas authority.
B. Lower Court InterpretationsofMiller
"An extraordinarily consistent body of case law has held that a
variety of restrictions on private firearms ownership, use, and
sales do not violate the Second Amendment, because such
restrictions have no effect on the maintenance of a well-regulated
militia the National Guard."3 17 Beginning with the Miller
decision and continuing through US. v. Henson,3 18 there has
been a "collective judicial assumption made about the Second
Amendment that the Framers could not have.., meant that
individuals should have a judicially-enforceable right to keep and
bear arms. '319 An analysis of lower court opinions will help in
Id.; See Kopel, supra note 12, at 174 (agreeing that Presserwould allow states to
regulate firearms, but he argues that theory that Due Process clause of Fourteenth
Amendment might protect substantive constitutional rights had not yet been invented.);
see also Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 542-43 (1961) (Harlan J., dissenting) (stating liberty
315

in Due Process cannot be limited by other guarantees of Constitution, "This 'liberty' is not
a series of isolated points picked out in terms of the taking of property; the freedom of
speech, press, and religion; the right to keep and bear arms..."); Kopel, supra note 12, at
126-27 (arguing that Fourteenth Amendment's "liberty" belongs to individuals, not to
state governments. See generally,Hale, supranote 265 (incorporating right of militia into
rights clause not constraining right of militia by justification).
316 Presser, 116 U.S. at 265 (citing Cruikshank which set limits on the Second
Amendment).
317 Herz, supra note 17, at 68.
318 U.S. v. Henson, 55 F.Supp. 2d. 528 (S.D.W.V. 1999).
319 Denning, supra note 3, at 971. In assessing the lower court's use of Miller, Denning
claims that:
the courts have moved so far away from what Milleractually says that their citations
of the case cease to have any meaning. The courts seem guilty of using the
illegitimate precedent-avoidance
techniques Karl Llewellyn described as
"manhandling facts" and the "unvarnished citation of... alleged authorities" to avoid
outcomes the court cannot stomach. Id. at 971-72. Denning further claims that "[a]
close examination of the lower courts opinions and comparison with the central
holding of Mier, however, reveals that the lower courts have demonstrated a
remarkable obtuseness, sometimes lurching into intellectual dishonesty."
Id. at 999.
Justice Black stands seemingly alone in his opinion that the Second Amendment does
grant a broad individual right to keep arms. See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 16266 (1968) (incorporating Sixth Amendment right to trial by jury into Fourteenth
Amendment's Due Process guarantee). Justice Black wrote a concurring opinion in which
he included the statements of Senator Jacob Howard, one of the primary sponsors of the
Amendment. Id. at 162. These comments describe the first eight amendments to the
Constitution, including the right to keep and bear arms, as guaranteeing personal rights.
See Kopel, supra note 12, at 146 (arguing that by including these remarks in his opinion,
Justice Black was acknowledging individual right to arms). There are many good reasons
to believe that Justice Black viewed the right to possess arms as an individual right. See
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understanding how the courts have interpreted Justice
McReynold's holding in Miller.320 The most common approach to
321
Second Amendment claims has been to apply "the Mlfler test.1
There is no solid consensus as to what that test consists of,
however, a two-tiered test is common. 322 This test includes:
Kopel, supra note 12, at 156-57 (arguing the 14th Amendment guarantees first eight
amendments are enforceable against States and citing Justice Black who quoted Sen.
Howard in his argument first eight amendments are list of individual rights); See
generally Adamson v. California 332 U.S. 46, 51 (1947) (arguing Bill of Rights was
adopted for individual but are inapplicable in similar actions by States). But see Kopel,
supra note 12, at 157. In Duncan, Black is concurring with the Court. In Adamson, he
wrote a dissenting opinion. Whatever else can be said about Justice Black's Second
Amendment jurisprudence, there is surely no evidence that it ever represented the
feelings of a majority of the Court.
320This section will only address a few of the more important Circuit Court cases. There
have been numerous District Court cases addressing the Second Amendment, including,
but not limited to: United States v. Spruill, 61 F. Supp. 2d 587 (1999) (arguing statutory
prohibition against person possessing gun in interstate commerce while subject to
restraining order does not infringe on constitutional right to bear arms); United States v.
Henson, 55 F. Supp. 2d 528 (1999) (arguing statutory prohibition against person under
domestic violence restraining order from possessing gun does not violate 2nd amendment);
Gillespie v. City of Indianapolis, 13 F. Supp. 2d 811 (1998); Anderson v. United States,
1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7107, at *12 (N.D. Ill.
Apr. 24, 1998) (stating enhancement of
sentence because of possession of firearm is not violation of one's Second Amendment
rights) (1998); United States v. Caron, 941 F. Supp. 238 (1996) (holding provision barring
domestic violence offenders from possessing firearm does not violate Second Amendment);
Barsch v. Brann, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6822, at*12 (N.D. CA. Apr. 29, 1996) (stating
Supreme Court has long recognized Second Amendment is not absolute bar to regulation
or use of firearms); Luka v. Douglas, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21538, at *26 (N.D. Miss.
Jan. 17, 1995) (holding state laws proscribing carrying of concealed firearms is not
unconstitutional); White v. Town of Chapel Hill, 899 F. Supp. 1428 (1995) (arguing
possession of firearm is not civil right); Pencak v. Concealed Weapon Licensing Bd. for St.
Clair, 872 F. Supp. 410 (1994) (holding Second Amendment does not apply to States);
Moyer v. Sec'y of Treasury, 830 F. Supp. 516 (1993) (holding federal provision barring
convicted felons from possessing firearms violates the Second amendment); Levy v. Abate,
1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9231, at *22 (S.D.N.Y. June, 29, 1993) ( holding past arrests for
firearms did not prejudice jury in this case); Behre v. Thomas, 665 F. Supp. 89 (1987)
(arguing in order to receive compensatory and punitive damages for deprivation of
constitutional rights, claim must be specific); Thompson v. Dereta, 549 F. Supp. 297
(1982) (holding that to receive compensatory damages one must have Bivens type claim);
Engblom v. Carey, 522 F. Supp. 57 (1981) (arguing what is protected by Third
amendment); United States v. Kozerski, 518 F. Supp. 1082 (1981) (holding rural police
officer was not exempt from provision prohibiting convicted felon from possessing
firearm); Christina v. Department of New York, 417 F. Supp. 1012 (1976) (involving
constitutionality of revocation procedures of pistol licenses); United States v. Three
Winchester 30-30 Caliber Lever Action Carbines, 363 F. Supp. 322 (1973) (upholding
provision prohibiting felon from possessing firearm); Eckert v. Pennsylvania, 331 F. Supp.
1361 (1971) (upholding revocation of pistol license if one is caught concealing a handgun);
Klingler v. Erickson, 328 F. Supp. 674 (1971) (trying defendant in prison garb is not
violation of his constitutional rights); Wainwright v. United States, 289 F. Supp. 820
(1968) (arguing one must raise self-incrimination defense for possession of unregistered
firearm within two years).
321
CLAYTON CRAMER, FOR THE DEFENSE OF THEMSELVES AND THE STATE: THE ORIGINAL
INTENT AND JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION OF THE RIGHT TO KEEP AND BEAR ARMS 286, 189
(1994)
(arguing Miller standard has become most widely used approach).
32
At least one scholar believes the test can be manipulated to reach the result the court
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[The first part] for the weapon and [the] second for the
weapon holder. Even assuming that clear convincing proof
had shown that sawed-off shotguns were not merely part of
the military arsenal but in fact were standard issue as
common as... helmets and furthermore it was a court
martial offense to be found without it, it still would not have
done Mr. Miller a whit of good. Mr. Miller fails miserably in
the weapon holder test. He was not acting in the role of the
member of the "militia," much less a "regulated militia," and
least of all the "well regulated militia," described by the
Court and the Second Amendment. The most that can be
said for whose right emerged 3in
Miller is that of the state
23
militia's and their own arsenal.
From this, the lower courts in the United States have had to
determine what right the Court viewed the Second Amendment
granted.
"It seems clear that the right to bear arms is
inextricably connected to the preservation of a militia. This is
desires. Brannon P. Denning argues:
[T]here are basically three interpretations of Miller. The first concludes that Miller
directs courts to grant Second Amendment protection only where there is some
demonstrable relationship between the weapon that is restricted and the
maintenance of a militia. As it became evident that almost any kind of weapon could
be effectively used in combat, the courts' focus shifted to the state of mind of the
possessor, i.e., did the person using or possessing the weapon have first and foremost
in her mind the intent to insure the maintenance and efficacy of a militia. Finally, if a
plaintiff can overcome the tests in the first two formulations of the test, the court
might play its trump card: in individual can make such a colorable Second
Amendment claim because the Second Amendment protects only a collective right of
undifferentiated state citizens to form militias and to employ them to oppose federal
tyranny.... Over the years, the courts have moved so far away from what Miller
actually says that their citations of the case cease to have any meaning.
See Denning, supra note 3, at 971-72. Another commentator writes "[tihe test enunciated
by the Mil/er court states that the Second Amendment protects such weapons as are (1) of
the kind in common use among law-abiding people; and (2) provable as part of ordinary
military equipment of today." Byron L. Beck, Second Amendment Militias Seamhing for
Modern Day Redcoats Along the Shitig RhetoricalBattle Lines of a Gun Controlled
Utopia, 21 W. ST U. L. REV. 415, 442 (1994). Second Amendment Scholar Don B. Kates
recommends reformulating the Mifler test to provide that the "weapon must provably be
(1) of the kind in common use among law-abiding people; and (2) useful and appropriate
not just for military purposes, but also for law enforcement and individual self-defense,
and (3) lineally descended from the kinds of weaponry known to the Founders." Kate,
supranote 42, at 259.
'3
CRAMER, supra note 321, at 189-90. See generally, Denning, supra note 281, at 964
(quoting Kallgreen who stated, "[Miller held that] the scope of the people's right to bear
arms is qualified by the introductory phrase of the Second Amendment regarding the
necessity of a 'well regulated militia' for the 'security of a free State.' [Further, Mller
held] that the 'obvious purpose' of the Amendment was to 'assure the continuation and...
effectiveness of the state militias' and cautioned that the Amendment 'must be
interpreted and applied with that end in view."'). See e.g., Ehrman & Henigan, supra
note 42, at 40 (arguing that present day National Guard is modem equivalent of 18th
century state militia, thus rendering Second Amendment 'anachronistic and its
protections unnecessary.').
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precisely the manner in which the Supreme Court interpreted
324
the Second Amendment in [Millei."
325
1. Cases v. US

In 1942, the First Circuit decided a case attempting to apply
the Second Amendment holding from Miller.326 This court
rejected the Mller Court's logic to formulate its ruling and
instead looked to the state of mind of the person claiming a
Second Amendment right. 327 The court required that before
asserting a Second Amendment claim, a citizen must have in
mind the maintenance and preservation of the militia as his or
her main concern. 328 The defendant, Jose Cases Velazquez, shot
324

Quilici v. Morton Grove, 695 F.2d 261, 270 (7th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 863
(1983) (arguing that Miller Court held that "the right to keep and bear arms extends to
those arms which are necessary to maintain well-regulated militia"). See also, Spruill,61
F.Supp.2d at 590-91 (W.D. Texas 1999) (holding that "Second Amendment does not
prohibit the federal government from imposing some restrictions on private gun
ownership."); Lewis v. United States, 495 U.S. 55, 65 n.8 (stating, in dicta, that Mifer
stands for proposition that "the Second Amendment guarantees no right to keep and bear
firearms that does not have some relationship to the preservation or efficiency of a well
regulated militia.").
325
Cases v. U.S., 131 F.2d 916 (1st Cir. 1942).
326
Id. at 921-23. Unlike Jack Miller, who was indicted for transporting a particular type of
weapon, a shotgun having a barrel of less than 18 inches in length, through interstate
commerce, the defendant Jose Cases Velazquez, was convicted under the Federal Firearm
Act's prohibition against the transportation and reception of firearms and ammunition by
convicted felons. See Gregory Lee Shelton, In Search ofthe Lost Amendment: Chalenging
Federal FirearmsRegulation Through the "State's Right" Interpretaton of the Second
Amendment, 23 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 105, 119 (1987) (citing Cases argument that the
Miller standard would bar federal regulation of anything other than antiques).
37 Cases, 131 F.2d. at 922-23. The First Circuit admitted that an essential part of the
Milerholding was that "the federal government cannot prohibit the possession or use of
any weapon which has reasonable relationship to the preservation or efficiency of a well
regulated militia". Id. at 922. However, the First Circuit argued that the rule which the
Supreme Court established in Milerwas formulated solely to dispose of the facts that the
Miller case presented and not to establish a specific Second Amendment test. Id. at 925.
The court went on to state that Second Amendment challenges must be decided on a case
by case basis, with the inquiry being whether the federal regulation is valid under the
Constitution. Id. at 924-25. Since the Court found no evidence that Jose Cases Velazquez
was a member of a militia, nor that his use of a .38 caliber revolver was made with a view
toward militia activity, the Court found that as applied to Mr. Cases, the Federal
Firearms Act did not conflict with the Second Amendment. Id.
328 This analysis is a faithful restatement of the narrow rights argument. However,
Professor Nelson Lund is highly skeptical that there is any difference between the narrow
rights and state's rights theories:
[T]he Second Amendment is found, at the end of the day, inapplicable to the military
or non-military weapons possess by citizens who are or are not members of the
militia. What is left? Apparently nothing, except possession of weapons by the
National Guard or perhaps by some hypothetical state armies that the courts

consider sufficiently well regulated. In substance, this is at best the state's rights
theory all over again.
Lund, The Ends ofSecondAmendmen4 supra note 219, at 187.
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another person at a beach club in Carolina, Puerto Rico, and was
convicted for violation of the Federal Firearms Act of 1938, which
prohibited convicted felons from possession of firearms. The
court upheld the conviction and went on to try to explain what
29
the Supreme Court meant in its holding in Miller.
[U]nder the Second Amendment, the federal government can
limit the keeping and bearing of arms by a single individual as
well as by a group of individuals, but it cannot prohibit the
possession or use of any weapon which has any reasonable
relationship to the preservation or efficiency of a well regulated
militia. However, we do not feel that the Supreme Court in this
case was attempting to formulate a general rule applicable to all
330
cases.
The court was clearly concerned that an interpretation of
Miller which looked to the type of gun used, rather than to its
actual use in the militia, would prevent the government from
prohibiting "the possession or use by private persons ... of
distinctly military arms, such as machine guns, trench mortars,
anti-tank, or anti-aircraft guns."33 1 It logically follows from this
interpretation that the federal government "would be empowered
only to regulate the possession or use of weapons such as a
flintlock musket .... "332 Therefore, the court analyzed the facts
of this case in respect to what it thought the Supreme Court held
in Miller. The court found that the defendant possessed a gun
and ammunition and used the "firearm... without any thought
Consequently, Lund believes the Cases court simply misreads the Second Amendment
as a provision protecting some right or interest of a government organized militia rather
than the right of the people. Id. at 186. Of course, the individual right to arms would not
be completely inconsequential today if there were anything like an active militia in
existence. The fact that history has deemed such militias irrelevant should not permit us
to reconstruct the Second Amendment into something not intended by the founders. But
since such militias are unlikely to be resurrected, Lund correctly observes that Second
Amendment law is strict in theory but fatal in fact. Id. at 187.
329
Cases, 131 F.2d at 922-23 (arguing Mi//er should not be applied as a general rule).
330
Id. at 922 The Cases decision was based on the statement "the rule which [Mileri laid
down was adequate to dispose of the case before it and that we think was as far as the
Supreme Court intended to go." One Commentator argues that the decision in Cases is
illogical for the reason that the Supreme Court is rarely concerned with individual justice
when granting certiorari. See Harman, supra note 92, at 437. Harman posits that the
Miller case was taken by the Court because it presented a substantial issue of federal law
that had not been decided on. Id. at 438.
-13 Cases, 131 F 2.d at 922. But see Denning, supra note 3, 982-84 (arguing that "[Cases]
rejected the Mifler decision out of hand and proceeded, inexplicably, to engraft a state of
mind requirement onto the Second Amendment where one had not previously existed").
m3Cases, 131 F.2d at 922 (contending that Miler Court could not have possibly limited
federal regulation to weapons that could be classified as "antiques" and "curiosities.").
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or intention of contributing to the efficiency of the well regulated
militia which the Second Amendment was designed to foster as
''333
necessary to the security of a free state.
The Cases decision is famous for its ruling that the Miller
opinion cannot be interpreted to grant the right to possess such
334
destructive weapons as tanks, mortars, bazookas, and the like.
It would be cited in many cases to come in support of the notion
that the Second Amendment does not grant an individual right.
335
2. US v. Tot

In Tot, the court interpreted the Miller holding under a
historical view of the Second Amendment to support its
contention that there is no constitutional right to keep and bear
arms.

336

Frank Tot, a convicted felon, was found possessing a handgun,
and convicted of violating the Federal Firearms Act of 1938,
which made it a crime for a felon to carry a firearm capable of
being fitted with a silencer.3 37 Tot appealed his conviction to the
Third Circuit based on his rights under the Second
Amendment. 338 The court's decision held the following:
333Id. at 923 (arguing defendant did not possess a gun in order to possess in any way to

militia). One Commentator noted that the First Circuit severely altered Miller's "real
relationship inquiry." See Shelton, supra note 320, at 119-20. Shelton argues "[wihile the
Miller court scrutinized the firearm's militia utility, the Cases court further inquired into
whether the defendant's use of the weapon bore a reasonable relationship to militia
purposes." Id. Shelton continued "[tihe court thus narrowed those able to raise Second
Amendment defenses to those in "military organizations... and provided future courts
with the leeway to find Second Amendment protection inapplicable to individuals." Id.
33 See Cases v. United States, 131 F.2d 916, 922-23 (limiting rule espoused in Miller). In
addressing this contention, Second Amendment scholar Don Kates notes that since the
text of the Second Amendment refers to arms that the individual can "bear, weapons too
heavy or bulky for the ordinary person to carry are apparently no contemplated." Kates,
supra note 42, at 261. Another commentator noted that even under the most liberal
interpretation of the Miller test a weapon such as the "Saturday Night Special," handgun
would bear no reasonable relationship to a militia's preservation because of its
"inaccuracy and unreliability." Susan M. Stevens, Kelley v. R.G. Industries: When Cases
Make Good Law, 46 MD. L. REV. 486, 498-499. Another commentator, not in the legal but
political science field, addressed the prospect of such an unregulated armed citizenry in
the following manner, "[tihe idea that vigilantism and armed insurrection are
constitutionally sanctioned as voting is a proposition of absurdity that one is struck more
by its boldness that by its pretensions to seriousness." Robert J. Spitzer, Fresh Looks:
Researchingthe Second Amendment, 76 CHI.KENT. L. REV. 349, 362 (2000).
335
U.S. v. Tot, 31 F.2d 261, revd., 319 U.S. 463 (1943).
336 Tot, 31 F.2d at 266 (holding that a relationship must be shown between possession of
gun and preservation of well regulated militia).
337Id. at 265 (addressing same federal act at issue in Casesdecision).
338 Id. at 266. (appealing case based upon Second Amendment rights).
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It is abundantly clear both from the discussions of this
amendment contemporaneous with its proposal and adoption
and those of learned writers since that this amendment,
unlike those providing for protection of free speech and
freedom of religion, was not adopted with individualrights in
mind, but as a protection for the States in the maintenance
of their militia organizations against possible encroachment
by the federal power.3 39 (Emphasis added).
By recounting specific historical counts under James II, the
court concluded that the colonists "wanted no repetition" of
3 40
England's government for their adolescent American system.
The court implied that the Second Amendment was drafted as an
advisement to the government not to encroach upon the bounds
put in place by the Constitution and to ensure that the United
States would not return to the same government that they were
subject to in England. Lastly, the court clearly did not think that
the Second Amendment was enacted by the Framers to grant
individuals the right to keep and bear arms.
The court went on to explain how "weapon bearing" was
regulated by statute as far back as the Statute of Northampton
in 1328. 341 Throughout its decision, the court continuously
asserted that the Second Amendment "was not adopted with
342
individual rights in mind."

339Id.; see also The Ends of Second Amendment, supra note 219, at 171 (observing that
case introduced notion of state's rights into Second Amendment analysis). But see Yassky,
supra note 53, at 192 (recalling Professor Yassky's hypothetical: If Tot had been militia
member, Court may have recognized his right to possess gun). Once again, it is not the
Second Amendment law that has suffocated individual rights, but the absence of militias.
Further, hypothetical demonstrates meaninglessness of terms "states rights" and
"individual rights."
340 See Tot, 131 F.2d at 266 ("The experiences in England under James II of an armed
royal force quartered upon a defenseless citizenry was fresh in the minds of the Colonists.
They wanted no repetition of that experience in their newly formed government."); see
also McIntosh, supra note 2, at 679 (stating idea of Second Amendment was to protect
Americans from government tyranny). But see Roland H. Beason, Prntz Punts on the
Palladium of Rights: It Is Time to Protect the Right of the Individual to Keep and Bear
Arms, 50 ALA. L. REV. 561, 565 (1999) (explaining that "militia" in eighteenth century
language, did not mean organized group, but any adult male qualified for military
service).
341See Tot, 131 F.2d at 266; see also supra text accompanying note 81 (discussing
description of statute).
See Tot, 131 F.2d at 266; see also Steven H. Gunn, Second Amendment Symposium: A
Lawyer's Guide to the SecondAmendment, 1998 BYU L. REV. 35, 36-42 (1998) (describing
Second Amendment as protecting states, not individuals); Roots, supra note 256, at 73-75.
But see Beason, supra note 334, at 579 (declaring that Mller rejected collective right
theory, and emphasized individual's right to bear arms).
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3. U.S. v. Warin 343
This case arose after the Cases and Tot disputes, and coincided
with challenges to the federal gun control legislation of the late
1960's.
Francis Warin was convicted by an Ohio district court for
possession of an unlicensed submachine gun, violating federal
law. 344 He claimed he was a member of a "sedentary militia" and
he was modifying the gun in question so that he might offer it "to
the Government as an improvement on the military weapons
presently in use."345 The Sixth Circuit affirmed the conviction,
346
and cited Cases as precedent.
The court further relied on a case it had decided five years
earlier called Stevens v. United States, which held that since the
Second Amendment "applies only to the right of the State to
maintain a militia and not to the individual's right to bear arms,
there can be no serious claim to any express constitutional right
to possess a firearm."347 Then the court used the Stevens
decision to conclude, "it is clear that the Second Amendment
348
guarantees a collective rather than an individual right."
34 9
4. U.S. v. Hale

The Eighth Circuit more recently described Cases as "one of
the most illuminating circuit opinions on the subject of military
weapons and the Second Amendment." Consequently, the court
based its opinion in Hale on its interpretation of the Cases
350
decision and not on Miller.
33 530 F.2d 103 (6th Cir.) (holding that under Second Amendment defendant's enrollment
in militia did not provide him with right to violate federal statute by possessing illegal
firearm).
-4 Id. at 104 (affirming conviction of Warin for possession of submachine gun in violation
of 26 U.S.C. §§ 5861(d), 5871).
345Id. at 105. Warin had in fact designed and built the gun in question for the purpose of
"testing and refining." Warin was an engineer and worked for a company that developed
weapons for the government. Id.
46Id. at 106 ("Agreeing as we do with the conclusion in Cases... that the Supreme Court
did not lay down a general rule in Miler, we consider the present case on its own facts
and in light of applicable authoritative decisions").
37 Id. at 106 (quoting Stevens v. U.S., 440 F.2d 144, 149 (6th Cir. 1971)).
M8Id. at 106-107 (upholding Warin's conviction on grounds that Second Amendment did
not permit him to possess submachine gun unless he was militia member).
349
978 F.2d 1016 (8th Cir. 1992).
350Id. at 1019 (relying on Cases to hold that unless defendant can show that firearm
possession was related to military use, Second Amendment does not protect possession,
rejecting reading of Miller as stating government cannot regulate firearms under any
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Wilbur Hale was prosecuted and convicted for possession of an
unregistered machine gun in violation of federal law. 351 He made
the argument that the indictment violated his Second
Amendment rights, since the machine gun he possessed was
exactly the type of weapon that would be employed by a military
unit. 352
Therefore, the weapons would contribute to the
353
preservation of the militia, as stated in !iller.
The Eight Circuit rejected this reading of Millerand went into
a historical analysis of the state of the militia when the Second
Amendment was drafted, and where it stands today under the
National Guard. 354 The court then went on to cite Cases for the
following reason:
The claimant of Second Amendment protection must prove
that his or her possession of the weapon was reasonably related
to a well-regulated militia .... Where such a claimant presented
no evidence either that he was a member of a military
organization or that his use of the weapon was "in preparation
for a military career," the Second Amendment did not protect the
355
possession of that weapon.
circumstances).
351Id. at 1017 (affirming Hale's conviction for violation of 18 U.S.C.A. § 922(o) and 26
U.S.C. § 5861(d)).
352 Id. at 1019 ("Hale introduced no evidence.., of even the most tenuous relationship
between his possession of the weapons and the preservation of a well regulated militia.").
353 Id. at 1018 (stating that Hale's argument was based on reading of Miler that claims
Second Amendment bars government from regulating any firearms susceptible to military
use); see also Oakes, supra note 12, at 387 (applying Mi!ez's "reasonable relationship"
test between firearm possession and preservation of militia). But see U.S. v. Miller, 307
U.S. 174, 178 (1939) (stating that since Miller's possession of firearms was not related to
military use, the government could regulate his possession and uphold his conviction).
&54 See Hale, 978 F.2d at 1019. The court described that:
When the Second Amendment was ratified in 1791, the state militias functioned as
both the principal units of military organization and as an implicit check on federal
power. These militias were comprised of ordinary citizens who typically were required
to provide their own equipment and arms. The Second Amendment prevented federal
laws that would infringe upon the possession of arms by individuals and thus render
the state militias impotent. Over the next 200 years, state militias first faded out of
existence and then later reemerged as more organized, semi-professional military
units. The state provided the arms and the equipment of the militia members, and
these were stored centrally in armories. With the passage of the Dick Act in 1903, the
state militias were organized into the national guard [sic] structure, which remains in
place today.... Considering this history, we cannot conclude that the Second
Amendment protects the individual possession of military weapons. In Mler, the
Court simply recognized this historical residue.
Id. (citations omitted).
355 Id. at 1020 (citation omitted). This view of the Second Amendment responds to many of
Kopel's Supreme Court opinions allegedly acknowledging in dicta an individual right. See
Kopel, supra note 12, at 113-15. For instance, Kopel quotes Justice Stevens in his dissent
in Spencer v. Renn..being found guilty of a crime "may result in tangible harms such as
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5. Love v. Pepersack 35 6
More recently, the Fourth Circuit supported the collective
rights view of the Second Amendment in the Love case. April
Love had been arrested on four occasions, and subsequently
convicted of a misdemeanor on one of these charges. 35 7 She later
358
tried to purchase a handgun and her application was denied.
imprisonment, loss of the right to vote or to bear arms.. . ." Id. at 114 (quoting 523 U.S.
1, 4 (1998) (Stevens, J. dissenting). It is asserted that "if an individual can lose his right
'to bear arms', he must possess such a right." Id. at 114. This article does not argue,
however, that no right is created by the Second Amendment. The issue is whether the
right belongs to citizens as individuals or citizens organized collectively into militias.
Nothing in Stevens' opinion suggests an individual right to bear arms. Instead, the
opinion can be interpreted to mean a loss of the right to bear arms as a member of a
collective militia. This view of the Second Amendment appears to be endorsed by the Hale
court. This view may also reconcile the Amendments two seemingly contradictory clauses:
the militia clause and the "right of the individual to keep and bear arms" clause.
In two of the cases that Kopel discusses, the party asserting a constitutional right is
not an American citizen. Id at 128. In US. v.Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 262
(1990), the defendant was a Mexican citizen whose home in Mexico was raided by drug
agents. The defendant argued that the evidence should be excluded under the Fourth
Amendment. Id. at 263. The Court held that "the people" protected by the Fourth
Amendment, as well as the First and Second Amendment, "refers to a class of persons
who are part of a national community ... " Id. at 265. Kopel argues that "if 'the people'
whose right to arms is protected by the Second Amendment are American people, then
'the right of the people' in the Second Amendment does not mean 'the right of the states."'
Kopel, supra note 12, at 129. Again, however, Kopel's logic is compatible with the narrow
rights interpretation of the Second Amendment.
Kopel also quotes the interesting case of Johnson v. Eisentrager,339 U.S. 763 (1950).
In this case, German soldiers were captured, but asserted a Fifth Amendment right
against self-incrimination. Kopel, supra note 12, at 151-53. Justice Jackson, writing for
the Court, rejected the claim because this would give German soldiers all constitutional
rights, including the right to bear arms; it would require "the American judiciary to
assure them freedoms of speech, press, and assembly as in the First Amendment, right to
bear arms as in the Second... ." Johnson, 339 U.S. at 784. It is reasonable to conclude
from this case, as Kopel does, that the soldiers are "individuals and as individuals would
have Second Amendment rights, if the Second Amendment were to apply to nonAmericans." Kopel, supra note 12, at 152. However, it would also be possible to conclude
that the opinion supports the collectivist view as well: the German soldiers could not be
disarmed because they are part of a militia. Kopel attempts to circumvent this argument,
noting that the Justice Jackson's opinion refuses to grant Second Amendment rights to
guerilla fighters and "were-wolves." Johnson, 339 U.S. at 784. Kopel argues that a militia
"is an organized force under government control" but guerilla fighters are "small groups
or individuals functioning in enemy territory beyond the reach of any friendly
government." Kopel, supra note 12, at 152 n.217. This is a distinction recognized in
international law and Justice Jackson, as a judge in the Nuremberg trials, would have
recognized the importance of the distinction. But it is not clear that this distinction has
constitutional importance. Jackson's opinion perhaps does nothing more than recognize a
kind of military action (guerilla fighting) which requires access to firearms. Kopel cannot
demonstrate that Jackson's opinion does anything more than discuss bearing arms in
certain military contexts. It certainly does nothing to acknowledge the right to possess
arms beyond a military use.
- 47 F.3d 120 (4th Cir. 1995).
357 Id. at 122. (stating that Love was convicted of participating in obscene show and paid
fine).
351 See Pepersack, 47 F.3d at 122 (stating Love was denied from purchasing handgun
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She sued on Second Amendment grounds, and the Fourth Circuit
affirmed the defendant's motion to dismiss. 59 The court correctly
concluded that "lower federal courts have uniformly held that the
Second Amendment preserves a collective, rather than an
individual right."36 0 It further stated that it is the "collective
right of keeping and bearing arms which must bear a 'reasonable
relationship to the preservation or efficiency of a well-regulated
militia."' 361 The court concluded that Love did "not identif[y] how
her possession of a handgun will preserve or insure the
3 62
effectiveness of the militia."
C. US. v. Emerson
Considering all the aforementioned cases that have held how
the Second Amendment grants a collective right, it is hard to
imagine that any responsible court, even a trial court, could hold
differently. In 1999, however, the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Texas implied that the Second
Amendment grants an individual right to bear arms.
The
opinion was deeply influenced by the avalanche of recent broad
rights scholarship. 363 The court adopts the analytical framework
based on her prior arrest record, although under Maryland code, prior arrest is not
ground for denial of application).
5 See Pepersack,47 F.3d at 124 (affirming judgment dismissing Love's claims based on
fact that she failed to satisfy Mier"reasonable relationship" test).
36oSee Pepersack, 47 F.3d at 124. See generallyU.S. v. Hale, 978 F.2d 1016, 1020 (8th
Cir. 1992) (stating purpose of Second Amendment is to restrain federal government from
regulating possession of arms when such regulation would interfere with preservation of
militia); U.S. v. Oakes, 564 F.2d 384, 387 (10th Cir. 1977) (stating purpose of Second
Amendment is to preserve effectiveness and continuation of state militia and courts must
interpret and apply amendment with such purpose in view); U.S. v. Warin, 530 F.2d 103,
106 (6th Cir. 1976) (stating Second Amendment guarantees collective rather than
individual right).
361Pepersack, 47 F.3d at 124 (quoting US. v. Miler,307 U.S. 174, 178 (1939)); see also
U.S. v. Baer, 235 F.3d 561, 564 (10th Cir. 2000) (noting Supreme Court has long held that
Second Amendment guarantees no right to bear arms that do not have reasonable
relationship to preservation of well regulated militia); U.S. v. Bournes, 105 F. Supp. 2d
736, 744 (E.D. Mich. 2000) (stating defendant was unlikely to satisfy difficult burden of
establishing possession of two unregistered was reasonably related well regulated
militia).
362Pepersack, 47 F.3d 120, 124 (4th Cir. 1995).
36 See Yassky, supra note 53, at 190 (asserting that Emerson court relied "heavily on
revisionist scholarship" that advocates "a broader, individual-rights oriented approach to
the Amendment"); see also Barnett and Kates, supra note 142 at 1142 (advocating
acceptance of broad individual right view, that right of people to keep and bear arms is to
be treated same as other rights secured by Bill of Rights); William Van Alstyne, The
Second Amendment and the Personal Right to Arms, 43 DUKE L.J. 1236, 1239 (1994)
(complaining of lack of useful Second Amendment case law).
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of the broad individual right theorists, asserting that the right to
bear arms is either a state collective right or an individual
right.364 A historical examination convinces the court that "the
right to bear arms has consistently been, and should still be,
construed as an individual right."365 The court fails to address
whether the right is absolute or whether it is limited by the
terms of the Second Amendment.
In United States v. Emerson, Timothy Emerson was indicted
for possessing a firearm while subject to a restraining order
pursuant to federal law. 366 Emerson moved to dismiss the
indictment against him claiming that the statute is
unconstitutional under the Second Amendment. 367 The court
looks to Miller but concludes that the case "did not answer the
crucial question of whether the Second Amendment embodies an
individual or collective right to bear arms." 368 Emerson quotes
Miler in describing "the purpose of the Second Amendment as
'assuring the continuation and rendering possible the
effectiveness of [the Militial."'369 Ironically, the Emerson court
then ignores Miller and comes to a diametrically opposed
conclusion regarding the purpose of the Second Amendment: "the
framers designed the Second Amendment to guarantee an
individual's right to arms for self - defense. "370 In striking the
law down, the court turned to textual and historical arguments to
support its holding that Emerson had a Second Amendment right
Unfortunately, none of the court's
to possess his firearm.
analysis is supportive of its holding that the Second Amendment
guarantees a broad individual right to keep and bear arms.

See United States v. Emerson, 46 F. Supp. 2d 598, 600 (N.D. Tex. 1999), rev'd, 270 F.
3d 203 (5th Cir. 2001) (describing collective rights and individual rights schools of thought
and stating that textual analysis of Second Amendment supports individual right to bear
arms); Plouffe, supra note 236, at 61 (offering synopsis of Emerson and stating district
court recognized collective and individual rights doctrines as two dominate schools of
thought concerning Second Amendment interpretation).
365 Emerson, 46 F. Supp. 2d at 602.
366 See Emerson, 46 F. Supp. 2d at 599 (stating defendant Emerson was indicted for
possessing firearm while under restraining order, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922 (g)(8)).
367 See Emerson, 46 F. Supp. 2d at 599 (stating Emerson challenged statute as
unconstitutional exercise of congressional authority under Commerce Clause and Second,
Fifth and Tenth Amendments).
368 Emerson, 46 F. Supp. 2d at 608.
369 Emerson, 46 F. Supp. 2d at 608 (quoting U.S. v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174, 178 (1939)).
370 Emerson, 46 F. Supp. 2d at 607.
364
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1. Textual Analysis
The court correctly sets forth the argument of the narrow
individual right advocates.
Referring to a "collective right
theory," the opinion sets for the possibility that "the subordinate
clause qualifies the rest of the amendment by placing a
limitation on the people's right to bear arms." 371 But rather than
analyzing the question of the scope of the individual right, the
court demonstrates why the Second Amendment is not a state
right. 372 By assuming that the right is either a broad individual
right or a state right, the judge curiously overlooks the possibility
that his own opinion posits: that there is an individual right to
keep and bear arms qualified by participation in a militia. In
protecting so narrow an individual right, Madison was
recognizing the manner in which militias had historically
functioned. In both English and colonial history, the individual
militia members were responsible for providing their own
weapons. 373 In order to protect the ability of the state to raise an
armed militia, the right of the militia members to access arms
must be put beyond the power of the Congress to restrict. This
construction is fully consistent with the courts initial observation
that the Second Amendment is an individual right qualified by
participation in a militia.
The same analysis also responds to the court's understanding
of the word "people". The judge says that the meaning of the
word in the Second Amendment must be the same as its meaning
in the other amendments.3 74 The meaning of the word people
371 Emerson, 46 F. Supp. 2d at 601.
37 See Emerson, 46 F. Supp. 2d at 601 (stating that if right to bear arms were state right,
Second Amendment would read, "[a] well regulated militia, being necessary to the
security of a free State, the right of the States to keep and bear Arms, shall not be
infringed"); see also Plouffe, supra note 236, at 63 (noting Emerson court's failure to
address essential question of whether or not Second Amendment is fundamental right).
373 See Emerson, 46 F. Supp. 2d at 602 (stating Englishmen were required to bear arms
and serve in military and citing Virginia statute requiring heads of families to furnish
themselves and all family members capable of bearing arms with firearms); see also
David E. Johnson, Note, Taking a Second Look at the Second Amendment and Modern
Gun Control Laws, 86 KY. L.J. 197, 202 (1998) (noting that in eighteenth century
America, "the militia was the entire adult male citizenry, who were not simply allowed to
keep their own arms, but affirmatively required to do so"); Plouffe, supra note 236, at 70
(discussing several pre-American Revolution colonial laws that mandated ownership and
even public carrying of arms).
374 See Emerson, 46 F. Supp. 2d at 601 (stating Supreme noted that phrase "the people" in
Second Amendment has same meaning in both Preamble and First, Fourth, Fifth and
Ninth Amendments of Constitution); see also, McIntosh, supra note 2, at 676
(differentiating between political right to bear arms as collective right of revolution and
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"refers to a class of persons who are part of a national community
or who have otherwise developed sufficient connection with this
country to be considered part of that community. 375 According to
the judge, this "supports a holding that the right to keep and
bear arms is a personal right retained by the people, as opposed
to a collective right held by the states."376 A narrow individual
rights advocate has no qualm with this interpretation. But the
judge's analysis certainly does not address the possibility that
the individual right of the people may be limited to participation
in the militia.
The opinion attempts to reconcile the competing Second
The judge essentially adopts the
Amendment clauses.
justification reading of the militia clause. 377 He asserts that "the
function of the subordinate clause was not to qualify the right,
but instead to show why it must be protected."378 The argument
civil right to bear arms as personal right of self defense); Rakove, supra note 207, at 106
(arguing Second Amendment controversy is distinguishable from other Constitutional
disputes by degree to which individual right interpretation rests upon commitment to
originalism).
375Emerson, 46 F. Supp. 2d at 601 (quoting US. v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 265
(1990)); see also The Ends of the Second Amendment supra note 219, at 173 (stating
phrase "the right of the people" as used in Second Amendment is same as phrase used in
First and Fourth Amendments where phrase is used to protect rights of individuals, not
states). See generally,Daniel A. Farber, DisarmedBy Time: The Second Amendment and
the Failureof Origina'sm,76 CHI-KENT L. REV. 167 (2000) (arguing orginalists are not
only wrong about how judges should read Constitution, but are wrong about very nature
of Constitution itself).
376 Emerson, 46 F. Supp. 2d at 601; see also Resnick, supra note 41, at 12 (stating that
despite lack of evidence that "the people" as used in Second Amendment has different
meaning than "the people" as used in Preamble, First and Fourth Amendments, collective
rights theorists claim "the people" does something different as used in Second
Amendment). See generally Robert Spoo, Commentary on Akhil Reed Amar's The Bill of
Rights: Creation and Reconstruction 'No Word Is An Island": Textualism and Aesthetics
in Akhl ReedAmar's The Bill OfRights, 33 U. RICH. L. REV. 537 (May 1999) (examining
nature and validity of interaction between aesthetic and historical argument in Bill of
Rights).
37 See Emerson, 46 F. Supp. 2d at 601 (stating right to bear arms exists independent of
existence of militia because without individual right to bear arms, existence of militia and
security of state would be jeopardized); see also Eugene Voloch, The Commonplace Second
Amendment, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 793, 806 (June 1998) (arguing Framers may have
intended right to bear arms as means of maintaining militia and ensuring security of
state but they sought to further such purposes through specific means - right of people to
keep and bear arms). But see David C. Williams, The Unitary Second Amendment, 73
N.Y.U. L. REV. 822, 822 (June 1998) (arguing operative and purposes clauses of Second
Amendment should be read together to produce unitary provision).
378Emerson, 46 F. Supp. 2d at 601; see also, Kevin J. Worthen, supra note 132, at 146
(stating Second Amendment does not focus on right of individuals to protect themselves
but on right of people to maintain freedom of state). But see Nicholas J. Johnson,
Principlesand Passions: The Intersection of Abortion and Gun Rights, 50 RUTGERS L.
REV. 97, 100 (Fall 1997) (arguing gun right theory that intersects abortion right theories
is right to own or use gun for personal self defense).
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suffers from the basic flaw of the justification interpretation, for
it fails to demonstrate that the militia clause is part of the
justification and not part of the operative right. 379 There is no
qualm with the argument that the need for state security is the
justification for the right. But it is difficult to perceive that the
militia is also part of the justification when a militia is not an
end in itself. When broken into its operative and justification
clauses, the right of individuals in militias should be seen as the
operative right, and state security should be seen as the
justification. When the militia clause is seen as part of the
operative right, there is no basis for the view that individuals not
in a militia have any Second Amendment right. Had the drafters
intended a broad right, the subordinate clause would have been
omitted. This would have allowed arms for militias and would
have protected access for all other individual purposes. It would
seem that the militia clause would only have been added to the
amendment if it was intended as a qualification of the right.
The judge makes an additional curious argument. He asserts
that "[t]he right exists independent of the existence of the militia.
If this right were not protected, the existence of the militia, and
38 0
consequently the security of the state, would be jeopardized."
Obviously, if the right of militia members to access firearms were
not protected, the existence of the militia would be threatened.
But the point of the Second Amendment is to protect access to
arms when a militia is called. Thus, when the security of a state
is threatened, the members have a constitutionally guaranteed
right to arm themselves. But when state security is not
jeopardized, there would be no need for a militia and no
constitutionally protected access to arms. Contrary to the judge's
assertion, the existence of the right is dependent on the existence
of a militia.
If the individual possession of arms is
constitutionally justified only by state security, there is no right
to possess arms broader than participation in a militia.
379See supra text accompanying notes 256-266 (discussing justification interpretation of
Amendment). See generally,McAfee & Quinlan, supranote 92, at 787 (discussing media
presentations of Second Amendment); David Williams, The Constitutional Right To
'Conservative' Revolution, 32 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 413, 443 (Summer 1997)
(discussing role of Second Amendment in modern militia movement).
380Emerson, 46 F. Supp.2d at 601. See generally,Barnett & Kates, supra note 142, 1141
(embracing individual right to bear arms); Lund, supra note 99 (arguing that individual
right to bear arms is not limited or qualified by prefatory militia language of Second
Amendment).
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2. Right to Bear Arms in English and Colonial History
The judge makes the argument that the rights of the American
38
colonists were the same as the rights of the English people. '
And the right to bear arms in England was, of course, included in
the English Bill of Rights. 382 But in the Bill of Rights, the
people's right to arms is subject to "their conditions and as
allowed by law."38 3 The facial reading of the provision is that
there is no right to bear arms that is beyond the power of
Parliament to regulate. 384 Moreover, the historic English right to
arms was no broader than participation in the common
defense. 385 Lastly, the judge does not address the argument that
the purpose of the provision was not to secure a right to arms but
to transfer control of the militia from the crown to the
Parliament. 386 The mere recitation of the English Bill of Rights
There are
does little to advance the judge's argument.
compelling reasons to believe that this history is not compatible
with the ruling that the Second Amendment recognizes a broad
3 7
individual right to bear arms. 8
Emerson, 46 F. Supp. 2d at 602-3 (discussing historical laws regarding militia and
right to bear arms). See generally, Stephen Halbrook, Second-Class Citizenship And The
Second Amendment In The District Of Columbia, 5 GEO. MASON U. CIV. RTS. L.J. 105,
112 (Summer 1995) (discussing application of Second Amendment in Washington, D.C.);
Herz, supra note 17, at 64 (highlighting distinction between collective and individual
right to bear arms).
382 See Emerson, 46 F. Supp. 2d at 602 (noting that American colonists had right to bear
arms under English Bill of Rights). See generally, Rodriguez, supra note 35, at 799
(characterizing Second Amendment as legacy of English Bill of Rights); Schwoerer, supra
note 88, at 29 (commenting on Malcom's interpretation of Second Amendment as legacy of
English Bill of Rights).
383 See Blakely, supra note 113 (quoting text of English Bill of Rights). See generally,
Heyman, supra note 179, at 253 (arguing that English Bill of Rights is plausible
precedent to Second Amendment); Gordon Wood, The Origins Of Vested Rights In The
Early Republic, 85 VA. L. REV. 1421, 1425 (October 1999) (noting that English Bill of
Rights protected right to bear arms from restriction by king not from restriction by
Parliament).
384
See supra text accompanying notes 127-137 (discussing Parliament's power to regulate
right to bear arms). See generally, Gallia, supra note 192, at 146; Olson & Kopel, supra
note 100, at 401.
385 See generally, Bellesiles, supra note 88, at 571; Cliff Stearns, The Heritage Of Our
Right To BearArms, 18 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 13, 14 (1999).
3
86See supra text accompanying notes 118-121 (discussing Parliament's power over right
to bear arms). See generally, Bogus, supra note 36, at 377 (mentioning Parliament's
restrictions on English right); Brandon Denning, Gun Shy.The Second Amendment as an
'Unenforced ConstitutionalNorm, 21 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL. 719, 760 (Summer 1998)
(noting power Parliament had to restrict right to bear arms).
387
See United States v. Emerson, 46 F. Supp. 2d 598, 603 (Tex. 1999), rev'd, 270 F.3d 203
(5th Cir. 2001) (describing events leading up to Revolutionary War and militia's role in
war); Gun Control in America: Interview with Michael Barnes, President Handgun
381See
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3. Ratification, Drafting, and Structural Analysis
The judge's ratification analysis revolves around his belief that
the Second Amendment was a guarantee to "the personal right to
bear arms as a potential check against tyranny." 388 His proof of
this point is a smattering of quotes that cannot possibility bear
the weight the judge assigns to them. Among the quoted figures
are those not heretofore known to be major figures in the
founding (Theordore Sedgwick 389 and Zachariah Johnson 390),
those who, according to Jefferson, should not be used to interpret
the Constitution (Richard Lee Henry391 and Patrick Henry39 2),
one who was explicitly referring to the militia (George Mason 39 3),
and those whose thoughts are taken out of context (Patrick
Henry 394 and James Madison. 395 ). Stripped of these sources, the
Control,Inc., 6 GEO. PUBLIC POLY REV. 31, 34 (2000) (stating Second Amendment relates
to "well-regulated militia[s]" and not individual right to own weapons). But see Gun
Contro] in America- Interview with Larry Pratt, Executive Director, Gun Owners of
America, 6 GEO. PUBLIC POL'Y REV. 37, 42 (2000) (stating Second Amendment protect
individual "... right of the people to keep and bear arms.").
388 Emerson, 46 F. Supp 2d at 605-6 (discussing proposed amendments to Constitution);
see also Dennis, supra note 81, at 91 (suggesting Framers of Constitution and Bill of
Rights intended Second Amendment guarantee individual right to carry and posses
arms); Lara L. Overton, Permit to Carry Legislation:Has the Time come for cbange in
Minnesota's FirearmLegislation and Policy? 21 HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POLY 95,122-23
(1999) (noting some advocates argue Second Amendment affords individual right to bear
arms).

389 See id. at 603 (stating that Theodore Sedgwick of Massachusetts felt that although it is
hard to imagine that our country could ever be enslaved, it is possible that army can be
raised).
390
See id. at 604 (noting, that Zachariah Johnson told Virginia Convention that liberties
will be safe because "the people are not to be disarmed of their weapons").
391See id. at 604 (stating that Richard Lee Henry's view of well regulated militia being
entire armed populace rather than select body of men was reiterated by proponents to bill
of rights).
392 See id. at 604-5 (quoting Patrick Henry as arguing for right to arms); see also Wills,
supra note 207 (noting Jefferson's argument that only words 6f those who voted in favor of
Constitution should be used to interpret it).
393 See Emerson, 46 F. Supp 2d at 603-4 (quoting George Mason). Mason is quoted first as
to the necessity of maintaining the militia. Id. at 604. He is then quoted as saying that the
militia "consist now of the whole people." Id. at 603. The judge takes this to mean that
"[blecause all were members of the militia, all enjoyed the right to individually bear arms
to serve therein." Id. at 604. Of course, the militia did not and never has "consisted of the
whole people." See Bogus, supra note 36 (discussing structure of militia). As the
modifying phrase "well regulated" would suggest, the militia has always meant a state
administered organization. See Feller & Gotting, supra note 55 (discussing need for
militia to be state-administered).
39 See Emerson, 46 F. Supp. 2d at 605 (referring to Henry's quote that "the great object is
that every man be armed." When put in context, Henry was obviously referring to the
need to arms militias. See supra text accompanying notes 215-217 (discussing need to
arm militias).
395 See Emerson, 46 F. Supp. 2d at 603-5 (discussing propositions advanced by Theodore
Sedgwick, Zachariah Johnson, Richard Henry Lee, Patrick Henry, George Mason and
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judge's case comes down to the proposed amendments offered by
Pennsylvania, Massachusetts, and New Hampshire, 396 and
James Monroe, who included the right to bear arms in a list of
basic human rights.3 97 What the judge fails to demonstrate is
that any of these thoughts were incorporated into the meaning of
the Second Amendment. The fact that someone in American
history once suggested a right to the private uses of arms is
hardly proof that this right was constitutionally codified. The
real meaning of the Amendment is demonstrated by the
ratification debates in which the obvious concern was how
militias could be assured a source of weapons. 398 Quotes that are
out of context or from those who opposed ratification do nothing
to undermine this conclusion. Given that the judge uses such
sources, his analysis can legitimately be described as a "linguistic
399
wild-hare chase."
The judge also considers the argument that the original
James Madison); see also Finkelman, supra note 190, at 216 (stating in 1978 Richard
Henry Lee urged Virgina to defeat Bill of Rights and hold out for more sweeping
amendments). See generally,James Gray Pope, Republican Moments: The Role of Direct
PopularPower in the American Constitutional Order,139 U. PA. L. REV. 287, 342 (1990)
(noting conservative federalist Theodore Sedgewick motioned to delete assembly clause
considering it redundant appendage to free speech guarantee).
396 See Emerson, 46 F. Supp. 2d at 605-6 (discussing proposed amendments to
Constitution); see also Michael A. Bellesiles, Symposium, Fresh Looks: The Second
Amendment in Action, 76 CHu.-KENT. L. REV. 61, 70 (2000) (noting gun ownership in
Pennsylvania "was premised on notion that individual would use that weapon in state's
defense when called upon"); Kates, supranote 42, at 273 n.91 (stating "Adams proposed to
the Massachusetts ratification convention an amendment guaranteeing the right to bear
arms").
397
See Emerson, 46 F. Supp. 2d at 605 (quoting James Monroe). Given that Monroe used
the phrase "bear arms" it is questionable that he was speaking of a non-military
possession of weapons. See supra text accompanying note 217 (discussing Monroe's
Second Amendment proposal).
398 See Heyman, supra note 179, at 271 (confirming that in late 181h century America,
right to bear arms was understood as collective right, exercised through formation of state
militias); Kopel, supra note 110, at 1414 (asserting that Founders saw state militias as
protection against federal standing army and therefore Second Amendment only
guarantees state governments and not individual right to form a militia); Joelle E.
Polesky, The Rise of the Private Mi'lita: A Firstand Second Amendment Analysis of the
Right to Organize and the Right to Train, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1593, 1630 (1996) (stating
that militia clause was intended to balance potential threat of tyranny by federal
government's power to establish standing army).
399See WILLS, supra note 5 (asserting that such argument appears to be extremely
dubious, not least because of its schizophrenic logic). See generally, Christopher
Chrisman, Constitutional Structure of the Second Amendment: A Defense of the
Individual Right to Keep and Bear Arms, 43 ARIZ. L. REV. 439, 440 (2001) (noting that
Emerson was first time in nearly sixty-years that federal court struck down law passed by
Congress as violation of Second Amendment, going against clear weight of authority in
other jurisdictions and making reversal likely); Spitzer, supra note 226, at 370 (stating
that federal courts have been uniform in their interpretation of Second Amendment, with
exception of Emerson).
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placement of the proposal and its alteration demonstrates a
broad Second Amendment right. The suggested interlineation of
the right in the body of the Constitution 40 0 "reflect[s] recognition
of an individual right, rather than a right dependent upon the
existence of a militia. '40 1 But the judge does nothing to
demonstrate why this would be the case. It is reasonable to
suggest that this proposed placement reflects an individual right
that can be asserted upon satisfaction of the condition precedent
of belonging to a militia. It is also maintained that listing the
right in the Bill of Rights proves the individual nature of the
40 2
right because "this is a bill of rights retained by the people."
First, it is not argued that the Second Amendment embraces a
state's right. Second, this argument is historically false on its
own terms. The original proposed Bill of Rights included several
states rights at the beginning of the list. 40 3 Moreover, the fact
that these beginning amendments were not ratified, placing the
right to bear arms as the Second Amendment, was strictly
coincidental. 404 The judge recites the changes that were made to
See Emerson, 46 F. Supp. 2d. at 606 (alleging that Madison envisioned personal right
to bear arms with his original plan being to insert amendments between specific sections
in existing Constitution and not to add them to end of document); see also Edward
Harnett, A "Uniform andEntire"Constitution;Or, What If Madison Had Won, 15 CONST.
COMMENTARY 251, 252 (1998) (reiterating that Madison wanted to preserve entire
uniform system and proposed to integrate amendments into body of Constitution); Herd,
supranote 37, at 207 (stating that right to bear arms was not submitted as separate Bill
of Rights but was proposed as amendment by interlineations to be inserted in Article 1,
Section 9 between clauses 3 and 4).
4 01
Emerson, 46 F. Supp. 2d. at 606.
4 02
See David Harmer, Securinga Free State: Why the Second Amendment Matters, 1998
BYU L. REv. 55, 60 (1998). See generallyHenderson,supra note 257, at 181 (pointing out
that text of Second Amendment is unique from rest of amendments composing Bill of
Rights in that its opening clause indicates a purpose); David E. Johsnon, Taking a Second
Look at the Second Amendment and Modern Gun Control Laws, 86 KY. L.J. 197, 204
(1998) (stating it was Founders' intention that the Bill of Rights be interpreted
consistently).
403 See Akhil Reed Amar, A Tale of Three Wars: Tinker in Constitutional Context, 48
DRAKE L. REV. 507, 510 (2000) (affirming that original Bill of Rights was designed not
only to protect individual rights but also to protect state's right against federal
government); see also Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth
Amendment, 101 YALE L.J. 1193, 1263 (1992) (noting that original Bill of Rights mirrored
the body of Constitution in that it included both state and individual rights and stating
that states' rights are not limited to the Ninth and Tenth Amendments); Michael Kent
Curtis, A Story ForAll Seasons:Akhi Reed Amar On the Bill ofRights, 8 WM. & MARY
BILL OF RTs. J. 437, 440-41 (2000) (suggesting that original Bill of Rights was about
localism and state's rights).
404 See STEPHEN P. HALBROOK, THAT EVERY MAN BE ARMED: THE EVOLUTION OF A
CONsTITuTIONAL RIGHT 84 (University of New Mexico Press 1984) (stating, "a purely
logical analysis of the words of the Second Amendment and its relation to the Bill of
Rights in its entirety demonstrates consistently with the historical context and the intent
400
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the wording: from "best security" to "necessary to the security";
omitting "composed of the body of the people" as a description of
the militia; dropping the religious exemption clause; rejecting the
phrase "for the common defense." 40 5 The judge barely pretends to
describe how these changes support his argument, only asserting
without rationale that "necessary to the security" is "an even
stronger endorsement than Madison's original description." 406 In
fact, each of these changes are either irrelevant or support the
militia centric vision of the Amendment. 4 7 The judge again fails
to present a single convincing argument that the Second
Amendment embraces any right to possession of a gun not
related to military use.

III. PUBLIC POLICY
In comparison to other industrialized countries, American
suffers from a high degree of lethal gun violence. Guns further
contribute to tens of thousands of deaths a year by way of
accidents and suicides. America's rate of gun ownership is
higher than most other industrialized countries. The homicide
rate in America is staggering. From 1990 through 1994, over
23,000 people a year were victims of homicide annually in the
United States. 408 By the early 1990s, the homicide rate was 9.4
per 100,000 people, among the highest in the world, and is a
leading cause of death. 40 9
Italy, Canada, and the United
Kingdom had homicide rates in 1990 of 2.6, 2.1 and .7,
of the framers."); see also MALCOLM, supra note 76, at 164 (asserting, "the position of this
amendment, second among the ten amendments added to the Constitution as a Bill of
Rights.").
405 Emerson, 46 F. Supp. 2d at 606.
4
0Id.
407 See Barnett & Kates, supra note 142, at 1205 (noting that militia system required
every household to have gun because state required individuals to have guns as part of
militia and concluding that it is still seen as collective right); see also Dennis, supra note
81, at 90 (stating that state rights theorists use "militia-centric" nature of Supreme Court
to advance their views); Kopel, supra note 110, at 1500 (stating militia-centric
explanation of Second Amendment refers to an organization of state militia).
408

Nat'l Inst. Of Justice, A Study of Homicide in Eight US. Cities: An NIJ Intramural

Research Project,RES. IN BRIEF, Nov. 1997, at 1.
409 See FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING & GORDON HAWKINS, CRIME Is NOT THE PROBLEM: LETHAL
VIOLENCE IN AMERICA 54 (Oxford University Press, 1977); see also Peter Stone, Lethal
Weapons, THE AMERICAN PROSPECT, May 7, 2001 at 46 (stating that US has arsenal of
nearly 200 million guns, making their homicide rate far in excess of any other developed
nation); People and Places, LLYOD'S LIST, March 15, 1991, at 5 (reporting that US
homicide rate in 1990 was more than double that of Northern Ireland, four times that of
Italy, nine times that of Britain, and eleven times rate in Japan).
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respectively. Japan, which has an extremely violent history and
culture, but which has learned to control its violence by strict
gun laws, had just .6 homicides per 100,000, has one of the lowest
homicide rates in the world. 410 This glaring disparity demands a
search for causative factors of America's extraordinarily high
homicide rate.
Overwhelmingly, the weapon of choice used in homicide is the
firearm. Nearly two-thirds of all homicides in the U.S. are
The numbers become more
committed with firearms. 4 11
disturbing when firearm related - accidents, suicides, and
unintentional gunshot injuries are taken into account. Under
this measure, the total number of lives taken in the U.S. alone by
guns of all kinds is 38,000.412 Indeed, firearms are the eighth
leading cause of death in the country. 413 The number of lives
taken by firearms from 1963 to 1982 (900,000) is greater than the
number of American soldiers who died in all wars from the Civil
War through Vietnam (747,000).414 Clearly, "[flirearm violence
has reached epidemic proportions in this country, and is now a
public health emergency...
The consequences
of firearm violence
are suffered
disproportionately by a few demographic groups. Children and
teenagers in the U.S. are particularly susceptible to death by
guns. In 1993, these age groups accounted for 5,751 gun deaths,
and 957 of these were under 15 years of age. 416 Fifteen children a
day died from gunfire the same year. 4 17 In 1994, among twenty
states, more people between the ages of 15 to 20 died from
gunfire than from car accidents. 418 Between 75% - 80% of all
410 See ZIMRING & HAWKINS, supra note

403, at 54.
See Richard Aborn, The Battle over the Brady Bill and the Future of Gun Control
Advocacy, 22 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 417, 417-18 (1995) (asserting that firearms are leading
cause of death and if trends continue they will surpass deaths by automobile by 2003); see
also Dorf, supra note 260, at 342 (asserting handguns are responsible for over one half of
all homicides); Bryan A. Liang, Shortcuts to "Truth"- The Legal Mythology of Dying
Declarations, 35 AM. CRiM. L. REV. 229, 239 (1998) (reporting that two-thirds of
homicides involve firearms).
42 See Aborn, supra note 405, at 417-18.
4 13
See Aborn, supranote 405, at 417-18.
414 See Herd, supranote 37, at 232.
4 15
Commentary, Firearm Violence and Public Health, Limiting the Availability of Guns,
271 JAMA 1281, 1281 (1994).
416 Frank J. Vandall, OX Conal IT Policy Issues in Municipal Suits Against Gun
Manufacturers,44 ViLL. L. REV. 547, 548 n.4 (1999).
411

417
418

See id. at 548.

See id. at 550 n.15 (stating also that in same year, nationwide deaths from guns
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murder victims aged 24 and less are killed by guns. 419 One
measure of lost life is the number of people killed times the loss
of life expectancy of each victim. Taking into account this
measure, homicide by firearms is the fourth leading cause of
potential life lost before age 65.420 The loss of potential life from
firearms in the U.S. is more than one-third of the loss of potential
421
life from all forms of cancer.
The overwhelming burden of gun violence is borne by the black
community. Out of every 100,000 black males between the ages
of 15 and 19, 105.3 are victims of firearm murder. This compares
422
to a figure of 9.7 for white males in the same age group.
Incredibly, the American inner city is more than twice as violent
as the most violent country on earth. 4 23 These data are sufficient
to support the finding that "[y]oung black men are being shot and
killed at an alarming rate."424 However, the problem is not
limited to the inner city. The homicide rate for whites alone is
between two to six times higher the rates of other industrialized
425
countries.
The total cost of gun violence cannot be measured only by
counting the corpses accumulating on the American street. Nonfatal injuries impose huge costs on both the victims as well as on
society at large. A survey of 91 hospitals nationwide has
estimated a ratio of non-fatal to fatal firearm incidents of 2.6:1.426
Another sampling of three cities collectively thought to be
ethnically representative of the nation, Seattle, Galveston, and
totaled 38,505 while car accidents were only slightly more deadly, killing 42,542).
419 See Jeffrey A. Roth, Nat'l Inst. of Justice, Firearmsand Violence, RES. IN BRIEF, Feb.
1994 at 1, 1.
420 See Benjamin Bejar, Wielding The Consumer Protection Shield: Sensible Handgun
Regulation In MassachusettsA ParadigmFor A NationalModel, 7 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J.
59, 66 (1998).
421
ZIMRING & HAWKINS, supranote 403, at 57.

4MId.
Id. at 54 (stating Columbia, at 49 homicides per 100,000, has the highest rate in the
world).
424Arthur L. Kellermann et al.., Injuries Due to Firearmsin Three Cities,335 NEW ENG.
J. MED. 1438, 1443 (1996).
425 See Kevin R. Reitz, Lethal Violence in America: An Overview of the Colorado Law
Symposium, 69 U. CoLO. L. REV. 891, 894 (1998) (stating when African-American
homicides are removed from statistics U.S. homicide is still more than twice that of
Canada, more than four times rates in France and Germany, and more than six times
rates in United Kingdom and Japan).
426 Joseph L. Annest et al., National Estimates of Nonfatal Firearm-RelatedInjuries,273
JAMA, 1749, 1751 (1995) (tabulating ratios of nonfatal to fatal injuries generally and for
specific categories of race, age and gender).
423
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Memphis, concluded that the ratio was 4.2:1.427 Extrapolated to
the country as a whole, and assuming a total death rate by
firearms from all causes to be about 38,000, total non-fatal uses
of firearms total between 99,000 to 160,000 incidents annually.
Some estimates are significantly higher. One study placed the
total number of fatal and non-fatal instances of gun use at one
428
million.
Given the magnitude of the problem, it can come as no surprise
that the social cost from firearm use is enormous. A study of San
Francisco General Hospital indicated that the average non-fatal
gun injury costs $6,915. Because 85% of this is paid by public
sources, taxpayers nationwide pay over $1 billion annually for
gun injuries. 429 One study estimated total costs for medical care,
43 0
long-term disability, and premature death at $14 billion.
Another indicated that, excluding medical costs, the firearmrelated economic burden is $19 billion. 43 ' The Center for Disease
432
Control also estimates an economic cost of $20 billion.
Problems that have not yet been, and perhaps cannot be,
monetized are the psychological ills sown by growing up in
Kellermann et. al., supra note 418, at 1443 (determining ratio for nonfatal to fatal
injuries).
428 See Herd, supra note 7, at 232 ("When non-fatal gun-related accidents are counted
with the fatalities, the total firearm incidents reach about one million each year in the
United States.").
429 See Michael J. Martin et al., The Cost of Hospitalizationfor Firearm Injuries, 260
JAMA 3048, 3048 (1988) (stating legislators should be aware issue is not just one of
individual rights but one of cost to taxpayers of $1 billion); see also Carl W. Chamberlin,
Johnny Can'tRead 'CauseJane's Got A Gun: The Effects OfGuns In Schools, and Options
After Lopez, 8 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 281, 292-93 (1999) (contrasting factors
included in determining average medical costs per gunshot victim in 1986 to more modem
times while maintaining exclusion of professional fees); Dan Bischoff, A Preventable
Epidemic: ProvidersBack Nationwide ProtestAgainst Violence, MODERN HEALTHCARE,
Apr. 20, 1998, at 58 (citing Handgun Epidemic Lowering Plan's 1997 estimates of average
medical costs of $145,000 per gunshot survivor).
430 See Roth, supra note 413, at 1; see also Charlotte M. Hendricks & Ann Reichert,
Parents'Self-Reported Behaviors Related to Health and Safety of Very Young Children,
66 J. SCH. HEALTH 247, 247 (1996) (suggesting that approximately $3.4 billion would be
saved by reducing infant handgun accidents with parents' injury prevention counseling);
Philip J. Hilts, Annual Costs of Treating Gunshot Wounds Put at $2.3 Billhon, N.Y.
TtMES, Aug. 4, 1999, at A12 (reporting that JAMA study discovered average of $14,600 for
emergency care and $35,400 for lifetime medical care per gunshot victim).
431 See Commentary, supra note 409, at 1281 ("[Flirearm related injuries imposed an
estimated $19 billion economic burden on the United States in 1990 in addition to the
direct health care costs.").
432 See Herd, supra note 7, at 232 (stating costs at $20 billion for gunshot violence and
rationalizing many physicians' argument for tighter gun restrictions based on increasing
victims and costs); see also Susan Headden, Guns, Money and Medicine, U.S. NEWS &
WORLD REPORT, Jul. 1, 1996, at 31 (stating that only fraction of Center for Disease
Control's handgun costs are apportioned to medical bills).
427
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communities in which gun violence is a daily occurrence. 433
In recognition of this enormous expense, cities are awakening
to their right to demand recompense. Chicago, for instance, is
suing gun manufacturers for $433 million.
This amount
recognizes costs for hiring extra police, medical expenses, welfare
expenditures, and the costs to clean up after a shooting in a
public area. 4 34 Atlanta, Bridgeport, New Orleans, and Miami
have also brought similar lawsuits. 43 5
Some have asserted that America's higher homicide rate is a
function of a generally more violent society. It is indeed true that
America is a violent society and that firearms play a role in this
unfortunate fact. But, in their well-regarded work, Zimring and
Hawkins demonstrate that the level of crime in America is not
disproportionate to the level of crime in other industrialized
countries. One commentator, summarizing their analysis, has
offered that measurements of violent crime "place the United
States comfortably in the pack along with places like the
Netherlands, West Germany, Canada, New Zealand and
Australia.
Indeed, one recent assault victimization survey
ranked America as being only slightly more dangerous than
England and Sweden and noticeably more placid than Canada,
New Zealand, and Australia. 436 Instead, it is the significantly
greater likelihood that the crimes will take a deadly turn that is
See Commentary, supra note 409, at 1281 (indicating links between witnessing
violence and emotional disturbances in children); see also Trends & Timelines, Violence:
JAMA Looks at Issue, AM. HEALTH LINE, Aug. 5, 1999 (noting majority of California
physicians' failure to screen for victims of violence); James Garbarino et al., Children in
Danger: Coping With the Consequences of Community Violence 13, 25-26, 56-57, 67-99
(1992), cited in Chamberlin, supra note 423, at 294 n.92 (enumerating intangible
Symptoms of children exposed to violence to include sleep disturbances, day dreaming,
recreating trauma in play, emotional numbing, diminished expectations for future, and
biochemical changes in child's brain that impair social and academic behavior).
4 See Fox Butterfield, Chicago is Suing Over Guns From Suburbs, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 13,
1998, at A18 (describing $433 million suit and explaining violence-related "excess costs"
facing Chicago's police, fire departments and public hospitals); see also Vandall, supra
note 410, at 549 (describing Chicago's claimed losses due to firearm violence).
435
Vandall, supra note 410, at 548 (stating Atlanta, Bridgeport, New Orleans, and Miami
as having brought suit against gun manufacturers). See H. Sterling Burnett, Suing Gun
Manufacturers:Hazardous to OurHealth, 5 TEx REV. L. & POL. 433, 436 n. 5 & 6 (2001)
(enumerating total number of cities that have already filed suit against gun
manufacturers and illustrating that many more are considering filing based on other
cities' success rate). See generally City of Philadelphia v. Beretta U.S.A., Corp., 126 F.
Supp. 2d 882 (E.D. Pa 2000) (dismissing city plaintiffs' claim against gun manufacturers
for failure to state cause of action).
436 Reitz, supra note 419, at 893. See ZIMRING & HAWKINS, supra note 403; Franklin E.
Zimring, Gun Control, DEP'T JUST. NAT'L INST. JUST., CRIME FILE STUDY GUIDE 1, 1
(1998) (noting that majority of killings in large cities are committed with handguns)..
43
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43 7 Thus, it
"the tragic aberration of American lethal violence."
seems clear that the high U.S. homicide rate is not due to a
greater penchant for violence among U.S. citizens, but rather the
means available to U.S. citizens for manifesting that violence.
Most estimates place the total number of firearms privately
owned at about 210,000,000.438 Roughly one-third of these, or
about 66 million, are handguns. 43 9 But handguns are clearly the
weapon of choice of those who commit homicides and other
crimes. Of all killings committed by guns, about three quarters
are committed with handguns. 440 Virtually all gun robberies are
committed with handguns. 441 As Zimring and Hawkins have
concluded in their comprehensive study of gun violence, "[wie
know of no way for the United States to move toward a homicide
rate even fifty percent higher than that of Australia or Canada
without serious attempts to restrict the availability and use of
handguns." 442 Thus, the easy availability of handguns is clearly
437 Reitz, supra note 419, at 894.
438

See Mark Udulutch, Note, The ConstitutionalImplicationsof Gun Controland Several
Realistic Gun Control Proposals, 17 AM. J. CRiM. L. 19, 23 n.19 (1989) (stating that
accurate estimate on handguns is unlikely); see also Gary Fields, 'GunslingingCulture'
Fueled NRA's Comeback Group Tries to Broaden Appeal, Maintain Core, U.S.A. TODAY,
May 18, 2000 at 5A (estimating that 230 million guns owned by public constitutes 200%
increase over last 30 years, and are concentrated among 65-80 million people); Peter
Slevin, Buying Back Safer Streets?- Researchers Say Repurchase ProgramsHave Little
Impact on Crime, WASH. POST, May 19, 2000, at A03 (claiming that community buyback
programs for 200 million guns found in 45% of U.S. households have translated into
minimal reduction in crime).
439 See Nicholas Dixon, Crime and Punishment Symposium: A System in Collapse: Wby
We Should Ban Handgunsin the United States, ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 243, 250 n.17
(estimating total ownership of obtained handguns); David L. Wilson, Handguns and
Violent Crime: A PotentMix, 22 NAT'L J. 1796, 1796 (1990) (finding that between 60-70
million handguns are in private possession). See generally Gun PurchasingLaws, by
State, USA TODAY, Dec. 29, 1993, at 8A (noting that large number of states require delay
period between time of purchase and delivery for handguns).
440 See Zimring, supra note 430, at, 1 (noting that majority of killings in big city are
committed by handguns); see also Wilson, supra note 439 (asserting that over 22,000
Americans are killed by handguns annually); Susan Dryman, Guns the Weapon of Choice,
ASHEVILLE CITIZEN-TIMES, Nov. 15, 1999, at Al (finding that guns are still weapon of
choice and that majority of firearm deaths in particular community were caused by
handguns).
441 See Gregory Nelson Joseph, Reaistic Toy Guns Not Always Harmless, S.D. UNIONTRIB., Sept. 17, 1986, at El (claiming that "about half of all robberies are committed with
handguns"); Zimring, supranote 430, at 1 (recognizing that small size of handguns makes
them easy to conceal); see also Gun Crimes Are Up, Says Justice Dept., FRESNO BEE, July
10, 1995, at A4 (recognizing large percentage of offenders commit crimes, such as robbery,
by using handguns).
442 Franklin E. Zimring & Gordon Hawkins, Overall Perspectives on Crime is Not the
Problem: Crime is Not the Problem: A Reply, 69 U. COLO. L. REV. 1177, 1198 (1998)
(stating American handgun ownership and use restrictions will not always guarantee
cost-effective results); see also America and Guns, ECONOMIST, Apr. 4, 1998, at 16
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the critical factor in America's distinctively high rates of lethal
violence.
An international comparison certainly suggests a strong
correlation between ownership of handguns and homicides. As
the following chart indicates, 443 the rate of death by handguns
increases dramatically as handgun ownership increases.

Country

Handgun Homicide / 100,000

Handguns / 100,000

Australia

.07

2,301

Canada

.031

Great Britain

.012

Israel

.542

3,716

Sweden

.228

3,700

Switzerland

.819

United States

3.56

22,696

Although there exist differences between countries that may
account for some of the differences in lethal violence other than
the availability of handguns, "there is no other cause that
(discussing substantial number of deaths caused by firearms, including homicide, and
recognizing that gun-related violence is highest in states where guns are cherished); Tom
Wicker, In the Nation: You, Me and Handguns,N.Y.TIMES, Dec. 12, 1980, at A35 (noting
high U.S. death rate caused from handguns and asserting that high crime rate is due to
fact that anyone who desires gun can easily obtain ownership). See generally Emily

Hancock, More Jail Time for Handgun Offenders, CAP., Nov. 29, 1996, at Al (asserting
availability of handguns calls for stricter measures of enforcement); Wicker, supra note
442, at A35 (finding American demand for handguns is so great that it makes it
impossible to prevent illegal supply).
443 See Dixon, supra note 434 at 248-49 (noting chart reflects both legally and illegally
owned handguns by civilians in each country); see also America and Guns, ECONOMIST,
Apr. 4, 1998, at 16 (discussing substantial number of deaths caused by firearms, including
homicide, and recognizing that gun-related violence is highest in states where guns are
cherished); Wicker, supra note 436, at A35 (noting high U.S. death rate caused from
handguns and asserting that high crime rate is due to fact that anyone who desires gun
can easily obtain ownership).
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correlates so well with handgun murder" as handgun
availability.4 44 Thus, it is surely not coincidental that the U.S.
suffers from both the highest rate of homicide and the highest
rate of gun ownership. 44 5
As Zimring and Hawkins have
observed, "[iirearms use is so prominently associated with the
high death rate from violence that starting with any other topic
446
would rightly be characterized as intentionally evasive.1
In response to suggestions that Americans are by nature more
violent than Germans, French, or Japanese, and that this
explains America's higher rate of handgun death, a recent
comprehensive study compared rates of lethal violence in Seattle
and Vancouver, British Columbia. The cities were chosen due to
similarities in geography, climate, history, unemployment and
income, educational levels, cultural and entertainment tastes,
and demographics. 447 The cities experience comparable levels of
burglary and robbery; during the first four years of the study,
Seattle's rate of simple and aggravated assault were only slightly

" Dixon, supra note 433, at 252 (realizing other causal factors play role but that none
alone is strong enough to be considered only cause and none disprove author's
hypothesis); see also S. Jan Brakel, The Calamity of Gun Violence, Cmi. TRIB., Oct. 31,
1998 (stating level of gun violence in U.S. is much greater that any other Western
industrialized country and that easy availability of guns is one of leading causes of gun
violence); Humphrey Taylor, Americans List Contributorsto Violence in Nation, GANNETT
NEWS SERV., Mar. 20, 1994 (noting significant number of majorities believe that easy
availability of guns is one of leading causes contributing to violence in U.S.).
44SSee Dixon supra note 433, at 250 (discussing handgun ownership estimates are based
on independent inquires to government agencies); see also Andre Cimo Soddy-Daisy,
CDC's Bias, CHATTANOOGA TIMES, Apr. 21, 1998, at A5 (recognizing U.S. is leader in gun
deaths and noting Center for Disease Control hopes that America will adopt socialist gun
policy). See generallyJeff Muchnick, Better Yet, Ban All Handguns,USA TODAY, Dec. 29,
1993, at 11A (finding handguns in home actually increase chances of murder rather than
offering protection).
446 ZIMRING AND HAWKINS, supra note 403, at 106 (supporting connection between
firearms and high death rate); see also Law and Disorder,SUNDAY TIMES, Oct. 24, 1993
(claiming other countries are horrified at violence caused by guns in America and noting
more homicides were committed with firearms in Los Angeles than in England and Wales
combined); Bill Lindelof, Guns May Soon Pass Cars as Top US. Killers, S.F. EXAM'R, Jan.
14, 1995, at Al (finding gun violence is probably number one killer in nation).
44 See John Henry Sloan, Arthur L. Kellermann, Donald T. Reay, James A. Ferris,
Thomas Koepsell, Frederick P. Rivara, Charles Rice, Laurel Gray, & James LoGerfo,
Handgun Regulations, Crime,Assaults, andHonicide, 319 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1256, 125657 (1988) (initiating study in order to discover "associations among handgun regulations,
assaults, and other crimes, and homicide... "); see also Susan Okie, Impact of Gun
ControlIndicated in MedicalStudy; ResearchersSay Rate ofHandgun Murdersin Seattle
is 5 Times Greater Than in Vancouver, WASH. POST, Nov. 8, 1988, at A4 (finding two
cities similar except Vancouver has stricter gun control laws); Canada-US., FACTS ON
FILE WORLD NEWS DIG., Dec. 9, 1988, at 908 B3 (noting the study was conducted between
1980 and 1986).
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higher.448 The greatest difference between the cities is the much
higher rate of gun ownership in Seattle (41%) compared to
Vancouver (12%). 449 However, Seattle experienced a rate of
homicide of 11.3 per 100,000; this was much higher than
Vancouver's rate of 6.9 per 100,000.450 After adjusting for the
type of weapon used in homicides, the authors conclude that
"[v]irtually all of the increased risk of death from homicide in
Seattle was due to a more than fivefold higher rate of homicide
452
by firearms." 45 ' Non-gun homicides were approximately equal.
Thus, "it is clear that there is no greater proclivity towards
violence in Seattle; rather, it is gun violence that is much more
prevalent in Seattle than in Vancouver." 453 One commentator
concludes from this study that "it will be difficult to deny that the
almost fivefold difference in the frequency of homicides
committed with firearms is responsible for the substantially
See Sloan, et al., supra note 441, at 1257-58 (stating aggravated assaults were
categorized by offenders and weapons); see also Allan R. Gold, Gun Curbs Linked to
Homicide Rate, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 9, 1988, at A16 (determining two cities were similar in
burglary, robbery and assault rates); Okie, supra note 441, at A4 (claiming study found
rates of robbery, burglary and assaults with weapons other that gun were practically
identical in two cities).
449See Sloan, et al., supra note 441, at 1257 (noting one method used in developing study
was to determine restricted weapons permits issued in Vancouver and compare number to
concealed weapons permits issued in Seattle); see also Guns Do Kill People, N.Y.TiMEs,
Nov.18, 1988 at A34 (finding gun ownership in Seattle is three times greater than that in
Vancouver); Okie, supra note 441, at A4 (acknowledging that no direct ownership surveys
exist for either Seattle or Vancouver but other information aided in concluding that gun
ownership is more common in Seattle).
450 See Sloan, et al., supra note 441, at 1258 (recognizing that during seven year study,
total number of homicides in Seattle was 388 whereas Vancouver only experienced 204
homicides); see also The Nation, L.A. TiMES, Nov. 9, 1988, at 2 (asserting there is 63%
greater chance of being murdered in Seattle than in Vancouver); Schneider, Wounded
Giant Must Comprmise, S.D. UNION-TRIB., Nov. 14, 1988, at B6 (finding even though
Vancouver is only 140 miles north of Seattle, the risk of getting murdered in Seattle is
much higher).
451Sloan et al.,
supra note 441, at 1258-59 (discussing some significant caveats to study
and acknowledging that other differences such as illegal drug related activity or illicit gun
sales may weaken relation between firearm regulations and rate of homicide); see also
Dixon, supra note 433, at 261 (understanding disadvantaged racial minorities are more
likely to commit murder and noting large portion of murder victims and offenders are
within same minority group); Schneider, supra note 444, at B6 (noting lax gun laws
heavily increased chances of Seattle residents being murdered by handguns).
452See Sloan et al.,
supra note 441, at 1258 (listing that finding); John A. Calhoun, We
Can Prevent Jonesboros,NATION'S CITIES WEEKLY, Apr. 13, 1998, at 11 (stating Seattle
and Vancouver's crime rates are "identical until guns are factored in [t]hen Seattle leaps
ahead"); see also Patty Murray, Guns Kids & Pain: Children's Gunshot Wounds Are a Big
PublicExpense, SEATTLE POST INTELLIGENCER, May 23, 1993, at E1 (citing same study as
showing Seattle's firearm homicide rate was five times higher than Vancouver's and
seven times higher for firearm assault, but that "rates for violent crimes were similar").
453Scott Jacobs, Note, Toward a More ReasonableApproach to Gun Control: Canada as a
Model, 15 N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT'L. & COMp. L. 315, 334 (1995).
448
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higher homicide rate in Seattle." 454 What is true on a local level
also appears to be true on a national level. One study asserts
that, given their common histories, customs, and constitutional
and government structure, the United States and Canada
resemble each other more closely than any two countries in the
world. 45 5 One crucial difference is that twice as many U.S.
households own guns compared to Canada. 456 As a consequence,
America's gun related murder rate is 10 times higher than
Canada, gun related suicide is four times higher and deaths in
the commission of a robbery is three times higher. 45 7 This cannot
be attributed to a higher rate of violence generally in America. If
this were true, the rate of non-firearm related violence would be
higher as well; in fact, the two countries have "comparable rates
458
of violent crime when guns are not involved."
This evidence is strongly suggestive that the availability of
guns in this society is causally linked with the extraordinarily
high rates of lethal violence.
In advancing this argument,
Zimring and Hawkins are careful not to assert that guns are the
cause of violence. Rather, the existence of guns adds a lethal
component to social situations that are likely to result in
violence. For instance, the largest single circumstance in which
454See Dixon, supra note 433, at 259 (noting that finding); see also Gary Taubes, Violence

Epidemiologists Test the Hazards of Gun Ownership, SCIENCE, Oct. 9, 1992, at 213
(noting similarities in non-gun related crimes between two cities except for 500% greater
gun-related homicide in Seattle, and quoting researchers' conclusion "that restricting
access to handguns may reduce the rate of homicide in a community").
455 See Jacobs, supra note 447, at 316 (stating this proposition); Cecilia Benoit, Book
Review, Partingat the Crossroads: The Emergence of Health Insurance in the United
States and Canada, (stating "Canada and U.S. resemble each other more than either
resembles any other nation," citing SEYMOUR MARTIN LIPSET, CONTINENTAL DIVIDE: THE
VALUES AND INSTITUTIONS OF THE UNITED STATES AND CANADA 212, (1990)).
456 See Jacobs, supra note 447, at 331 (stating U.S. data indicates twice as many U.S
households own guns than as in Canadian households); see also Gregg Lee Carter,
Dueling statistics,F. FOR APPLIED RES. & PUB. POL'Y, Jan 1, 2000, at 6875 (noting 1993
study found 48% of U.S. households owned guns, three times greater than typical
European country); Marc Ouimet, Crime in Canada and in the United States: a
Comparative Analysis, CAN REV. Soc. & ANTHROPOLOGY Aug. 1., 1999, at 389 (noting
1990 telephone survey showed 29% of American households owned guns while less than
5% of Canadian households did).
457See Jacobs, supra note 447, at 333 (listing statistic); Reuters, Canada Unruffled by
Heston Gun Lecture, ORANGE COUNTY (CAL.) REG., Apr. 15, 2000, at A31 (stating
Canadian government figures show U.S. gun-related homicide is eight times greater than
Canada's); see also L.T. Anderson, Moses Heston in the Land of the Free Canadians
Think They Are Free People - and Safer as Well, CHARLESTON DAILY MAIL (WV), Nov. 3,
2000, at P4A (listing result from Seattle-Vancouver study showing Seattle's assault rate
involving firearms was seven times greater than Vancouver's while murder rate involving
guns
was 4.8 time greater).
458 Jacobs, supranote 453, at 333.
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homicides occur are not criminal acts but "social processes that
generate arguments."459 Sixteen percent of homicides occur
during criminal acts but 32% occur during family or social
conflict. 460 But there is no reason to believe that Americans have
more argument's over money, jealousy, male honor or have
greater strife with their neighbors than residents of other
countries. Nor does this country experience atypically higher
rates of burglary, robbery, or assault compared to other
industrialized countries. America's higher rate of lethal violence
is a function of the "combination of the ready availability of guns
and the willingness to use maximum force in interpersonal
conflict .... ",461 Or, as a commentator in this thesis has said,
"the presence of guns is a necessary rather than a sufficient
cause; guns interact with cultural factors that give rise to an
unusual willingness among some American subpopulations to
use maximum force in the settlement of disputes .... ,,462
459 ZIMEING & HAWKINS, supra note 403, at 61; see also Waaland & Keesey, Police
Decision Making in Wife Abuse: The Impact of Legal and Extra legal Factors, 9 L. &
HUM. BEHAV. 355 (1985) (stating "instances of assault with a deadly weapon or of
homicide occur with disproportionate frequency between people who have a domestic
relationship, and with whom the police have had prior dealings in responding to
complaints of domestic violence").
460 See ZIMRING & HAWKINS, supra note 403, at 61 (listing that statistic); see also Bob
Thompson, TRIGGER POINTS; The Evangelists of'injury Control'BelieveThat Scientifc
Knowledge and PublicHealth Activism Can BreakAmerica's Cycle of FirearmsMayhem.
But Can They Survive the Treacherous Politicsof Gun Control? WASH. POST, Mar. 29,
1998, at W12 (quoting university emergency medicine director: 'We've got all these guns
in people's homes.., a number of them for protection, but when I hear news stories it's
usually about suicide or an accidental shooting or a family homicide").
461 ZIMRING & HAWKINS, supranote 403, at 122-23; see also Mark T. Steele & W. Kendall
McNabney, Hospitals, PhysiciansExpress Opposition to PropositionB, KAN. CITY STAR,
Apr. 5, 1999, at A5 (characterizing Seattle-Vancouver study and similar studies as
conveying message that "in the absence of guns, people do not kill themselves or other
people as frequently as they do when guns are readily available"); see alsoJim McJunkin,
Modern Moses FirearmsMajor Factor in Youth Violence Rate, CHARLESTON GAZETTE
(WV), Nov. 5, 1999, at P5A (noting gun availability is one contributing factor to United
States' unusually high gun-related youth suicide rate among industrialized nations).
46 Reitz, supra note 419, at 895. Another article points out that American teenagers are
just as likely to lash out violently as teens in other industrialized nations, but that
American teens are much more likely to use guns and other weapons in doing so. Erin
Texeira, Something New is Raging in OurSchools, TIMES UNION (ALB.), Dec. 22, 1997, at
A7. The argument that gun availability necessarily equates with greater lethal violence
may be somewhat undermined by the experience of states that have enacted "shall issue"
concealed gun laws. A 1994 survey of 14 states with these laws failed to demonstrate a
link to an increase in the murder rate after the laws were enacted. Some states may have
experienced a decline in murder as a result of the policy. Beau A. Hill, Go Ahead, Make
My Day.: Revisiting Michigan's Concealed Weapons Law, 76 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 67, 87
(1998). A more recent study, however, suggests that murder rates in some Florida cities
have increased since the passing of its concealed gun law. Vernon Silver, Holes Found in
Law on Carrying Hidden Guns, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 2, 1995, at Al6.
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Restrictions of gun ownership surely would not affect the level of
social conflict and may not affect the number of crimes
committed. But in the absence of highly lethal instruments like
guns, extraordinary rates of death would no longer attend these
events.
The nature of the gun as a contributing cause to America's
high murder rates responds to many of the arguments advanced
by critics of gun control. For instance, such critics assert that
America's higher proportion of socially disadvantaged racial
minorities, not the availability of firearms, explains the
preponderance of homicide. 463 While it is true that social and
economic frustration make one more violent, it is the presence of
highly lethal instruments that make such impulses deadly. As
one commentator notes,
It is among those elements of the population who, by virtue of
disadvantages linked to race (discrimination, lack of economic
opportunity, poverty, unemployment, and so forth), are more
likely to kill that we should expect the homicide increasing
influence of handguns to be most profound. It is, as it were, "the
straw that breaks the camel's back" in the case of violence prone
4
sectors of society. 6
It should also not be forgotten that the white murder rate in
the U.S. is many times higher compared to other industrialized
countries. 465 Although Vancouver's white murder rate is slightly
higher than Seattle's, 466 the American white homicide rate is
40 See Carter, supra note 450, at 6875 (citing reports which show that "the rate of

homicide due to firearms for black males in their early twenties was more than eight
times higher than the rate for all individuals in the same age group: 140.7 per 100,000 for
black males as opposed to 17.1 for all males."). But see Ouimet, supra note 450, at 389
(criticizing approach which emphasizes discrimination and social inequalities as the cause
of the high homicide rate in America). See generally Cottrol & Diamond, supra note 293,
at 359 (discussing race-related aspects of gun control debates).
464 Dixon, supra note 433, at 261.
465 See Reitz, supra note 430, at 893-94 (stating that America's proportions of lethal
violence closer resemble Third World nations than other English-speaking nations,
Western Europe and Japan); see also Tim Weiner & Ginger Thompson, US. Guns
Smuggled into Mexico Feed Drug War, N.Y. TIMES, May 19, 2001, at A3 (stating that
United States' 6.3 murders per 100,000 people is far shy from countries with worst
statistics like Mexico's 10 murders per 100,000 people). See generallySloan et al., supra
note 441, at 1256 (justifying accuracy of Seattle-Vancouver comparison because it isolates
handgun control from other socioeconomic, behavioral and crime factors).
466 See Sloan et al., supra note 441, at 1256; see also Murray, supra note 446, at El
(suggesting that Seattle's comparatively high firearm violence rate can be reduced with
proposed Firearm Victims Prevention Act). See generaly Kellermann et al., supra note
418, at 1443 (noting that intra-national, three city study of handgun violence that firearm
violence cannot be definitively linked to race, despite alarming mortality rates of black
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almost three times higher than the Canadian rate.4 6 7
Critics of gun control argue that, if deprived of guns, those who
commit homicide will simply use other instruments. While
restricting access to guns may reduce gun homicides, the overall
rate of homicide would not be affected as deaths caused by knives
or other easily accessible lethal weapons would increase. But
this argument ignores the much greater lethality of guns
compared to other weapons. Certainly, it is difficult to imagine
the Columbine murderers killing and maiming dozens of school
children armed with knives and brass knuckles. Zimring and
Hawkins suggest three features of guns that reflect greater
killing capacity: "the greater injurious impact of bullets, the
longer range of firearms, and the greater capacity of firearms for
executing multiple attacks. 468 Due to these factors, a gun used
in an assault is seven times more likely to result in death
compared to the use of any other weapon.4 69 In a separate work,
Zimring notes other studies which have found that assault
committed with a gun is 3 to 5 times more likely to cause death
than when committed with a knife, and gun robberies are 3 to 4
times more likely to result in death compared to the use of other
weapons.470
These results
have been approximately
corroborated. One study determined that 4 deaths result from
every robbery committed with a gun, "about 3 times the rate for
knife robbers, 10 times the rate for robberies with other weapons,
471
and 20 times the rate for robberies with unarmed offenders."
Surely, given a choice of being threatened with a gun or some
other weapon, victims would choose the latter. Not only is
severity of the wound reduced but there is a greater chance of no
wound at all because "running away will at least sometimes by
an option for the victim, whereas this tactic will be of little use in
the face of a loaded gun. A reduction in robberies and their
men).
467See Dixon, supra note 433, at 261 (stating how nationwide, America's homicide rate

among whites alone is almost three times higher than in Canada).
468 ZIMRING & HAWKINS, supra note 403, at 113 (noting that authors call these
instrumentality aspect of gun use that can increase death rates... "as opposed to the
features in social setting related to gun use..." that also add to greater killing potential).
469 See Id. at 108 (discussing how the use of gun, in assault, is more likely to result in
victims death, than is use of any other weapon).
470See ZIMRING & HAWKINS, supra note 403, at 1 (noting that majority of killings in large
cities are committed with handguns).
471Roth, supra note 413, at 4.
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degree of violence is a likely result of such a substitution." ' 472
Such studies suggest that even if the next most lethal weapon is
substituted for firearms, the number of deaths resulting from the
use of such weapons will be diminished. 473 It is also fair to
assume that not every aggressor would substitute the next most
lethal weapon in place of guns. Instead, "[iut is more probable
that at least some potential murderers would turn to less lethal
weapons or their bare hands, or that some would be deterred
47 4
from assaults altogether.'
Gun proponents also argue that substituting other weapons in
place of guns would cause an increase in the number of non-fatal
injuries suffered. Interestingly, when other weapons are used
against victims, there is more often a response to fight back.
Conversely, use of a gun reduces the chance of escalation because
"robbers with guns are less nervous, or victims confronted with
guns are too frightened to resist, or both."'475 Thus, robberies
committed with guns result in injuries 17% of the time, but
472 Dixon,

supranote 433, at 269. But see Don B. Kates, Gun Control: SeparatingReality
from Symbolism, 20 J. CONTEMP. L. 353, 372 (1994) (suggesting that running away and
screaming is far more dangerous and less effective than resisting with gun); Lawrence
Southwick, Guns and JustifiableHomicide: Deterrenceand Defense, 18 ST. LOUIS U. PUB.
L. REV. 217, 244 (1999) (concluding that armed civilians actually deter committing of
crimes and stop crimes in progress).
473 See Alan M. Gottlieb, Gun Ownership:A ConstitutionalRight, 10 N. Ky. L. REV. 113,
118 (1982) (stating similar substitution analysis militates strongly against restricting
handguns more severely than long guns and although substitution of long guns for
handguns would probably reduce number of assaults, increase of lethality of long guns
would increase homicide rates from 25% - 500%); see also Absolute Liability for
Ammunition Manufacturers, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1679, 1694 (1995) (suggesting that
substitution from guns to knives could prove to lessen negative impact of crime because
assault with firearm is five times more deadly than assault with knife); Andrew 0. Smith,
The Manufactureand DistributionofHandgunsas an Abn orm ally DangerousActivity, 54
U. Ci. L. REV. 369, 400 n.142 (1987) (citing Frank Zimring, Is Gun Control Likely to
Reduce Violent Killings 35 U. Ciu. L. REV. 721 (1968) (proposing that elimination of
guns would result in overall reduction in crime, even after accounting for increased
propensity of attack when assaulter is armed with knife rather than with gun)).
474 Gottlieb supra note 467, at 270. But see Raymond Kessler, Book Review: PointBlank:
Guns and Violence in America, by Gary Kleck, 82 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLGY 1187, 1187
(1992) (describing Kleck's contention that assumption that general gun availability
positively affects frequency and average seriousness of violent crimes is not supported);
David Kopel, Crime and Punishment Symposium: A System in Collapse: Peril or
Protection?The Risks and Benefits ofHandgun Prohibition,12 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV.
285, 328 (1993) (supporting proposition in Dixon, supra note 433, that substitution from
handguns to shotguns was sufficiently large enough in Australia and Canada to
substantially increase overall death toll).
475 Roth, supra note 413, at 4. But see Dixon, supra note 433, at 269 (dismissing
implications of devolved substitution effect whereby victims of handgun robbery are less
likely to be injured than victims of other weapons because handguns are highly effective
at securing victim compliance); Kopel supra note 468, at 328 n. 184 (agreeing with Dixon's
dismissal of devolved substitution effect, but on other grounds).
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robberies committed with knives result in injuries 32% of the
time.4 76 A study by the National Crime Victimization Survey
found that injuries resulted from guns 14% of the time, 25%
when the offender was armed with a knife, 30% when not armed,
477 Most
and 45% when the aggressor had some other weapon.
advocates of gun control seem to accept the possibility of this
tradeoff. But even assuming a 100% knives for guns substitution
effect, the trade-off seems to militate in favor of gun control. The
above data suggests about a two-fold increase in injuries (14% to
25% or 17% to 32%), but at least one-third to one-fifth fewer
deaths. 478 It is difficult to dispute that a smaller increase in nonfatal injuries is outweighed by a greater increase in deaths. As
Zimring and Hawkins conclude, "the greater dangerousness of
guns when fired more than compensates for the lower number of

wounds. "479
Some gun proponents argue that the intent of the aggressor,
not the instrument used, is the critical factor in homicide. Those
who intentionally commit homicide will naturally choose the
most lethal means to carry out this intent. But if deprived of
guns, they will find some other means with which to carry out
the act. When homicidal intent is combined with a knife or some
other weapon, it is argued that the result is likely to be as lethal
as if a gun were used. 480 But this argument assumes that most of
See Dixon, supranote 433, at 269 (discussing how David Hardy and Don Kates reject
idea that using knifes and clubs as alternatives to guns in robberies, will lead to reduction
in robberies and violence associated with them).
477 See Roth, supra note 413, at 4 (finding that likelihood of violence is greater when knife
or blunt object are used in robbery, rather than when gun is used); Smith, supra note 467
at 400 n.142 (citing federal study showing that 10 percent of cases where criminals were
armed with knives resulted in stabbings, while only 4 percent of cases where criminals
were armed with guns resulted in shootings); Weapons Used in 37% of Violent Crimes,
Federal Study Shows, CI. TRIB., Jan. 6, 1986, § 1, at 6 (reporting federal study that
indicated victims of offenders who are armed only with guns were less likely to suffer
injury than those by offenders with knives or other weapons).
478 See Smith, supra note 467, at 400 n.142 (asserting that although more injuries were
inflicted by criminals with knives than guns, injuries from guns tended to be much more
severe). But cf Victoria Dorfman & Michael Koltonyuk, When the Ends Justify the
Reasonable Means: Self-Defense and the Right to Counsel, 3 TEX. REV. LAW & POL. 381,
395-96 (1999) (explaining that potential for long gun substitution for handguns would in
fact significantly increase gun fatalities because they are more likely to accidentally
discharge and are more deadly when discharged).
479 ZIMRING & HAWKINS, supra note 403, at 114; see Roth, supra note 413, at 4 (stating
that even though damage inflicted by guns is more serious then injuries caused by knives,
less infliction compensates for potential damage caused); Smith, supra note 467, at 400
(asserting that risk of harm presented by knives pales in comparison to guns).
480 See Dixon, supra note 433, at 269 n.88 (sighting Gary Kleck, Policy Lessons from
Recent Gun ControlResearch, 49 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 35, 38); see also Kopel, supra
476
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those who commit homicide intend to do so. There are a number
of reasons to believe that those who pull the trigger are usually
not intending to kill. If most gun murders were intentional, one
would expect the aggressor to fire multiple times to assure their
goal was realized. However, a study of Chicago victims of gunfire
indicated that 80% received a single wound. This suggests that
the aggressors "failed to use the full capabilities of their guns to
achieve the goal of killing."'4' More directly, in a ten state survey
among those who fired a shot in the commission of a crime, 76%
48 2
said they had no prior intent to do so.
A homicide most typically is an impulsive act of the aggressor.
A killer is no more likely to be a hardened criminal than an
ordinary citizen who lost control in a temporary fit of rage. In
almost half of all homicides, the victim was a relative or
acquaintance of the killer. 48 3 In one study, more than one third
of all murders occurred in the course of domestic or other
argument. 484 The correlation between anger and homicide may
be much higher. One study found that 80% of homicides occurred
during arguments or altercations. 48 5
In such situations, the
note 468, at 326 (stating that knives are not much less deadly than small handguns). But
see Smith, supra note 467, at 400-01 (explaining that guns cause greater bodily harm
than knives).
481 Roth, supra note 413, at 4.
8
4 See id.
4w See Dixon, supra note 433, at 266 (citing Uniform Crime Reports 13 (1990)); see also
Daniel D. Polsby & Don B. Kates, Jr., Causes and Correlates of Lethal Violence in
America; American Homicide Exceptionaism, 69 U. COLO. L. REV. 969, 972-73 (1998)
(quoting John Lindsay, The Case for FederalFirearmsControl22 (1973) (suggesting that
most gun murders are committed impulsively, while engaged in arguments with family
members and acquaintances)). But see Kates, Jr., supranote 466, at 377 (challenging this
statement by explaining that characterization of "close acquaintance" is extremely broad).
44 See Dixon, supra note 433, at 266 (citing Uniform Crime Reports 13 (1990)); see also

James Alan Fox & Jack Levin, Multiple Homicide: Patterns ofSerial and Mass Murder,
23 CRIME & JUST. 407, 435 (1998) (stating that more than half of all single-victim
homicides occur during argument between victim and offender); Rudolph J. Gerber, Death
Is Not Worth It, 28 ARIz. ST. L.J. 335, 341 (1996) (asserting that domestic quarrels are
one of main sources of homicide); Polsby & Kates, supra note 476, at 973 n.21 (quoting
statement of Dee Helfgott, Coordinator, Coalition for Handgun Control of Southern
California Inc. in Hearingsbefore the Subcomm. on Crime of the Comm. on the Judiciary,
94th Cong. 1774 (1975) claiming that most murders occur during arguments with family
members
or acquaintances).
485
Arthur L. Kellermann & Donald T. Reay, Protection or Peril?An Analysis ofFirearmRelated Deaths in the Home, 314 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1557, 1559 (1986); see Gerber, supra
note 478, at 341 (noting quarrels and arguments are likely causes of homicides). But cf
Kates, supra note 466, at 378 n.81 (quoting Murray A. Straus, Domestic Violence and
Homicide Antecedents, 62 BULL. N.Y. ACAD. MED. 446, 454, 457 (1986) as leading
authority on domestic homicide positing that "[iintrafamily homicide is typically just one
episode in long standing syndrome of violence").
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aggressor resorts to a gun not because of its lethality but because
it happens to be the weapon most available. 486 The picture that
emerges from the data is that guns are used to express rage, not
as a means to intentionally kill. Homicide in most cases is a
function of both interpersonal conflict and the ready availability
of the most lethal weapons. 48 7 To excise guns from this equation
and substitute less lethal weapons will almost surely be to reduce
the number of resulting deaths.
The international studies also demonstrate that homicide is an
impulsive act made deadly by the ready availability of guns. The
authors of the Seattle - Vancouver study address the issue of
intent directly. They pose the question as follows:
If the rate of homicide in a community were influenced more by
the strength of intent than by the availability of weapons, we
might have expected the rate of homicides with weapons other
than guns to have been higher in Vancouver than Seattle, in
direct proportion to any decrease in Vancouver's rate of firearm
488
homicides.
The study determined that weapons substitution does not
result in the same number of deaths. Homicide committed by
weapons other than guns was not significantly higher in
Vancouver than Seattle, "suggesting that few would-be assailants
switched to homicide by other weapons." 489 Analysis of this sort
See Gerber, supra note 478, at 342 (noting use of weapon is largely due to its
accessibility); Roth, supra note 413, at 4 (relating gun availability to increased violence in
crimes and arguments when guns are used). But see Kates, supra note 466, at 369
(concluding that gun control efforts are unlikely to reduce gun murder rates because most
gun murders would still occur with other less lethal weapons, illegal guns would continue
to be available and criminals will not obey gun control laws).
487See ZIMRING & HAWKINS, supra note 403, at 122; Polsby & Kates, supra note 476, at
969-74 (discussing instrumentality theory and its focus on weapons and their availability,
not on crime or criminal intent of gun user). But ct Polsby & Kates, supra note 476, at
999 (suggesting one participant typically has history of behavior that increases likelihood
of homicide occurring from arguments).
488 Sloan et al., supra note 441, at 1260. See generallyCarl T. Bogus, Pistols,Politicsand
Products Liabiity, 59 U. CIN. L. REV. 1103, 1117 (1991) (discussing Sloan study and
different policies between cities for obtaining handguns); Hill, supra note 456, at 72
(discussing Sloan study and its conclusion that increased availability of guns results in
higher homicide rate).
489Sloan et al., supra note 441, at 1260. See generally Markus Boser, Go Ahead, State,
Make Them Pay An Analysis of Washington D.C 's Assault Weapon ManufacturingStrict
Liabihty Act; 25 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 313, 319 (1992) (noting statistics reinforce
notion that increased firearm ownership leads to increased homicides). But see Kopel,
supra note 468, at 313 (suggesting Seattle-Vancouver model fails to recognize Canada
lacks substantial oppressed minority population comparable to that of urban areas in
United States).
486
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dovetails with the work of Zimring and Hawkins. They concur
that the single largest category of homicide occurs in the course
of argument or other conflict in social situations. 490 But there is
no reason to believe that social conflict is greater in this country
compared to other industrialized countries.
To make the
substitution effect argument, gun proponents must show why
this effect has not occurred in other countries. Lacking any such
demonstration, the most logical conclusion is that the availability
of guns is the critical contributing factor in America's unusually
high homicide rate. As Zimring and Hawkins note,
the very fact that the United States is a high-violence
environment makes the contribution of guns use to the death toll
very much greater. When viewed in the light of the concept of
contributing causation, the United States has both a violence
problem and a gun problem, and each makes the other more
deadly. 49 1 There are compelling reasons to believe that restricting
gun availability would reduce America's horrific homicide rate.
Put in context, homicide usually occurs either during the
commission of another crime or in situations of social strife. In
neither of these contexts is the homicide typically premeditated;
rather, the killing occurs as an impulsive act in a situation of
inherent danger. The level of danger obviously increases with
the presence of a gun, the most lethal of all readily available
weapons. To deprive the aggressor of the gun logically reduces
the level of lethal violence likely to result from the violent event.
This correlation is most convincingly demonstrated empirically.
Other industrialized countries have the same rates of crime and
social strife as the United States but significantly lower homicide
rates.
Diminished access to firearms is the most logically
compelling reason why violent situations in other countries are
less likely to result in death compared to this country. In this
way, the critical link between the high rate of gun ownership and
See ZIMRING & HAWKINS, supra note 403, at 61. See generaLly Gerber,supra note 478,
at 341 (stating homicides often result from domestic disputes and arguments or
robberies); Samuel R. Gross, The Risks of Death: Why Erroneous Convictions Are
Common in Capital Cases, 44 BuFF. L. REV. 469, 477 (1996) (stating most homicides
result from interpersonal conflicts).
491 ZIMRING & HAWKINS, supranote 403, at 61; see Ronald C. Kramer, Poverty,Inequaity,
and Youth Violence, 567 ANNALS 123, 134 (2000) (asserting that violent activities are
more likely to turn deadly due to widespread presence and availability of guns in United
States); see also Barnes, supranote 381, at 32-33 (stating that guns greatly contribute to
"the mayhem that's going on out here in the streets everyday").
490
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the high rate of lethal violence has been established.
In addition to a reduced number of homicides, the number of
accidental deaths would also result from more restrictive gun
availability. This result probably obtains intuitively; fewer guns
in private hands would, as a matter of pure probability, reduce
the chances of accidental discharge. This has also been the
empirical result. Before 1968, accidental deaths from guns
varied from about 2,000 to 3,200; in 1967, there were 2,896 of
these incidents. 492 In 1968, the Gun Control Act was enacted,
restricting the class of permissible gun dealers and buyers to
exclude drug addicts and those in mental institutions. 493 Since
1968, accident related death has fallen precipitously to 1,400 in
1992. 494

Canada has demonstrated the same correlation, as

accidental deaths were reduced by 34% after enacting tougher
gun control in 1997. 495 These rates evidence the intuitive result

that more restrictive gun policies reduce the number of deaths
from accidental shootings.
Less intuitively, however, lower suicide rates may also result
from more restrictive gun policies. Shooting oneself is the
preferred method of suicide; guns now account for as many
suicides as all other means combined. 496 In a two county study in
492 See

Jacobs, supra note 447, at 334 (discussing statistics for accidental deaths in
United States); see also Christopher L. Robbins, Note, Double-Barreled Prosecution:
Linkng Multiple Section 924(c) Violations to a Single PredicateOffense, 49 VAND. L. REV.
1577, 1579 (1996) (noting large increase in firearm related crimes during late 1960s). See
generally Ryan S. Andrus, Note, The Concealed Handgun Debate and the Need for Stateto-State ConcealedHandgun PermitReciprocity,42 ARIZ. L. REV. 129, 129 (2000) (noting
pervasiveness of questions such as accidental death prevention within gun control debate
in Congress, scholarly journals and media).
4- See 18 U.S.C.S. § 922(g) (Law. Co-op. 2001); see also James T. Dixon, Note, On Lemon
Squeezers and Locking Devices: Consumer Product Safety and Firearms, A Modest
Proposal,47 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 979, 996 (1997) (noting Gun Control Act established
categories of people to whom guns could not be sold); Jacobs, supra453, at 328 (discussing
history of United States gun control legislation).
494 See Vernick & Stephen P. Teret, Point/Counterpoint:A Public Health Approach to
Regulating Firearms as Consumer Products, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 1193, 1209 (2000)
(reporting that there were approximately 1000 accidental gun deaths in 1997 in United
States); Jacobs, supra note 447, at 335 (discussing accidental death statistics in United
States); see also Southwick, Jr., supranote 466, at 236 (stating that accidental gun deaths
continue to fall steadily).
495 See Jacobs, supra note 447, at 335 (discussing Canadian statistics). See generally
Barnes, supra 381, at 35-36 (suggesting Canada's gun restrictions result in less gun
deaths than United States); Christopher D. Ram, Living Next to the United States:
Recent Developments in Canadian Gun ControlPolicy, Politics, and Law, 15 N.Y.L. SCH.
J. INT'L & COMP. L. 279, 302-04 (1995) (discussing difference between Canadian and
American public policy with respect to gun control).
496 See Arthur L. Kellermann et al., Suicide in the Home in Relation to Gun Ownerh'p,
327 NEW ENG. J. MED. 467, 467 (1992); see also Rebecca Peters, Gun Controlin America:
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the New England Journal of Medicine, the authors found that the
"ready availability of guns increases the risk of suicide. ..,497
This finding does not seem to accord with intuition because,
given the myriad of means available to kill oneself, restricting
access to guns would lead to effective substitution of methods.
This argument fails to take into account that, among adolescents,
suicide tends to be a highly impulsive act. 498 Given the easy
availability and high lethality of guns, method substitution may
be less likely among this age group. 499 Thus, firearms in the
500
homes of adolescents "markedly increase their risk for suicide."
This finding was corroborated by a second Seattle - Vancouver
comparison. This revealed that people in Seattle aged 15 to 24
were 1.4 times more likely to commit suicide than their
Vancouver counterparts where guns were less accessible. 50 1 In

Interview with Rebecca Peters,Senior JusticeFellow, Open Society Institute, 6 GEo. PUB.
POLY REV. 43, 45 (2000) (finding that "The majority of deaths from guns in most Western
countries are suicides, even in America."). See generally David Kairys, The Or'gin and
Development ofthe Governmental Handgun Cases, 32 CONN. L. REV. 1163, 1168 (2000)
(discussing demand in gun industry and its incidental effect on facilitating teenage

suicides).
49 Kellermann et al., supra note 490, at 470; see also Kairys, supra note 490, at 1168
(noting guns procured for self-defense often become "easy vehicles" for suicidal teenagers
to end their life); Andrew J. McClurg, The Public Health Case for the Safe Storage of
Firearms:Adolescent SuicidesAdd One More "SmokingGun ",51 HASTINGS L.J. 953, 98182 (2000) (stating that teenage suicide is facilitated by availability of and access to guns).
498See David A. Brent et al., The Presence and Accessibility of Firearmsin the Homes of
Adolescent Suicides, 266 JAMA 2989, 2994 (1991) (noting prominent role impulsivity and
substance abuse play in youthful suicide); Andrew J. McClurg, Armed and Dangerous:
Tort Liabilityfor the Negligent Storage ofFirearms, 32 CONN. L. REV. 1189, 1205 (2000)
(stating that presence of guns increases risk of suicide for adolescents "because of their
impulsivity and shortsightedness"); McClurg, supra note 491, at 958 (describing
adolescents as population group "marked by immaturity, impulsiveness, and
shortsightedness").
49 See Brent et al., supra note 492, at 2994 (stating that method substitution would not
occur among adolescents and young adults); McClurg, supra note 491, at 979 (asserting
that "method substitution" argument is unpersuasive because adolescent suicide rate of
United States is highest in world). See generally McClurg, supra note 492, at 1203-07
(discussing risk of adolescent suicides).
500
Mark L. Rosenberg et al., Guns andAdolescent Suicides,266 JAMA 3030, 3030 (1991);
see also Kairys, supra note 490, at 1168 (suggesting that guns kept in homes are
responsible for large number of teenage suicides); McClurg, supra note 492, at 1204-05
(stating that easy access to guns in home creates high risk of suicide for adolescents).
501 See John H. Sloan et al., FirearmRegulations and Rates of Suicide: A Comparison of
Two Metropolitan Areas, 322 NEW ENG. J. MED. 369, 371 (1990) (reporting SeattleVancouver study results that Seattle had significantly higher suicide rate for persons
aged 15-24 than Vancouver); see also McClurg, supranote 492, at 1205 (noting study has
shown that adolescent suicides in United States accounted for 54% of total suicides in
children under age of fifteen in twenty-six industrialized countries during one year
period); Ram, supra note 489, at 302-04 (discussing cultural and political differences
between Canadian and American approaches to gun control).
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1998, 1372 adolescents killed themselves with firearms. 5 2 It is
believed that this number may be significantly reduced by
50 3
restricting the availability of guns in the home.
The last refuge of the gun proponent pertains to the issue of
self-defense. This is certainly a major perceived reason for the
private ownership of guns. In a 1979 survey, when asked why
they possessed a gun, 20% of all gun owners and 40% of handgun
owners cited self-defense as the reason.5 0 4 It is unfortunate that
these people may be operating under a delusion, having subjected
themselves and their families to great danger in the guise of selfprotection. One study examined the number of times a gun is
used in self-defense against the risk of having a gun in the home
in King County, Washington.50 5 The risks measured by the
authors were the cumulation of "death from unintentional
gunshot wounds, homicide during domestic quarrels, and the
ready availability of an immediate, highly lethal means of
suicide." 50 6 The authors conclude that for every instance of a
death resulting from defensive use of a gun, there were 43 gun
deaths resulting from domestic fights, accidents, or suicides. 50 7
5m See Rosenberg et al., supra note 494, at 3030; see also Susan DeFrancesco, Children
and Guns, 19 PACE L. REV. 275, 284 (1999) (discussing risks associated with keeping
firearms in homes and noting that "[tihe risk of suicide of a family member is increased by
nearly five times in homes with guns; the risk is higher still for adolescents and young
adults."); McClurg, supra note 492, at 1205 (stating that guns in home increases risk of
suicide for adolescents).
503 See Rosenberg et al., supra note 494, at 3030 (suggesting safest approach is removing
all guns from home). See generally Alfred Blumstein & Daniel Cork, Linking Gun
Availabil'ty to Youth Gun Violence, 59 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 5, 5 (Winter 1996)
(stating that increase in availability of guns to young people has led to dramatic rise in
teenage suicide); Joan Nessier, Disclosing Adolescent Suicidal Impulses to Parents:
Protecting the Child of the Confidence 26 IND. L. REV. 433, 447 (1993) (stating that
removing guns from home will increase child's safety and reduce likelihood suicide).
504 See Roth, supra note 413, at 4; see also William Meyerhofer, Statutory Restrictionson
Weapons Possession: Must the Right to Self-Defense Fall Victim?, 1996 ANN. SuRv. AM.
L. 219, 226 (stating most Americans buy guns for protection); William A. Walker, The
Privilege to Keep and Bear Arms: The Second Amendment and Its Interpretation by
Warren Freedman,88 MICH. L. REV. 1409, 1411-12 (1990) (stating that author overlooks
fact people still turn to guns for self-defense).
505 See Kellermann & Reay, supra note 479, at 1557 (suggesting keeping of firearms in
home must be questioned). See generally Sayoko Blodgett-Ford, Do Battered Women
Have a Right to Bear Arms 11 YALE L. & POLY REV. 509, 536 (1993) (weighing
possibility that gun intended for self defense could be turned on gun-owner by assailant).
But see Southwick, Jr., supra note 466, at 236 (stating, conversely, that gun ownership
has risen since 1960 and accidental deaths have steadily declined).
506 Kellermann & Reay, supra note 479, at 1557.
507 See Kellermann & Reay, supra note 479, at 1560. The authors of the study
acknowledge that their research does not account for defensive uses of guns that do not
result in death, for instance, cases in which intruders were injured or frightened away by
the homeowners gun. Id. at 1559. Critics have seized on this fact as a fatal flaw of the
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One researcher, commenting on the study, noted that "the
justifiable use of firearms for self-protection is a rare occurrence
and carries with it much greater associated risks of the death of
someone other than the perpetrator. 5 0 8 The same approximate
result obtains on a nationwide scale. In 1992, there were 308
justifiable firearm homicides in self-defensive compared to 15,377
total firearm homicides. 5 9 Surely, no public policy can be
sustained when the negative consequences occur 50 times more
often than the positive consequences. It should also be noted
that self-defense would be less necessary if guns were less
available to criminals; "[a] heavily armed citizenry might be a
rational response if heavily armed criminals were inevitable; but
far more rational would be a society that strives to disarm all
private citizens, thus obviating the need to use firearms in selfdefense." 510
study, but the number of non-lethal defensive uses of guns are notoriously difficult to
calculate. Estimates range from a low of 80,000 annually (Phillip J. Cook, The Technology
of Personal Violence, 14 CRIME AND JUSTICE: A REVIEW OF RESEARCH 1, 4 (1991)) to a
high of 3.6 million (JOHN R. LOTT, MORE GUNS, LESS CRIME: UNDERSTANDING CRIME AND
GUN CONTROL LAws 11 (1998) (quoting various national surveys including Gallup and
Los Angeles Times)). The debate regarding the deterrent effect of guns has become more
heated since the publication of Professor Lott's article, Crime, Deterrence, and JMght-toCarry ConcealedHandguns.This regression analysis, using data from every county in the
country, concluded that concealed gun laws, by adding to the number of guns in private
hands, reduce the number of murders, rapes, robberies, and aggravated assaults,
although property crimes increase. John R. Lott & David B. Mustard, Crime, Deterrence,
and Right-to-CarryConcealed Handguns,26 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 1 (1997). This study has
been attacked on a number of methodological grounds. See, e.g., Black & Nagin, supra
note 44, at 218-19. Professor Lott has attempted to respond to the critics of the study in
MORE GUNS, LESS CRIME. Unfortunately, a full evaluation of Professor Lott's findings and
the criticisms against them is beyond the scope of this article. As a last resort, one need
only read a local newspaper and compare the number of articles about armed robberies,

shootings, and murders, with stories about self-defense, although when the latter actually
occurs it usually receives generous publicity.
5m Jacobs, supra note 447, at 336; see Kellermann & Reay, supra note 485, at 1560
(questioning wisdom of keeping firearm in home). But see Jason D. Fisher, The "Shoot the
Carijacker"Law under Fire: A Cost-Benefit Analysis of a Controversial Expansion of
Justifiable Homicide, 47 EMORY L.J. 1401, 1431 (1998) (stating that National Crime

Victimization Survey indicates that use of gun in self-defense is rare, but warns that
these results are debatable).
509See Jacobs, supra note 447, at 335-36 (citing number of justifiable firearm homicides
committed in self-defense). See generaly David Hemenway, Survey Research and SelfDefense Gun Use: An Explanation of Extreme Overestimates, 87 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 1430, 1438 (1997) (comparing likelihood one would use their gun in selfdefense with likelihood of making contact with alien); Kellermann & Reay, supra note
479, at 1559 (citing fact that less than 2% of homicides on national scale are considered
legally justifiable).
510 Dixon, supra note 433 at 275. See generallyDarwin Farrar, In Defense of Home Rule:
California'sPreemption of Local FirearmsRegulation, 7 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 51, 52
(1996) (citing link in California between firearms and violent crimes); David A. Saichek,
Violence and the Administration ofJustice, 69 WISC. LAW. 7, 7 (1996) (arguing guns are
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Past experience demonstrates that public policy considerations
are not the exclusive province of legislatures. The judiciary,
including the Supreme Court, has recognized the need to account
for social consequences as a basis of their decisions. In Brown v.
Board of Education,5 11 the Court looked to the psychological
ramifications of segregated schools in ruling that integration was
constitutionally required.5 12 In Casey v. Pennsylvania, 13 the
Court struck down legal requirements that a woman seeking an
abortion must notify their parents or spouse on the ground that
the law subjects the woman to abuse.5 14 Given this precedent,
the judiciary should have no qualm about looking to the
extraordinary social costs of broad gun ownership as a factor in
their Second Amendment rulings. Whatever individual right is
embodied in the Second Amendment, public policy considerations
simply recognize the obvious: individual rights cannot be
exercised to the detriment of the life or liberty of others. In
evaluating the constitutionality of gun laws, courts are faced
with a relatively simple balancing decision. The social costs of
broad gun ownership are unacceptably high while the individual
right to possess a gun is extremely narrow. Courts should have
little difficulty upholding restrictive gun laws when the former so
clearly outweigh the latter.
IV. CONCLUSION

Gun ownership by responsible and law-abiding citizens should
be protected, and can and should rest on sound public policy
grounds. As long as guns exist, law-abiding citizens should be
problem and not solution).
511Brown v. Board of Ed. of Topeka, Shawnee County, Kansas, 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
512 See Brown, 347 U.S. at 494 (arguing feeling of inferiority created by segregation will
negatively affect children). See generally Alan B. Handler, Judging Public Poicy, 31
RUTGERS L.J. 301, 302 (2000) (stating judicial decisions are not made in vacuum); Brock
Rowatt, Comment, The Public Policy Exception to Employment at Will: Can Judicial
Decisions Be Used as a Source of Public Policy?, 62 UMKC L. REV. 325, 335 (1995)
(stating many courts allow judicial decisions to establish public policy).
513Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
514 See Casey, 505 U.S. at 852 (stating women's liberty is at stake and, therefore, her
suffering is too intimate to be state mandated). See generally Robert D. Goldstein,
Reading Casey Structurng the Woman's DecisionmakngProcess, 4 WM. & MARY BILL
RTS. J. 787, 826 (1996) (stating Casey guarantees that woman's choice must be more than
merely formal right); John Christopher Ford, Note, The Casey Standardfor Evaluating
FacialAttacks on Abortion Statutes, 95 MICH. L. REV. 1443, 1463 (1997) (stating Court
weighed data regarding spousal abuse and other sociological studies to reach its decision).
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entitled to possess the means for personal self-defense. However,
the gun lobby does a great disservice to gun owners by basing
their case for gun ownership on dubious and unfounded Second
Amendment grounds rather than on legitimate public policy
grounds.
Every circuit case ever decided in the United States since the
Supreme Court case of Miller upholds the collective rights
interpretation. The U.S. Supreme Court in Miller stated that
"The Second Amendment guarantees no rights to keep and bear a
firearm that does not have some reasonable relationship to the
preservation or efficiency of a well-regulated militia." There are
two possible interpretation of this language. The first is that the
Second Amendment gives every citizen a right to possess a
weapon which might conceivable be used for military purposes.
The problem with this interpretation is twofold: first, it leads to
the remarkable conclusion that citizens have a right to possess
such military weapons as machine-guns; bazookas, and perhaps
even suitcase-sized nuclear weapons, but no right to carry a
weapon such as a Saturday night special, which no branch of the
military has ever issued to its troops. (Even the gun lobby has
never suggested that there is no right under the Second
Amendment to carry small handguns such as Saturday night
specials). The second problem with this interpretation is that
every circuit court since Miller, without exception, has rejected
this interpretation of Miler. Not surprisingly, the American
Civil Liberties Union, has stated their official position that the
Second Amendment states a collective, not an individual right.
This leaves the second interpretation of Miller-namely, that
the Second Amendment protects only the right to members of a
militia to carry weapons needed for carrying out their duties in
the militia. This is the interpretation of every circuit court
decision since Miller. It is true that some members of the gun
lobby purport to claim that since every male U.S. citizen between
the age of 16 and 55 is technically a member of a theoretical,
though non-existent militia (according to an ancient, but never
repealed federal statute), and that all such militia members are
therefore entitled to carry a gun. The problem with this position,
however, is that it excludes males over 55, and all women, and
gun lobby has yet to concede that women have no rights under
the Second Amendment.
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The history of the Second Amendment supports Miller and the
unanimous decisions of the Circuit Courts. There was never a
single mention at the Constitutional convention about an
individual right to bear arms. Rather, many representatives of
the Southern States expressed great concern about a federal
standing army that might supercede the state militias, upon
which the Southern states relied to put down slave insurrections.
It is true that later during the ratification hearings on the Bill of
Rights in Congress, a draft of the Second Amendment was
originally introduced which set forth an individual right to bear
arms (that is, which did not attach a qualifying militia clause to
the clause setting forth the right to bear arms). However, this
version, which would clearly have set forth an individual right to
bear arms was soundly defeated, and anew version, written by
Madison, and which qualified the right to bear arms to its use in
the service of a militia, was subsequently adopted and
incorporated in to the Bill of Rights.
It is, of course, perfectly legitimate for members of the gun
lobby to criticize the Miller decision, as well as the unanimous
circuit court decisions interpreting M7ler, all of which set fort a
collectivist rather than an individual right to bear arms. Even
today, there are many who claim that the Supreme Court was
wrong in its decision in Brown vs. Board of Education that racial
segregation was a violation of equal protection. But it is a far
different matter to claim, or represent to the American public
that existing case law upholds an individual right to bear arms.
It simply is not true. Indeed, it is this very misrepresentation
which led an exasperated ABA to call upon the bar for help in
educating the American public, and the Chief Justice of the
United States to assert that this misrepresentation was the
greatest fraud ever perpetuated on the American people. The
NRA has even gone so far in this misrepresentation to set forth
above its door its quotation of the Second Amendment which
entirely deletes reference to the qualifying militia clause.
But why should it matter that the gun lobby bases its
campaign against responsible gun legislation on the Second
Amendment? It matters because gun owners are due for a severe
shock when the Supreme Court finally is forced to spell out the
existing law. When renegade District Court judge in Texas took
it upon himself to disregard not only the Miller case, but every

2002]

THE INCONVENIENT MILITIA CLA USE

circuit court decision in the land which interpreted Miler as
setting forth a collectivist interpretation of the Second
Amendment. Up to this time, the Supreme Court has had no
reason to grant certiorari in a Second Amendment case, since
every circuit court has followed Miller to the letter, and adopted
the collectivist interpretation. Despite law school chant that
demands of certiorarido not indicate approval of circuit court
case, it is inconceivable that the Supreme Court would have let
fifty years of circuit court decisions to uncorrected if the Court
believed they wee wrong. Now that a District Court judge has
chosen to ignore all these decisions, the Court may be forced to
take the case. This will clearly be bad news for the NRA, which
for years has assiduously avoided getting a Second Amendment
case to the High Court, for fear that an adverse decision would
undercut their publicity and fund-raising campaigns.
Once the Supreme Court is forced to re-affirm the Miller case,
the moral foundation of those who believe that laws should
permit gun ownership may be irremediably undercut. It may
become open season on gun owners, and open the door to extreme
laws limiting gun ownership. This would not be good news for
gun owners. If the gun lobby were to instead base their positions
on sound public policy, this would not occur.
A second tactic of the gun lobby which threatens the right of
gun owners, it to dispute the indisputable statistical studies
showing that countries with strict gun laws have far fewer
handgun deaths than the U.S. Howe can one dispute that the 90
handgun deaths in Japan (which has a cultural history of
violence at least equal to that of the U.S.) Compared to the
20,000 handgun deaths in the U.S. is explained, at least in part,
by Japan's strict gun laws? To dispute such studies only
undermines the gun lobby's credibility and moral authority. Why
not concede that obviously namely that the more guns there are
lying around, the more people will get shot? Why not concede the
many deaths in the U.S., and instead argue that this is a price
we are willing to pay in order to live in a free society in which
everyone should have the right to defend themselves?
It is probably too late in our history to register guns. There are
too many, and the likelihood of widespread compliance is now too
remote. Were it not too late gun licensing would make sense
simply for the reason that a federal gun licensing law which pre-

ST JOHN'SJOURNAL OFLEGAL COMMENTARY

[Vol. 16:41

empted local laws would protect gun owners traveling across
state and local boundaries, from being trapped by various
random local laws forbidding possession of guns.
For all the reasons hypothesized in the Introduction, the
Supreme Court has declined to grant certiorari in a Second
Amendment case. In recent years, this failure to grant cert can
be explained by the unwillingness of the NRA and other gun
lobby groups to appeal lower court cases on Second Amendment
grounds. The case of US. v. Emerson5 15 , however, will yet again
test the Supreme Court's resolve in declining to settle the great
Second Amendment dispute.
Responsible gun legislation, such as President Bush's plan to
require background checks before selling guns would not be legal
under the individual rights interpretation of the Second
Amendment yet another reason why the American people
deserve a straightforward and honest assessment of present state
of the law.
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U.S. v. Emerson, 46 F. Supp. 2d 598 (N.D. Tx. 1999), revd, 270 F.3d 203 (5th Cir.

2001). See generally Roger I. Roots, The Approaching Death of the Collective Right
Theory of the Second Amendment, 39 DUQ. L. REV. 71, 71 (2000) (discussing backlash
that may turn tide on collective right movement as it pertains to Second Amendment);
Gregory Lee Shelton, In Search of the Lost Amendment: ChallengingFederalFirearms
Regulation Through the "StateRight" Interpretationon the Second Amendment, 23 FLA.
ST. U. L. REV. 105, 107-08 (1995) (discussing individual versus collective rights debate
that is discussed in Emerson).

